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A ubiquitous part of everyday communication takes place 
via pictures. For example, people use pictures to show 
what things look like, how things work, or what can be 
dangerous. Some of these pictures are less realistic than 
others: They distort reality by for instance violating what 
the represented reality looks like, or they present a sim-
plified, schematized version of reality. This dissertation 
aims to explore whether such distortions of reality in rep-
resentational pictures influence the way people describe, 
remember, understand, and learn from these pictures.
This dissertation explores the influence of visual re-
alism from various fields of research, including memory, 
language production, route descriptions, educational psy-
chology, and information design. In a series of experimen-
tal studies, in which participants perceive and cognitive-
ly process pictures, effects of visual realism on different 
kinds of processing are explored and described.
Chapter 1 introduces visual realism in pictures, and 
hypothesizes how deviations from visual realism may in-
fluence cognitive processing. Chapter 2 studies effects of 
visual realism on object recognition and memory, and the 
focus is on atypically colored pictures of objects. It is found 
that color atypicality affects object recognition, and con-
secutively atypically colored objects are remembered bet-
ter than typically colored ones under certain circumstanc-
es. Chapter 3 introduces similar atypically colored objects 
in a language production task. Color atypicality is found 
to have large effects on the production of referring ex-
pressions: People mention atypical colors more frequently 
than typical colors when describing objects in visual con-
text. Chapter 4 also concerns language production, but 
now in the context of producing route descriptions from 
maps. Maps are often either visually detailed (i.e., aerial 
photographs) or consist of schematic graphics, and this 
difference in visual realism is found to affect the both form 
and content of route descriptions that people produce. 
Chapter 5 further explores the differences between photo-
graphs and schematic graphics, but now in the context of 
educational design. Secondary school students are found 
to benefit from schematization, but experimental results 
suggest that this benefit is related to schematic pictures 
employing visual emphasis in pictures, rather than the 
leaving out of irrelevant visual detail. Finally, Chapter 6 
presents a case study on visualizing football statistics, and 
it explores effects of visually realistic elements and natural 
metaphors on how people use (and prefer to use) an infor-
mation display. The final chapter, Chapter 7, presents the 
conclusions drawn in this dissertation, identifies connec-
tions between the experiments in Chapters 2 through 6, 
discusses limitations of this dissertation and suggestions 




Taken together, the experiments reported in this disser-
tation present effects of different deviations from visual 
realism, using stimuli diverging in complexity and usage 
context, and situated in multiple fields of study. Visual 
realism is found to have an effect in studies in recogni-
tion, memory, language production, learning and com-
prehension, and information design. All studies in this 
dissertation, reported in Chapters 2 to 6, offer support for 
the hypothesis that deviations from visual realism in rep-
resentational pictures influence how people process these 
pictures. Deviations of visual realism in pictures, either in 
terms of color atypicality or as schematization, are found 
to affect a number of human reactions towards these pic-
tures, and the experiments reported in this dissertation 
suggest that pictures that deviate from visual realism are 
processed differently than realistic counterparts.
Chapter 1
General introduction
Human interaction is an intricate phenomenon that takes 
place not only via words, sounds, prosody, and facial ex-
pressions, but also via pictures (e.g., Tversky, 2000, 2011). 
In fact, using pictures to convey messages is ubiquitous in 
everyday communication. For example, manuals present 
pictures to show how things work or how they should be 
constructed (e.g., “insert plug A into connector B”), traffic 
signs and warnings can communicate where dangers are 
(“take care not to trip when boarding the train”), adver-
tising often revolves around pictures (“see how sleek and 
elegant this new smartphone is”), and the news visualizes 
events by for example plotting statistics in graphs (“the 
national team scored five goals in yesterday’s game, and 
the opposition scored once”).
Pictures serve many functions (e.g., Carney & Levin, 
2002; Pettersson, 1998, 2013; Rieber, 2000; Tversky, 2011). 
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Pictures may have an aesthetic role, intended to elicit 
emotions in the people perceiving them, such as to like a 
new smartphone. Pictures can also be meant to affect be-
havior, by for example showing people where to insert a 
plug, what smartphone to buy, or where they might trip or 
fall if they do not pay attention. Some pictures have a pri-
mary function to visualize informational content, for ex-
ample showing how a sports match played out. The focus 
in this dissertation is on the representational function of 
pictures. Representational pictures are pictures that rep-
resent things in the real world. In other words, they depict, 
as if they are a pictorial variant of descriptions (Carney & 
Levin, 2002; Pettersson, 2013; Tversky, 2001; 2011). 
In depicting things and their features, representational 
pictures in visual communication often distort the reali-
ty they represent (Tversky, 2011): Some pictures are less 
realistic than others. The sign warning us not to trip and 
fall does not show the exact same train that we are exiting, 
for example. In the literature, visual realism is defined in 
terms of likeness: The less realistic a picture is, the fewer 
features of the represented reality are truthfully encom-
passed by the picture (e.g., Dwyer, 1976; Pierroutsakos & 
DeLoache, 2003; Rieber, 2000). In this dissertation, visual 
realism is defined as the degree to which a picture is vis-
ually similar to the reality it represents. Thus, according 
to this definition, color photographs are in principle more 
visually realistic than black and white pictures, which are 
in turn more realistic than schematic line drawings, for ex-
ample. Also, pictures that show objects in strange or un-
likely colors are less realistic than true-color counterparts.
The individual studies in this dissertation deal with dif-
ferent visual characteristics of pictures that affect the de-
gree to which pictures are visually realistic. One concerns 
characteristics of pictures that are incongruent with the 
depicted content in reality. A case in point is the use of 
atypical colors. Another way in which pictures can be less 
visually realistic concerns schematization, where certain 
characteristics of reality are left out of the picture, and 
others are highlighted.
These two ways in which pictures can violate visual re-
alism are illustrated in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1a shows a case 
where the depiction of an apple deviates from how apples 
usually appear in reality (assuming that blue apples do 
not exist). In other words, it is incongruent with the reality 
it represents, as it violates one of the features of what a 
typical apple looks like, namely its color. Color typicality 
is discussed more in depth in Chapters 2 and 3, and for 
example in Naor-Raz, Tarr, & Kersten, 2003; Ostergaard 
and Davidoff, 1985; Price and Humphreys, 1989; Tana-
ka and Presnell, 1999; Tanaka, Weiskopf, and Williams, 
2001; Therriault, Yaxley, and Zwaan, 2009; and Vernon and 
Lloyd-Jones, 2003.
The drawing of an apple in Figure 1.1b also deviates 
from how apples usually appear in reality, but in a different 
FIGURE 1.1 TWO APPLES.
NOTES (A) A PHOTOGRAPHIC PICTURE OF A BLUE APPLE, (B) A SCHEMATIC 
DRAWING OF AN APPLE.
CHapter 1 | General introduCtion  9
of one of the stages in a cycling race. Note how all these 
pictures deviate from reality: Elephants are not pink but 
grey, the map shows an abstract version of the vicinity of 
Tilburg University, the eye anatomy picture does not re-
semble what an actual eye looks like, and cyclists get a 
different view of the climbs and descents than what the 
schematic overview of the stage looks like.
This dissertation asks questions about how such de-
viating pictures function, and how they are processed by 
the people perceiving them. Are they processed differently 
than more congruent or realistic pictures? Are deviating 
pictures in any way beneficial? Would people remember 
such pictures better? Would it affect how people describe 
them? Would it help them to understand a phenomenon 
better if a picture is not realistic? Gaining more insight 
into potential influences of visual realism on processing 
and understanding may be relevant for a variety of scien-
tific disciplines and methodologies, and could be interest-
way than Figure 1.1a. The schematic picture in Figure 1.1b 
leaves out some details of what an apple looks like (such as 
color and texture), as it is a schematic picture of an apple. 
In addition, clear lines and contrasts are used to highlight 
certain characteristics, such as the apple’s outline and 
stem. Schematization of pictures is further discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, and for example in Butcher, 2006; Dw-
yer, 1976; Goldstone and Son, 2005; Scheiter, Gerjets, Huk, 
Imhof, & Kammerer, 2009; Schwartz, 1995; and Tatler and 
Melcher, 2007.
Many of the pictures that we come across in everyday 
(visual) communication are incongruent with reality, or 
present a schematic form of what they represent. The pic-
tures in Figure 1.2 show some (familiar) examples. From 
left to right, it shows a still from the “pink elephants on 
parade” scene in Disney’s Dumbo movie, screen shots from 
mapping software on a mobile device, an expository pic-
ture of the anatomy of the human eye, and an overview 












NOTES (A) PINK ELEPHANTS ON PARADE, (B) MAP VARIATIONS ON A MOBILE DEVICE, (C) ANATOMY OF THE EYE, (D) PROFILE OF A STAGE IN A CYCLING RACE.
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son, & Faísca, 2011; Naor-Raz et al., 2003; Tanaka et al., 
2001). Atypical colors also attract visual attention (Beck-
er, Pashler, & Lubin, 2007), leading to effects of visual 
salience on for example language production (Mitchell, 
2013). Concerning schematic pictures, schematized visu-
alizations are sometimes found to improve learning and 
comprehension, which is explained in terms of schemat-
ic pictures not presenting learners with irrelevant visual 
information (e.g., Dwyer, 1976; Scheiter et al., 2009; but 
also see Imhof, Scheiter, & Gerjets, 2011; Joseph & Dwyer, 
1984). Pictures that deviate from reality can be found to be 
not cognitively ‘natural’ (e.g., Hegarty, 2011), or otherwise 
less alike the assumed ‘cognitive template’ of reality.
Taken together, this leads to the hypothesis that devi-
ations from visual realism influence cognitive processing. 
Recognizing, remembering, describing, and understanding 
deviating pictures may evoke different cognitive processes 
than high-fidelity realistic counterparts would.
In this dissertation, the influence of deviations from 
visual realism, in the form of color atypicality and sche-
matization is explored, adopting a multidisciplinary ap-
proach. In a series of experimental studies, in which par-
ticipants perceive and cognitively process pictures, effects 
of visual realism on different kinds of processing are ex-
plored and described. Chapter 2 covers effects of visual 
realism on how pictures of things are remembered. How 
such pictures are verbally referred to in definite descrip-
tions is investigated in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 looks into a 
specific context in which people verbally describe visuali-
zations: producing route descriptions from maps. Chapter 
5 concerns pictures in an educational context: Textbooks 
and educational applications often use pictures to explain 
certain concepts and processes, and this chapter considers 
effects of realism in these pictures on learning. Chapter 6 
commences from a more applied perspective, and explores 
ing for a range of practical applications, such as advertis-
ing, navigation, educational technology, and information 
design.
Processing and understanding pictures is essential in 
visual communication: For such communication to be 
effective, a visually conveyed message needs to be under-
stood by its receiver, which is a matter of cognitive pro-
cessing in the receiver’s mind (e.g., Hegarty, 2011; Tversky, 
2011). The focus in this dissertation is thus on the cogni-
tive processing and understanding of pictures (rather than 
on their production). Considering common theories on the 
processing of pictures, for example in the areas of visual 
cognition (e.g., Pinker, 1984), object recognition (e.g., 
Biederman, 1987; Tanaka et al., 2001) and naming (Hum-
phreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988), the understanding of 
pictures (e.g., Tversky, 2011), and of pictures in combina-
tion with expository text (e.g., Ainsworth, 2006; Mayer, 
2005), an essential aspect of understanding a picture is the 
consultation or assessment of some sort of mental rep-
resentation of what is depicted by that picture (i.e., prior 
knowledge). Assuming that such mental representations 
are based on prior experiences, viewing and processing 
deviating pictures should yield a certain confrontation or 
conflict between picture and prior knowledge.
Such differential processing may lead to several effects. 
In the literature, deviating pictures are for example found 
to be distinctive in memory (e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 
2012; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986), as pictures that devi-
ate from reality are remembered better than more realistic 
pictures. In addition, deviating pictures of objects are de-
scribed as atypical, since they are not alike the common or 
typical appearance of the object in reality. Atypical colors 
are for example found to slow down recognition of objects 
because color is an intrinsic property of some objects, and 
is used to identify these objects (e.g., Bramão, Reis, Peters-
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backgrounds and discussions for the investigated issues. 
The overview below is merely intended as a brief introduc-
tion into the research questions and main findings of each 
of the chapters. In each chapter, it is indicated on which 
conference paper(s) or journal paper the chapter is based.
This dissertation is structured on the basis of the two 
types of deviations from visual realism described above. 
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate effects of color atypicality, 
from two different perspectives. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on 
schematization, again from different perspectives. Finally, 
Chapter 6 takes a more applied perspective, and focuses on 
using realistic elements in information displays. Both the 
stimuli, and the human reactions towards visual realism, 
get increasingly complex throughout this dissertation, en-
abling the current work to cover a rich array of human re-
actions towards different aspects of visual realism in rep-
resentational pictures.
Chapter 2 studies effects of visual realism on memory. 
The focus is on atypically colored pictures of objects (as 
in Figure 1.1a). In memory research, one research ques-
tion concerns why people generally remember ‘strange’ 
or ‘different’ things better than common things (Hunt & 
Worthen, 2006). This effect has been found for words and 
sentences, as well as for representational pictures. These 
pictures vary in terms of congruity: Strange things are in-
congruent or atypical, as they deviate from reality. How-
ever, why people remember such stimuli better is an area 
of current investigation. The research question that is ad-
dressed is:
Why are incongruent pictures (atypically colored 
objects) remembered better than congruent pictures 
(typically colored objects)?
It has been proposed that one important factor in explain-
ing the effect of atypicality on memory is processing time, 
how using visually realistic elements in an information 
display that depicts statistics of soccer games affects un-
derstanding of and appreciation for the display.
Visual realism is thus studied from various angles. The 
experimental studies in this dissertation are rooted in re-
search into memory, language production, route descrip-
tions, educational psychology, and information design. 
Each field encompasses experimental research in which 
people look at and process visual information, and effects 
of manipulations in this information are expected to be 
observed in the resulting behavior (e.g., Abu-Obeid, 1998; 
Clarke, Elsner, & Rohde, 2013; Dwyer, 1976; Hegarty, 2011; 
Hunt & Worthen, 2006). In other words, the experimental 
stimulus input consists of pictures, and the output of inter-
est lies in several behavioral measures.
As this dissertation aspires to explore visual realism 
by studying it’s influence in different fields of study, each 
field is introduced in the respective chapters of this dis-
sertation. Each chapter presents a theoretical framing that 
introduces visual realism in a particular field. How realism 
plays a role in these chapters will be further explained in 
the Overview below.
overview and research 
questions
Before each Chapter is introduced in this overview, it 
should be noted that all studies in this dissertation (i.e., 
Chapters 2 to 6) are self-contained, in the sense that they 
have either been published in a peer-reviewed journal, 
have been submitted for publication, or are currently un-
der review for such a journal. These individual studies (or 
parts thereof) have also been presented at one or more 
international conferences or workshops. Therefore, the 
chapters themselves provide more in-depth theoretical 
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(e.g., “go left at the shop and then take the first street on 
the right”), they produce verbal descriptions of visual in-
formation (e.g., Taylor & Tversky, 1992). Route maps can 
contain different degrees of visual detail (e.g., MacEachren, 
2004; Timpf, 1999; and see Figure 1.2b), which is illustrat-
ed by mapping software available from for example Goog-
le, Apple, and Microsoft, which enable users to deliberately 
switch between detailed aerial photographs and simplified 
schematic maps. To investigate how visual detail in maps 
affects route descriptions, the research question addressed 
in this chapter is:
Are route descriptions that are based on realistic maps 
(aerial photographs) different from those based on 
schematic maps?
It is found that route descriptions are indeed different 
when people base them on schematic maps, compared to 
when they describe routes from detailed ones. These dif-
ferences are related to both the form and the content of 
route descriptions: Descriptions of photographic maps are 
longer than descriptions of schematic maps, and the type 
of landmarks that are used to indicate where to change di-
rection are different, depending on map type.
Chapter 5 investigates effects of visual detail on learn-
ing and comprehension. For several decades, educational 
psychologists have expressed an interest in the effects of 
visual detail in pictures that accompany written or spoken 
explanations (e.g., Butcher, 2006; Dwyer, 1968; Joseph & 
Dwyer, 1984; Mason, Pluchino, Tonatora, & Araisi, 2013; 
Scheiter et al., 2009). In textbooks and other educational 
materials, representational pictures are often used in com-
bination with text to explain certain concepts, facts, and 
processes to students. Research in educational psychology 
has suggested that schematic line drawings support com-
prehension more effectively than detailed photographs do 
but so far research into this explanation is inconclusive 
(e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 2012). The findings reported in 
Chapter 2 support the processing time account, by show-
ing that atypically colored pictures are processed longer 
than typical ones, and that this is associated with better 
memory for these pictures. These pictures are based on 
stimuli used in object recognition studies (e.g., Naor-Raz 
et al., 2003), depicting everyday objects in atypical colors, 
such as red bananas and yellow lobsters.
Chapter 3 studies verbal descriptions of atypically 
colored pictures. In research on language production, par-
ticularly on the production of referring expressions, the 
general focus is on how visual properties of objects and 
their environment affect the way people uniquely refer to 
these objects in definite descriptions such as “the blue ap-
ple” (e.g., Clarke et al., 2013; Coco & Keller, 2012; Dale & 
Reiter, 1995; Krahmer & Van Deemter, 2012). In Chapter 
3, color atypicality is introduced as a factor in research on 
referring expressions, addressing the following research 
question:
Are incongruent pictures (atypically colored objects) 
described differently than congruent pictures (typically 
colored objects)?
The results of the two language production experiments in 
this chapter show large effects of color typicality on refer-
ring expressions, as atypical colors lead people to mention 
these colors in their descriptions. This is attributed to cog-
nitive salience: Atypical colors attract attention because 
they contrast with stored knowledge, and speakers are in-
clined to mention what is salient.
In Chapter 4, the focus is on how visual realism (here 
operationalized as visual detail, as in Figure 1.1b) in route 
maps may affect route descriptions. When people look at 
a map and describe how to go from one point to another 
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Chapter 5 focuses on underlying processes or principles to 
which the potential advantage of schematic line drawings 
in educational materials can be attributed. It is found that 
the relative effectiveness of schematic pictures is not due 
to reduced visual detail compared to photographs, but due 
to the benefit of added visual emphasis. The findings in 
Chapter 5 support the idea that this visual emphasis helps 
(e.g., Dwyer, 1968; Scheiter et al., 2009). However, it is un-
clear what explains this potential advantage of schematic 
drawings. Hence, the research question addressed in Chap-
ter 5 is:
Why do students learn better from schematic 
pictures (line drawings) than from detailed pictures 
(microscopic photographs)?
TABLE 1.1 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES, CONDITIONS, AND VARIABLES IN THIS DISSERTATION.
FIELD OF RESEARCH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS MEASURE(S)
CHAPTER 2
NAMING AND REMEMBERING TYPICALLY 













USE OF COLOR ADJECTIVES
CHAPTER 4










LEARNING WITH SCHEMATIC, REALISTIC, 
AND HYBRID PICTURES







ACCURACY OF TEXT-PICTURE 
CONNECTIONS
CHAPTER 6
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inferences. Also, the display that does not contain such 
realistic elements, is in several ways preferred by its users.
Chapter 7 summarizes the most important findings and 
conclusions of the foregoing chapters, reflects on overar-
ching findings and themes, and discusses methodological 
implications of the current work. It also presents some 
considerations for practical applications.
In summary, the studies in this dissertation investigate 
various influences of visual realism on various cognitive 
processes. These chapters do so in a tradition and with de-
pendent measures appropriate for the scientific field the 
chapter is situated in. Table 1.1 outlines the fields of re-
search, experimental conditions, and dependent measures 
in each chapter.
Some remarks on differences 
between studies
Each study in this dissertation is situated in a different 
field of psychology and/or communication sciences. This 
means that the scientific literature is to a large degree 
unique for each individual chapter, and that there may be 
some differences in terminology. Most notably, the term 
realism is rarely used in Chapters 2 through 6, because 
each field of research has its own terminology to refer to 
differences in realism. In the Overview above, the terms 
color atypicality and schematization are used to refer to de-
viations from visual realism, which reflects the terminolo-
gy in most chapters.
Additionally, each field of study involves its own tradi-
tions in methodology and statistical tests for experimental 
research. In the chapters that comprise this dissertation, 
it is intended to follow these traditions, conventions, and 
best practices closely. Therefore, each study makes use of 
the techniques that are adequate in each respective field of 
students to identify key parts of the pictures, and make 
meaningful connections between text and pictures.
Chapter 6 presents a more practically applied example 
of visual realism, namely concerning information de-
sign. In the design of information displays, insights from 
perception and cognitive processing research lead to ex-
pectations about how they are best designed to facilitate 
optimal information extraction (e.g., Kessel & Tversky, 
2011; Hegarty, 2011). One way to design such displays is 
to use realistic elements, for example by displaying soccer 
statistics on relevant parts of a soccer field (e.g., number 
of corners in the corners, number of goals in the goals). 
Although using realistic elements in information displays 
has been investigated by information designers for several 
decades (e.g., Bateman et al., 2010; Jansen, 2009; Neurath, 
1974; Smallman & Cook, 2011), considering how visual 
realism in real-world information designs affects finding 
information yields new research questions (Hegarty, 2011). 
The question that is addressed in Chapter 6 is:
Does the use of visually realistic elements affect how 
people interpret and use an information display?
Chapter 6 aims to gain insight into effects of visually 
realistic elements in information displays by investigating 
whether theoretical design principles scale up to complex 
real-world information designs. Two real-world designs 
for summarizing soccer games are compared. Both designs 
were used by the BBC during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and 
form an interesting case for studying the effectiveness of 
visually realistic elements in information design. While 
the realistic elements in one of the displays are theoreti-
cally beneficial for finding and understanding information, 
a large scale evaluation among more than five hundred 
participants shows that this display is actually less effec-
tive in several respects, such as finding data and drawing 
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study, for the type of data that each experimental design 
yields. This dissertation contains quantitative experimen-
tal research in the lab, in classroom settings, and online, 
and it includes response time analyses, accuracy scores, 
verbal protocol analyses, quantified subjective evalua-
tions, and basic eye tracking techniques. The statistical 
analyses deployed range from analysis of variance in be-
tween, within, and mixed designs, F1 and F2 analyses, cor-
relation, linear regression, to (logit) mixed modeling (e.g., 
Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Jaeger, 2008).
This dissertation comprises an extensive and omnifar-
ious overview of influences of visual realism on cognitive 
processing and human communication, and thus takes up 
a multidisciplinary approach. The theoretical, terminolog-
ical, and methodological differences between the studies 
in this dissertation reflect this multidisciplinary approach.
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The bizarreness effect is the effect that stimuli that are distinctive or 
different from stored knowledge are remembered better than common 
stimuli. We combine methodology from object recognition with memory 
tasks to investigate the processing time explanation for this effect, i.e., 
that distinctive stimuli are remembered better because they are more 
deeply processed and thus take more processing time during encoding. 
Participants in our experiment named common and distinctive items 
(typically and atypically colored objects), and memory was tested 
in recognition tasks. Our results replicate the bizarreness effect, as 
recognition scores were higher for atypically colored objects than 
for typical ones. Crucially, analyses of response times in the naming 
task showed that participants need significantly more time to process 
atypically colored objects. Also, longer response latencies in the naming 
task predicted better recognition, such that an increase in processing 
time caused by color atypicality was associated with an increase in 
memorability for atypically colored objects. Our results support the 
processing time hypothesis for the bizarreness effect. However, in 
a follow-up experiment we found that the effect diminishes when the 
recognition task is replaced by free recall. We interpret these findings 
as indicating that processing time during encoding plays a role in the 





and atypically colored 
objects
introduction
A recurring finding in experimental psychology is that 
items that are unusual or distinctive are remembered 
better than common items (e.g., Hunt & Worthen, 2006). 
This distinctiveness effect remains a field of investiga-
tion in current experimental psychology (e.g., McDaniel & 
Bugg, 2008; Michelon, Snyder, Buckner, McAvoy, & Zacks, 
2003). There have been attempts to explain this effect in 
terms of differences in processing during encoding: Bet-
ter memory for distinctive stimuli is associated with more 
attention and thus more processing time during encoding 
(e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 2012; Kline & Groninger, 1991; 
McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). However, research aimed to 
test this explanation has been inconclusive. As we will ar-
this chapter is based on:
Westerbeek, H., Van Amelsvoort, M., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (in 
preparation). Naming and remembering atypically colored objects: 
Support for the processing time account for a bizarreness effect.
An earlier version of this work has been presented in:
Westerbeek, H., Van Amelsvoort, M., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2014). 
Naming and remembering atypically colored objects: Support for 
the processing time account for a secondary distinctiveness effect. 
in Proceedings of the 36th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science 
Society (CogSci), Quebec City, Canada.
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gue below, this could partly be due to the way processing 
time has been operationalized and analyzed in previous 
studies. Also, we argue that the choice of stimuli to ma-
nipulate common and distinctive items could allow for 
alternative explanations. In the current chapter, we ad-
dress these two potential problems, in order to investigate 
whether processing time is an explanatory variable for the 
secondary distinctiveness effect.
The secondary distinctiveness effect is the effect of 
better memory for items that are incongruent with gen-
eral knowledge and expectations based on experiences 
with the real world (e.g., Schmidt, 1985, 1991). A specific 
secondary distinctiveness effect is the bizarreness effect: 
The effect that stimuli that show or describe something 
that is very unlikely are found to be more memorable than 
common stimuli. For example, a sentence like “the dog 
rode the bicycle down the street” (McDaniel & Einstein, 
1986) is found to be remembered better than the non-dis-
tinctive equivalent  “the dog chased the bicycle down the 
street”. In other studies, participants were presented with 
pictures instead of sentences, to exert more control over 
potential effects of reading and comprehension process-
es (e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 2012). Secondary distinctive 
pictures show objects that are unlikely to be found in real-
ity, such as a an office chair with human legs (Michelon et 
al., 2003), or a giraffe with two heads (Gounden & Nicolas, 
2012). Alike the sentences, such pictures are found to be 
more memorable than pictures of common objects. Be-
cause such sentences and pictures can easily be regarded 
as strange, this particular secondary distinctiveness effect 
is called a bizarreness effect (e.g., McDaniel & Bugg, 2008).
The bizarreness effect has been examined using a wide 
variety of research designs and stimulus materials, in or-
der to explore the conditions under which it occurs (e.g., 
Gounden & Nicolas, 2012; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & 
Smith, 1980; Nicolas & Marchal, 1998; O’Brien & Wol-
ford, 1982). For example, both sentences and pictures are 
found to demonstrate the effect. Research designs also 
differentiate between whether memory is implicitly or 
explicitly tested, (Nicolas & Marchal, 1998). Designs also 
differ in how memory is tested (e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 
2012; Graesser et al., 1980). A particularly influential var-
iable is the time span between learning and testing (e.g., 
O’Brien & Wolford, 1982): The bizarreness effect typically 
occurs when there is a sufficient delay of about two weeks 
between encoding and testing (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 
1986; Michelon et al., 2003), which suggests that both 
common and distinctive items are remembered initial-
ly, but distinctive items are remembered longer than the 
common ones.
Explanations for the memory advantage for secondary 
distinctive items have been proposed in terms of differ-
ences in how these items and common ones are encoded 
into memory. Such encoding-based explanations propose 
that secondary distinctive stimuli are encoded differently 
than common ones (e.g., Kline & Groninger, 1991; McDan-
iel, Dornburg, & Guynn, 2005), as the distinctive nature 
of the stimuli attracts attention to what sets these items 
apart from what is considered normal or more common. 
One particularly appealing explanation for the effect that 
has received scholarly attention is the processing time 
hypothesis (e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 2012; Kline & Gro-
ninger, 1991; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). According to 
this account, distinctive items attract more attention than 
common ones during learning, and as a consequence more 
time is spent on the distinctive items. This longer and po-
tentially stronger encoding then leads to superior memory 
for these stimuli.
While the processing time account is very intuitive, 
previous studies have not found consistent evidence to 
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the secondary distinctiveness effect, the images were pre-
sented to participants for either 500, 1000, or 3000 milli-
seconds. An expected interaction between distinctiveness 
and presentation time was not found: The incongruous 
objects were recalled better than the common ones in 
every presentation time condition. These results seem to 
suggest that processing time is not related to the second-
ary distinctiveness effect.
Kline and Groninger (1991) did find an interaction be-
tween presentation time and bizarreness. They presented 
sentences similar to those used by McDaniel and Einstein 
(1986; 1989) for 3, 5, 7, 11, 15, or 20 seconds, and report a 
memory effect for some of these time windows, but only 
when the sentences were relatively complex. However, 
the direction of the effect is unclear, as common sentenc-
es lead to better memory with a presentation time of 11 
seconds, the effect reversed at 15 seconds, and no differ-
ence was found with a 20 second presentation time win-
dow. Therefore, bizarre items were not generally found to 
be processed longer than common items, and thus a con-
clusion that longer processing time for distinctive items 
accounts for the bizarreness effect cannot be based on the 
data.
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss two meth-
odological aspects of these studies that may have obscured 
potential effects of differences in processing time between 
common and distinctive stimuli: the manipulations of 
presentation time and the nature of the stimuli used. We 
argue that, if these methodological aspects are reconsid-
ered, encoding-based explanations for the bizarreness ef-
fect may not need to be discarded.
In the studies discussed above, presentation time was 
manipulated to investigate a potential modulating role of 
processing time on the bizarreness effect. However, pres-
entation time is not necessarily the same as processing 
support this hypothesis. To test whether processing time 
during encoding explains the differences in memory for bi-
zarre items, McDaniel and Einstein (1986) presented sen-
tences describing common or bizarre relations between 
nouns to participants for either 7 or 14 seconds. Through a 
yes/no recognition task, McDaniel and Einstein measured 
memory for these items. They report that more nouns from 
bizarre sentences were recognized correctly than nouns 
from common sentences, but this effect was not modulat-
ed by the different presentation times. The authors report 
that, in a prior task, common sentences were processed in 
approximately 7 seconds. So, they reason, when 7 seconds 
were given to study both common and bizarre sentences, 
participants would not be able to spend the additional pro-
cessing time on the bizarre sentences required to obtain 
an advantage in memory. However, because even at a 7 
second presentation rate the nouns from bizarre sentenc-
es were recognized better than the nouns from common 
sentences, McDaniel and Einstein conclude that the mne-
monic benefits of bizarreness are not related to increased 
processing time for such items.
When presentation time of distinctive and common 
items is manipulated, determining the relevant presenta-
tion time windows is crucial. Where McDaniel and Einstein 
(1986) based their presentation windows for sentences on 
mean processing times in previous research, Gounden 
and Nicolas (2012) reason that this method still yields a 
rather indirect manipulation. Therefore, they used images 
instead of sentences, taking additional processes involved 
in reading, comprehending and imagining the meaning of 
sentences out of the equation. These images were draw-
ings of single objects (e.g., a horse), and incongruous 
versions of these drawings were created by multiplying 
salient features of these objects (e.g., a horse with three 
heads). To observe a potential role of processing time in 
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jects fused into one, such as a key and a snake. Such picto-
rial stimuli however do not always yield minimal pairs in 
distinctiveness research, while the sentences for example 
used by McDaniel and Einstein (1986) and Kline and Gro-
ninger (1991) contain the same amount of words, nouns, 
and adjectives, irrespective of distinctiveness.
One could argue that using non-minimal pairs increases 
processing demands during encoding, as in the case of chi-
meric objects that comprise of (parts of) multiple objects. 
In such cases two objects are recognized, plus their spatial 
relationship with respect to each other. This is reflected by 
Michelon et al.’s finding that these objects elicit activation 
in both the ventral and the dorsal visual pathway. The dor-
sal pathway is often said to be associated with processing 
of spatial relations between objects (e.g., Landau & Jack-
endoff, 1993). So, the increase in overall cortical activity 
for chimeric objects may be explained by both their dis-
tinctiveness and by the fact that they comprise multiple 
objects. This problem also likely persists in other afore-
mentioned studies: The objects with multiplied features of 
Gounden and Nicolas (2012) presented participants with 
more (visual) cues than the common objects. As a result, 
it is not immediately clear whether the memory advantage 
for chimeric or otherwise more complex objects is due to 
more elaborate processing, or to the fact that these stim-
uli were more complex and therefore contained more fea-
tures, so that observers could possibly rely on more cues 
when retrieving them from memory.
We argue that if the methodological issues concerning 
presentation time and the nature of the stimuli used that 
we discussed above are addressed, this warrants a new 
investigation into the processing time account of the bi-
zarreness effect. If we can present people with items that 
are secondary distinctive, and which are processed less 
quickly than common counterparts, we can measure this 
time, and we reason that manipulations of presentation 
time make it difficult to ascribe secondary distinctiveness 
effects to differences in processing time. This is not only 
because presentation time and processing time are not 
necessarily the same, but also because one cannot know 
how quickly common and distinctive items are processed. 
Presentation times in experiments can be too short to ob-
tain the ‘necessary’ encoding time for distinctive items. 
They can also be too long, such that distinctive items that 
are potentially harder to process get sufficient process-
ing time anyway, nullifying a potential modulation of the 
memory effect. Moreover, processing time is likely to vast-
ly differ between different kinds of stimuli.
In contrast, Michelon et al. (2003) investigated an en-
coding-based explanation for the bizarreness effect with-
out manipulating presentation time, using event related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) instead. 
They presented pictorial stimuli to participants, all for 2.8 
seconds. As such, Michelon et al. kept presentation times 
constant throughout their experiment, and measured cor-
tical activity to study whether processing was different for 
common or incongruous pictures. Michelon et al. report 
that the incongruous pictures were remembered better 
than the common ones. Also, their analysis of cortical ac-
tivation supports encoding-based accounts for the effect 
as signal increases were greater for distinctive versus com-
mon stimuli in several cortical areas. So, Michelon et al. 
attribute the memory effect to more elaborate processing, 
and they managed to avoid potential problems with pres-
entation times.
The nature of the stimuli used by Michelon et al. poten-
tially allows for alternative explanations, however. Their 
common pictures showed familiar objects, such as a tea-
pot. Pictures in the incongruous condition were so-called 
chimeric objects, comprising of parts of two different ob-
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Experiments
We want to investigate the processing time hypothesis 
as an explanation for the bizarreness effect, and we take 
an interdisciplinary approach by combining methodology 
from object recognition with procedures from memory re-
search. First, we administer a naming task with pictures of 
typically and atypically colored objects as encoding task, 
so we can measure processing time (i.e., naming latency) 
for common and distinctive items. Consecutively, memory 
is tested in yes/no recognition tests (in Experiment 1) and 
in a free recall task (in Experiment 2). This combination of 
naming and memory tasks allows us to investigate wheth-




In this experiment, participants named typically and atyp-
ically colored everyday objects. They were not instructed 
about the successive memory tests, so our paradigm en-
tails incidental learning (Nicolas & Marchal, 1998). Di-
rectly after naming, a yes/no recognition memory task was 
administered to test whether incidental learning was suc-




Forty undergraduate students (all speakers of Dutch, thir-
ty-two women and eight men, with a median age of 22 
years) participated for course credit. They were not color 
blind, and all gave written consent for recording their 
voice and analyzing their data.
processing time difference and test whether the increased 
processing time of distinctive items predicts better mem-
ory for these items compared to common items. Further-
more, these distinctive items should not contain addition-
al (visual) features compared to common items. The field 
of object recognition provides us with stimuli that meet 
both these criteria.
Studies in object recognition provide evidence that pic-
tures of distinctive objects require more time to be pro-
cessed than common equivalents. It is well established 
that pictures of objects that have an atypical color (for ex-
ample a red banana) are less quickly processed (i.e., recog-
nized and named) than pictures of typically colored objects 
(e.g., Naor-Raz, Tarr, & Kesten, 2003; Tanaka, Weiskopf, & 
Williams, 2001; Therriault, Yaxley, & Zwaan, 2009). For 
example, Therriault et al. (2009) report significantly slow-
er responses for atypically colored objects compared to 
typically colored ones on naming and verification tasks, 
as well as on reading times for sentences where nouns are 
replaced by atypical pictures.
Atypically colored objects are secondary distinctive: 
They are − like bizarre, incongruous, or chimeric objects 
− unusual compared to stored knowledge, which contains 
information about the default color of an object (Bramão, 
Reis, Petersson, & Faísca, 2011; Naor-Raz et al., 2003). For 
example, a picture of a red banana contrasts with stored 
knowledge, which states that bananas are usually yellow. 
Additionally, typically and atypically colored objects are 
minimal pairs: They only differ in terms of one property 
(color) that has a different value. This minimizes poten-
tial confounds introduced by non-minimal pairs. Object 
recognition studies show that processing such atypically 
colored objects takes more time, but we do not yet know 
whether this influences memory. In this chapter, we thus 
combine object recognition with memory tasks.
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The seventy-six objects were equally distributed over 
two lists. In each list of thirty-eight objects, half of the ob-
jects was typically colored, and the other half was atypical. 
We ensured that an object never appeared in more than 
one color within each list. Of both lists, a second version 
was assembled in which color typicality was reversed: Ob-
jects that were typically colored in one version were atyp-
ical in the other and vice versa. This resulted in two ver-
sions of two lists of thirty-eight objects.
The lists were matched for color frequency, whether 
the objects are easily named (nameability), whether the 
typically colored pictures matched mental prototypes 
(prototypicality), how frequent the object’s name is in the 
language (Dutch), the length of the name in syllables, and 
the luminosity (i.e., brightness) of the pictures. We also 
made sure that luminosity was not different for typical and 
atypical objects within each list. Name frequencies were 
assessed using an on-line corpus (Keuleers, Brysbaert, 
& New, 2010). Luminosity was measured using MATLAB 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA).
Nameability and prototypicality of the typically colored 
objects were determined in pretests. Nameability was de-
termined by asking ten participants to name both typically 
and atypically colored objects. Two lists of stimuli were 
created for this pretest such that they named each object 
in only one of the two color conditions. Accuracy rates 
were used to determine whether all objects in our stim-
ulus set would be easily nameable. Whether the typically 
colored pictures matched mental prototypes was meas-
ured by means of an image agreement task (Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart, 1980): Seven different participants first read 
the name of an object (e.g., lion), and were instructed to 
imagine what this object would look like. Consecutively, 
they rated a picture of this object for how much it resem-
bled what they imagined, on a five-point scale. These rat-
Materials
Seventy-six everyday objects were selected on the basis 
of stimuli used in object recognition studies (e.g., Naor-
Raz et al., 2003; Therriault et al., 2009). Because atypi-
cally colored versions were to be created, these were all 
color-diagnostic objects (i.e., objects that have one or a 
few typical colors associated with them). For each object a 
high quality photo was selected and edited, such that the 
object was seen on a plain white background. For the atyp-
ically colored versions, further photo editing was done to 
change the objects’ color. Atypical colors were determined 
by rotating colors across the various objects, such that the 
number of objects in each color (red, blue, yellow, orange, 
green, brown, and pink) was the same in both typicality 
conditions. We did this to control for any effect of particu-
lar colors (hues and luminosities) on naming and recogni-
tion, which may confound our manipulation of typicality. 
Figure 2.1 presents some examples of objects in typical 
and atypical colors, as we used them in the experiment.
FIGURE 2.1 SOME EXAMPLES OF TYPICALLY AND ATYPICALLY COLORED 
OBJECTS, AS USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2.
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delay was 15 days, most participants returned after 14, 15 
or 16 days). After this task, color blindness was assessed 
using the web-based CU Dynamic Colour Vision Test (Bar-
bur, Harlow, & Plant, 1994).
Responses were recorded with a head-mounted mi-
crophone. Stimulus randomization, timing, and voice 
recording were administered using E-Prime (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). Reaction times were meas-
ured by analyzing the audio recordings in Praat (Boersma 
& Weenink, 2012; Kaiser, 2013, p. 144).
Research design and statistical analysis
For the naming task, we compared response times for typi-
cally and atypically colored objects in a within-participants 
design. For the recognition tasks, we compared hits, false 
alarms and corrected recognition scores (Pr) within partici-
pants. Response times and recognition data were analyzed 
using repeated measures ANOVAs, both on by-participants 
means (F1) and on by-item means (F2).
Results and discussion
Naming task
Despite the pretests, five of the seventy-six objects (black-
berry, celery, pickle, red cabbage, sprout) yielded dis-
proportionally high numbers of incorrect responses or 
non-responses, and were excluded (especially the atyp-
ically colored versions of these objects turned out to be 
problematic, as more than seventy percent of participants 
named the objects incorrectly or refrained from naming). 
So, all consecutive analyses are performed on the remain-
ing seventy-one objects. Response times for incorrect re-
sponses and non-responses were discarded, removing 11.1 
percent of the data. An outlier analysis on response times 
for correctly named objects was conducted, in which we 
removed response times that were faster than 500 ms or 
longer than 2500 ms. This outlier procedure resulted in 
ings were used to establish that the pictures of typically 
colored objects were found to be common exemplars (M 
= 4.30, SD = 0.55). None of the participants in the pretests 
were involved in the experiments reported in this chapter.
procedure
The experiment was performed in a dimly lit sound proof 
cabin, in order to minimize distraction. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the stimulus lists. They were 
instructed that they would get to see a number of pictures 
on a computer screen, and that they had to name these 
objects as quickly as possible. The instructions did not re-
veal that memory would be tested after the naming task. 
The objects appeared in a random order, one by one. The 
presentation time for each object was exactly 3000 ms, 
preceded by a fixation cross (800 ms) and followed by a 
blank screen (1000 ms). The first three items were filler 
objects, after which the thirty-eight stimulus objects were 
presented. The order of these stimuli was randomized for 
each participant.
Immediately after the naming task, the participants had 
to perform a second task. They were informed that the pic-
tures from the first task would be shown once again, but 
that new objects would be mixed in. Participants had to 
say as quickly as possible (out loud) whether each object 
was part of the naming task (“yes”) or not (“no”). The new 
objects were the objects from the list that the participant 
did not see in the naming task (so, these were not previ-
ously seen in other colors). The order of the objects was 
randomized for each participant.
The participants were asked to return to the lab about 
two weeks later, but they were not instructed about the 
purpose of this second meeting. All participants returned 
to the lab and performed the yes/no recognition task again. 
Due to practical constraints, the delay between the tasks 
ranged from 11 to 18 days across participants (the median 
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Recognition tasks
As is common practice in analyzing responses for recog-
nition tasks, we corrected for response bias by calculating 
a corrected recognition score or discrimination index Pr 
(for a comprehensive discussion of measurements of rec-
ognition memory, see Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). This 
recognition score corrects the percentage of hits (i.e., the 
participant saying that an object was seen when it actually 
was) for the percentage of false alarms (i.e., the participant 
saying that an object was seen while it actually was not), 
and is calculated as Phit − Pfalse alarm.
Results of the immediate recognition task showed no 
effects of color typicality on hits, false alarms, and on rec-
ognition scores; all p’s > .07. Performance was near perfect 
as hit rates and corrected recognition scores were both 
well above 95 percent. This confirmed that naming objects 
leads to successful encoding.
discarding of 0.4 percent of the response times for cor-
rectly named objects, well within an acceptable range for 
response time data (Ratcliff, 1993).
Analysis of the processing time in the naming task, 
shown in Figure 2.2 (left panel), revealed a main effect of 
color typicality: F1(1, 39) = 95.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = .711; F2(1, 
70) = 66.24, p < .001, ηp
2 = .486. Typically colored objects 
were named significantly faster (M = 1,123 ms, SD = 123 
ms) than atypically colored ones (M = 1,285 ms, SD = 162 
ms). This result replicates previous research in object rec-
ognition (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2001; Therriault et al., 2009), 
and shows that secondary distinctive items are processed 
less quickly than common ones.
FIGURE 2.2 MEAN PROCESSING TIME (IN MILLISECONDS) FOR ATYPICALLY 
AND TYPICALLY COLORED OBJECTS IN THE NAMING TASKS OF EXPERIMENTS 
1 AND 2.
NOTE ERROR BARS ARE +1 STANDARD DEVIATION.








M (SD) M (SD)
HITS 67.5 (16.6) 82.8 (10.2) ***
FALSE ALARMS 20.9 (16.3) 26.4 (15.4) *
RECOGNITION SCORE (PR) 46.7 (16.8) 56.6 (15.3) **
NOTES * P < .05, ** P < .005, *** P < .001. 
THE INDICATED SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS ARE BASED ON F1-ANALYSES.
CHapter 2 | naminG and rememberinG typiCally and atypiCally Colored objeCtS | experiment 1 26
t(70) = 2.08, p = .041; atypically colored objects: β = .35, 
t(70) = 3.10, p = .003). In both conditions, longer processing 
times predicted higher recognition scores (typical: R2 = .06, 
F(1, 70) = 4.32, p = .041; atypical: R2 = .12, F(1, 70) = 9.59, p 
= .003). Finally, the difference in processing time between 
typically and atypically colored objects in the naming task 
was associated with with the difference in memory score 
in delayed recognition, β = .24, t(70) = 2.08, p = .042, as a 
larger effect size in the naming task predicted a larger ef-
fect size in delayed recognition, R2 = .06, F(1, 70) = 4.30, p = 
.042. This shows that for objects for which processing time 
was virtually unaffected by color typicality, no secondary 
distinctiveness effect was found either. Conversely, for ob-
jects for which the color typicality manipulation yielded 
the largest effect on processing time, the memory effect 
was relatively large as well.
To our knowledge, we are the first to report that longer 
processing of atypically colored items is associated with 
better memory for these items, but to assess the robust-
ness of the bizarreness effect found in this experiment 
we attempt to replicate our findings in a follow-up exper-
iment. Because the yes/no recognition paradigm used in 
Experiment 1 is arguably relatively sensitive to the percep-
tual nature of our color typicality manipulation, in Exper-
iment 2 we replaced recognition by free recall. In a free 
recall task, participants do not receive visual input that 
may serve as an extra cue that can be exploited to retrieve 
items from memory. So, by altering the conditions under 
which items are retrieved from memory, we can investigate 
whether our finding that longer processing of atypically 
colored items fully explains their advantage in a memory 
task, or alternatively, whether a different retrieval para-
digm (i.e., without processing of visual input) may mod-
ulate the effect of processing time on memorability. This 
Results of the delayed recognition task are shown in 
Table 2.1. Analyses of hit rates revealed a main effect of 
color typicality, such that there were significantly more 
hits for atypically colored objects: F1(1, 39) = 35.85, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .479; F2(1, 70) = 27.89, p < .001 ηp
2 = .285. A mar-
ginally significant effect in the same direction was found 
for false alarms: F1(1, 39) = 4.27, p = .046, ηp
2 = .099; F2(1, 70) 
= 3.46, p = .067. Importantly, corrected recognition scores 
were higher for atypically colored objects than for typically 
colored ones: F1(1, 39) = 12.16, p = .001, ηp
2 = .238; F2(1, 70) 
= 11.51, p = .001, ηp
2 = .141.
Initial analyses showed that the number of days be-
tween naming and delayed recognition did not affect hits, 
false alarms, and recognition scores; all p’s > .14. Delay 
was, therefore, not included as a factor in the analyses 
above. However, there was an interaction effect between 
delay and color typicality for hits, F(1, 38) = 6.23, p = .017, 
ηp
2 = .141, which suggested that the effect of color typical-
ity increased as a function of the number of days between 
naming and recognition.
These results show that those items that were processed 
longer in the naming task (i.e., the atypically colored ob-
jects) were also remembered better than items that were 
processed more quickly in the naming task (typically color-
ed objects). To further explore this relationship between 
the results of the naming task and those of the recognition 
task, we carried out by-item linear regression analyses with 
naming latency as the predictor and corrected recognition 
scores as the outcome variable. A longer processing time in 
the naming task was associated with a higher recognition 
score in the delayed recognition task, β = .36, t(141) = 4.52, 
p < .001. A longer processing time predicted a higher rec-
ognition score, R2 = .13, F(1, 141) = 20.45, p < .001. Per color 
typicality condition, processing time and recognition score 
were similarly associated (typically colored objects: β = .24, 
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Results and discussion
Naming task
All consecutive analyses are performed on the same sev-
enty-one stimulus objects as in Experiment 1. Response 
times for incorrect responses and non-responses were dis-
carded, removing 9.4 percent of the data. The outlier pro-
cedure, which was identical to Experiment 1, resulted in 
discarding of 1.0 percent of the response times for correct-
ly named objects. Analysis of the processing time in the 
naming task, shown in Figure 2.2 (right panel), revealed a 
main effect of color typicality: F1(1, 38) = 76.67, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .669; F2(1, 70) = 95.92, p < .001, ηp
2 = .578. Typically colored 
objects were named significantly faster (M = 1,078 ms, SD 
= 111 ms) than atypically colored ones (M = 1,255 ms, SD = 
148 ms). These results replicate our findings in Experiment 
1, as well as findings in other object recognition studies.
Free recall tasks
Results of the immediate free recall task showed no effect 
of color typicality on the number of items recalled, as about 
an equal amount of typically colored (M = 6.9 objects, SD 
= 2.1 objects) and atypically colored objects (M = 6.5, SD = 
2.7) were recalled: F1 < 1; F2(1, 70) = 1.33, p =.253. Analyses 
of the number of items recalled in delayed free recall also 
showed no effect of color typicality, as the same amount 
of typically (M = 3.4, SD = 1.7) and atypically colored ob-
jects (M = 3.4, SD = 2.3) were recalled: F’s < 1. Note that the 
number of items recalled in both immediate and delayed 
free recall is arguably rather low, given that the maximum 
number of recalled items was 19 in each of the typicality 
conditions. We also observed that the color of objects was 
hardly ever mentioned in the free recall tasks. Processing 
times for items in the naming task did not reliably predict 
the number of times these items were recalled (p’s > .17).
allows us to explore the robustness of the association be-
tween processing time and memory for distinctive objects.
Experiment 2
Naming onto free recall
method
participants
Thirty-nine undergraduate students (all speakers of Dutch, 
thirty-one women and eight men, with a median age of 21 
years) participated for course credit. As in Experiment 1, 
they were not instructed about the fact that their memory 
would be tested. None of these participants participated in 
Experiment 1 nor any of the pretests, and none were color 
blind. All gave written consent for recording their voice 
and analyzing their data.
Materials, procedure, and statistical analyses
The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 
1, except that instead of yes/no recognition tasks, a free 
recall task was administered. During free recall, the par-
ticipants were asked to list as many items they had seen 
as possible (they were free to mention their colors as well). 
When the participant indicated that he or she could not re-
member any more items, the experimenter prompted once 
more, and in most cases this yielded a few more responses. 
The delay between the recall tasks ranged from 12 to 16 
days across participants (the median delay was 14 days, 
most participants returned after 13, 14 or 15 days). As in 
Experiment 1, color blindness was assessed after this task.
Statistical analyses were identical to Experiment 1, ex-
cept that for the free recall task the number of correctly 
recalled items was used as the dependent measure.
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when its color is typical (e.g., red strawberry), replicating 
results found in object recognition studies (e.g., Therriau-
lt et al., 2009). A recognition task that was administered 
two weeks later produced a bizarreness effect: Atypically 
colored objects were remembered better than typically 
colored ones. We thus found that items that received more 
processing time in encoding are associated with better 
recognition during the delayed memory test. These results 
are taken to support a processing time explanation for the 
bizarreness effect. To our knowledge, we are the first to re-
port a direct association between longer processing times 
in encoding and better retrieval in the memory task.
We focused on the processing time hypothesis, which 
is an encoding-based account for the bizarreness effect: 
Distinctive items are processed longer than common ones 
during encoding, and are therefore more memorable (e.g., 
Gounden & Nicolas, 2012; Kline & Groninger, 1991). So, a 
difference in processing between common and distinctive 
items can be observed during encoding, which is what we 
found in both experiments. Additional explanations, based 
on retrieval processes, have been proposed in the literature 
(e.g., Hunt & Worthen, 2006). Such explanations attrib-
ute an advantage of distinctive items to their bizarreness, 
which can yield cues that are helpful in retrieving items 
from memory (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 1986; McDan-
iel et al., 2005). For example, if distinctive items provide 
more visual features than common items, these extra cues 
can be utilized during retrieval (e.g, Waddill & McDaniel, 
1998). As addressed in the introduction, chimeric objects 
do just that: An office chair with human legs provides at 
least one additional (visual) cue compared to a common 
office chair, and objects with multiplied features also pres-
ent participants with more of such cues. We argued that 
when encoding-based explanations for the bizarreness ef-
fect are studied, such additional cues should be kept under 
In contrast to our findings in Experiment 1, where we 
reported a robust effect of color typicality (secondary dis-
tinctiveness) on delayed yes/no recognition, no such ef-
fect was found in free recall. So, under different retrieval 
conditions, processing time does not reliably predict the 
memorability of secondary distinctive items, compared to 
common items. Specifically, when the retrieval task does 
not involve visual processing, objects that look different 
from stored knowledge (i.e., atypically colored objects) are 
not remembered better than objects that are more proto-
typical (typically colored ones).
General discussion
We investigated the processing time hypothesis of the bi-
zarreness effect in two experiments in which participants 
named typically and atypically colored objects, followed 
by tests of memory for these objects. Atypically color-
ed objects are secondary distinctive: They contrast with 
stored knowledge about everyday normal objects, and 
the bizarreness effect predicts that these objects are re-
membered better than (non-contrasting) typically colored 
objects. Also, typically and atypically colored objects are 
minimal pairs, as atypically colored objects do not pres-
ent people with more (visual) cues than typically colored 
ones. To our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate 
the processing time account for the bizarreness effect by 
measuring (differential) processing times for common and 
distinctive items and correlating those to memory effects, 
instead of through an experimenter-controlled manipula-
tion of presentation time.
In Experiment 1, we combined an object naming task 
with a yes/no recognition memory task. In the naming 
task, we found that when the color of an object is atypical 
(e.g., red banana), the object is recognized less quickly than 
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other. And while we can not rule out that this is due to 
floor effects in the number of items recalled, it suggests 
that some processes that occurred during recognition (Ex-
periment 1), and not during free recall (Experiment 2), 
were crucial for the memory effect. Also, the correlation 
we find between processing time in naming and recogni-
tion score in memory in Experiment 1 is significant but 
not very strong, which leaves variation to be explained, for 
example, by retrieval-based interpretations of the superi-
or memory for secondary distinctive items over common 
items. Future research may be directed at the question 
under which circumstances encoding-based accounts ex-
plain more of the bizarreness effect than retrieval-based 
accounts, and vice versa.
Another direction for future research is related to the 
nature of the bizarreness effect that can be obtained with 
atypically colored stimuli. We changed the color of objects 
to obtain a rather subtle manipulation of secondary dis-
tinctiveness (i.e., with minimal pairs), that did not intro-
duce additional visual features. In the introduction we rea-
soned that more extreme manipulations potentially boost 
retrieval based effects. When, for example, stimuli are 
distinctive because they consist of two objects ‘fused’ into 
one (e.g., Michelon et al., 2003), or because they possess 
multiplied protruding attributes (e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 
2012; Nicolas & Marchal, 1998), such items also have more 
cues to be used during retrieval (e.g., Waddill & McDan-
iel, 1998). Further research may however address the hy-
pothesis that different encoding of distinctive and normal 
stimuli only accounts for secondary distinctiveness effects 
when stimuli that are minimally different from common 
stimuli are used. Only in such a case, during retrieval no 
higher number of cues is available for distinctive stim-
uli. Moreover, the current results suggest that the effect 
of color atypicality on memory may constitute a specific 
control as they may introduce confounds in experimental 
designs. In the current experiments we therefore ensured 
not to add attributes to distinctive stimuli (relative to 
common ones).
Our results do not rule out such additional retrieval 
based explanations of the bizarreness effect. Although 
we focused on processing time, our data may also provide 
evidence for differential processing during retrieval of 
secondary distinctive items compared to common items. 
We explored this by performing additional analyses on re-
sponse times in the yes/no recognition task in Experiment 
1. In the recognition task that was administered immedi-
ately after naming, response times for hits show a similar 
pattern as the response times in naming and in verification 
tasks (Therriault et al., 2009), as typically colored objects 
were recognized more quickly than atypical ones. Howev-
er, in the delayed recognition task administered two weeks 
later, retrieval latencies (response times for hits) were not 
significantly different for typically and atypically color-
ed objects. Although further research is needed, we take 
this interaction between delay and bizarreness to suggest 
that different processes are at play in delayed recognition 
as compared to immediate recognition. A possible expla-
nation is that secondary distinctive items are retrieved 
more quickly than common items in delayed recognition 
(as is reflected in the recognition scores in Table 2.1), and 
that this compensates for any slower object identification 
caused by the atypicality of these items.
We take the present results to indicate that differential 
processing time at encoding is an explanatory variable in 
the bizarreness effect, but this does not preclude effects of 
differences in retrieval. In fact, when the recognition task 
was replaced by free recall (in Experiment 2), our results 
were modulated such that recall of typically and atypically 
colored objects was not significantly different from each 
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When speakers describe objects with atypical properties, do they 
include these properties in their referring expressions, even when that 
is not strictly required for unique referent identification? We predict 
that speakers mention the color of a target object more often when 
the object is atypically colored, compared to when it is typical. Taking 
literature from object recognition and visual attention into account, we 
further hypothesize that this behavior is proportional to the degree to 
which a color is atypical, and whether color is a highly diagnostic feature 
in the referred-to object’s identity. We investigate these expectations in 
two language production experiments, in which participants referred to 
target objects in visual contexts. In Experiment 1, we find a strong effect 
of color typicality: Less typical colors for target objects predict higher 
proportions of referring expressions that include color. In Experiment 2 
we manipulated objects with more complex shapes, for which color is 
less diagnostic, and we find that the color typicality effect is moderated 
by color diagnosticity: It is strongest for high-color-diagnostic objects 
(i.e., objects with a simple shape). These results suggest that the 
production of atypical color attributes results from a contrast with stored 
knowledge, an effect which is stronger when color is more central to 
object identification. Our findings offer evidence for models of reference 
production that incorporate general object knowledge, in order to be 
able to capture these effects of typicality on determining the content of 
referring expressions.
Chapter 3
Describing typically and 
atypically colored objects
introduction
In everyday language use, speakers often refer to objects 
by describing what they see, in such a way that an address-
ee can uniquely identify the intended object (e.g., Arnold, 
2008; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Pe-
chmann, 1989; Van Deemter, Gatt, Van der Sluis, & Pow-
er, 2012a). In Figure 3.1, for example, a speaker can refer 
to the leftmost object by using the definite description 
“the yellow tomato”. In this visual context this referring 
expression accommodates unambiguous identification by 
the addressee, as it describes the target object and rules 
out the other (distractor) objects. Note, however, that a de-
scription like “the tomato” would also suffice as an unam-
biguous description of the leftmost object, as there are no 
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other tomatoes in the context. Then why would a speaker 
mention the tomato’s color anyway?
A reason could be that the color of the yellow tomato in 
Figure 3.1 draws attention, because it contrasts with one 
of the features in a stored representation of tomatoes in 
the speaker’s long-term memory, namely the feature that 
tomatoes are typically red. This makes the color of the to-
mato cognitively salient. Cognitive salience is different 
from physical salience, which is visual salience caused 
by image-level characteristics such as bright colors and 
strong contrasts (we take the terms cognitive and physi-
cal salience from Landragin, 2004). As such, the tomato’s 
color may not be physically different from the color of the 
pineapple, but when cognitively processed the color of 
the tomato is more conspicuous. As speakers are inclined 
to mention object properties that capture their attention 
or the attention of the addressee (e.g., Krahmer & Van 
Deemter, 2012), the yellow tomato’s atypical color prob-
ably causes the speaker to include this in the referring 
expression, even though this property may not be strictly 
necessary for unique identification. If speakers are influ-
enced by atypical colors, that implies that speakers are 
sensitive to contrasts with stored object knowledge when 
they determine the content of a referring expression.
The question of content determination (i.e., which 
properties of an object does a speaker include in a refer-
ring expression?) is often addressed from both a psycho-
linguistic perspective and in the field of Natural Language 
Generation (NLG). Psycholinguistics provides models of 
content determination by human speakers (e.g., Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006), for 
example by addressing the question whether object prop-
erties are mentioned merely because they are salient to 
the speakers themselves, or also because these properties 
may be found useful for the addressee, whose task it is to 
identify the referred-to object (e.g., Arnold, 2008; Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; Horton & Keysar, 1996). NLG models make 
comparable predictions on content determination, as they 
often aim to simulate human referring behavior (e.g., Dale 
& Reiter, 1995; Krahmer & Van Deemter, 2012; Frank & 
Goodman, 2012).
Models of reference, either implicitly or explicitly, de-
scribe at least two (addressee-oriented and speaker-inter-
nal) types of factors that speakers rely on when determin-
ing the content of a referring expression. The first is how 
informative an object property is for addressees: When, 
for example, a property is unique to an object in a context, 
this property is highly informative with respect to the ad-
dressees’ task to identify the target object, as it rules out 
all other objects in the context. As such, informativeness 
can be regarded as a mainly addressee-oriented factor in 
content determination. The other factor, salience, is es-
sentially more speaker-internal: Speakers tend to mention 
object properties that capture their visual attention (e.g., 
Brennan & Clark, 1996; Conklin & McDonald, 1982; Frank 
& Goodman, 2012; Fukumura, Van Gompel, & Pickering, 
2010; Krahmer & Van Deemter, 2012). This is not to say 
FIGURE 3.1 AN EXAMPLE OF A VISUAL CONTEXT, CONTAINING AN ATYPICALLY 
COLORED OBJECT.
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perceived objects, such as the tomato in Figure 3.1, they 
must first recognize and identify this object as being a 
member of the category tomato. Recognizing objects im-
plies assessing a stored representation of an object in 
long-term memory, which in turn yields a phonological 
representation of the object’s name (e.g., Humphreys, Rid-
doch, & Quinlan, 1988). This will then be realized as the 
head noun of the referring expression. Stored knowledge 
of the typical colors of objects plays a role in this process 
of object recognition and naming.
That atypicality affects object recognition follows from 
work in experimental psychology (e.g., Tanaka & Presnell, 
1999; Tanaka, Weiskopf, & Williams, 2001; Therriault, 
Yaxley, & Zwaan, 2009). In several studies, it is shown that 
color plays a role in object recognition through response 
latencies for example, as people are slower to recognize 
and name objects that are atypically colored (e.g., Price 
& Humphreys, 1989; Therriault et al., 2009), or through 
Stroop tasks (Naor-raz, Tarr, & Kersten, 2003). These ef-
fects are caused by the fact that an atypical color cannot 
function as a useful cue for finding the corresponding 
mental representation of the object. Also, atypically color-
ed objects are visually salient and thus likely attract atten-
tion in a scene (e.g., Becker, Pashler, & Lubin, 2007). These 
studies show that for (at least some) objects color is part of 
an object’s representation in stored knowledge, and that 
this is accessed when objects are recognized (see Tanaka 
et al., 2001; and Bramão, Reis, Petersson, & Faísca, 2011a, 
for comprehensive reviews).
Not all objects are strongly tied to one or a few particu-
lar colors. The degree to which a particular object is associ-
ated with a specific color is called color diagnosticity (e.g., 
Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). Objects that can have any color 
are called non-color-diagnostic. The color of these objects 
is not predictable from the object’s category (e.g., Bramão 
that addressees would not benefit from object properties 
that are included in a referring expression based on sali-
ence. Speakers’ decisions with respect to content determi-
nation may reflect addressee-oriented considerations as 
well (we will further elaborate on this in the general dis-
cussion).
While both informativeness for addressees and salience 
for speakers are part of current models of content deter-
mination in reference production, specific extensions may 
be needed to capture the potential effects of atypicality on 
content determination. Without such extensions, mod-
els of reference would not predict that atypical colors are 
more salient to speakers (and addressees), and thus would 
model referring expressions that are identical despite dif-
ferences in color atypicality.
To test how atypicality may affect content determina-
tion, we focus on atypical colors, and study definite de-
scriptions produced by speakers referring to typically and 
atypically colored objects. Our hypotheses are: (1) A high-
er proportion of descriptions will include the color of atyp-
ically colored objects, compared to typically colored ones; 
(2) this proportion is correlated to the degree to which a 
color is atypical for an object; and (3) this proportion is 
higher when shape is less diagnostic for the identity of an 
object. Our null hypothesis would be that speakers base 
content determination on informativeness and physical 
salience, and thus would not be sensitive to differences in 
atypicality of target objects.
Theoretical background
The cognitive processes that underly our predictions for 
effects of color atypicality on reference production are 
rooted in the psychology of object recognition. Object rec-
ognition is an integral part of speaker-internal processes 
in reference production. When speakers refer to visually 
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ject recognition (Bramão et al., 2011a, p. 245; Mapelli & 
Berhmann, 1997; McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & McNorgan 
2005; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Shape diagnosticity is, for 
object recognition, a moderating factor in the degree of 
association between an object and its typical and atypical 
colors: Once viewers have to recognize atypically colored 
objects that have a highly diagnostic shape, we may ex-
pect color to be less crucial in the recognition of the ob-
ject, as the process will be informed more prominently by 
the diagnostic shape. It may be assumed that manipula-
tions of color typicality are more conspicuous for objects 
with a relatively simple shape (e.g., lemons) than for com-
plex-shaped objects (e.g., lobsters).
As color atypicality is important for object recogni-
tion (and more so if objects have a low-diagnostic shape), 
and atypical colors capture visual attention (Becker et al., 
2007; Landragin, 2004), what does that mean when speak-
ers have to produce an adequate referential expression 
for visually present objects? In general, speakers are in-
clined to mention what captures their visual attention in 
referring expressions, which may be useful for addressees 
(e.g., Brennan & Clark, 1996; Conklin & McDonald, 1982; 
Frank & Goodman, 2012; Fukumura et al., 2010; Keysar et 
al., 1998; Krahmer & Van Deemter, 2012). Hence, for phys-
ical salience, the link with content determination is in-
deed well-established. For example, color contrast causes 
speakers to mention color in their object descriptions (e.g., 
Koolen, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2013; Viethen, Goudbeek, 
Krahmer, 2012). But what about cognitive salience, and 
color (a)typicality in particular? We expect that the cog-
nitive salience associated with atypical colors also results 
in color being a highly preferred attribute when speakers 
have to produce adequate referential expressions for atyp-
ically colored objects.
et al., 2011a; Sedivy, 2003), as theys can have many dif-
ferent colors (e.g., cars, pens). Conversely, objects that do 
have one or a few prototypical colors associated with them 
are called color-diagnostic objects (e.g., bananas, carrots), 
because color is diagnostic in determining their identi-
ty, and can be predicted from the object’s category (e.g., 
Bramão et al., 2011a; Bramão, Inácio, Faísca, Reis, & Pe-
tersson, 2011b, Tanaka & Presnell, 1999).
To study effects of atypicality, the focus is on color-di-
agnostic objects, because the color of these objects can 
be more or less like the prototypical color of the catego-
ry the object belongs to. As said, in stored knowledge, the 
mental representation of such objects plausibly contains 
information about what their typical color is (e.g., Naor-
Raz et al., 2003). This information is based on the color of 
objects in the same ontological category: If many exem-
plars of an object have the same color, then this color is 
prototypical of the object’s category (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 
1975). This does not rule out that other colors are possible 
too: Rosch’s (1975) Prototype Theory postulates that one 
object exemplar can simply be a better representative of 
the category than another. So, the exact color used is one 
factor that determines how atypical a color is for an object: 
For example, blue is very atypical for bananas, but green 
not so much.
Within the category of color-diagnostic objects, high-
er and lower color-diagnostic objects can be distinguished 
(e.g., Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). For high color-diagnostic 
objects, color is an important feature in determining their 
identity. Typical examples of such objects are fruits: Of-
ten a fruit’s shape is simple and similar to other fruits (i.e., 
round with only a few protruding parts), which makes color 
more diagnostic in identification (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2001). 
So, when other aspects of objects such as shape are more 
characteristic, color is likely to be less instrumental in ob-
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assistant to move a number of objects on a table into posi-
tions in a grid. Target objects could not be uniquely iden-
tified by mentioning their type only, so participants had to 
include shape, texture, or both in their referring expres-
sions in order to be unambiguous. Crucially, Mitchell et al. 
manipulated whether the shape of the object was atypi-
cal (e.g., a hexagonal mug), or whether the material was 
atypical (e.g., a wooden key), and using neither of those 
properties would result in an ambiguous referring expres-
sion. Thus, for unique identification of the target objects 
the speakers had to decide between mentioning a typical 
property, an atypical one, or both. Speakers turned out to 
prefer the atypical property over the typical one signifi-
cantly more often than the other way around.
So, previous work on reference production in combi-
nation with color diagnosticity and typicality shows that 
speakers to mention atypical properties of objects when 
referring to them. Nonetheless, there are some ways in 
which this work can be extended, with respect to over-
specification, effects of color diagnosticity and typicality 
in object recognition, and the specific use of color adjec-
tives. Firstly, it is yet unclear whether atypicality leads 
speakers to mention an atypical property that is not need-
ed to uniquely identify the target object, but will yield an 
overspecified referring expression instead. In Mitchell et 
al.’s (2013a) task, mentioning the atypical property always 
disambiguated the target object from distractors, and as 
such one can speculate that the preference of speakers for 
the atypical property over the typical one may not only be 
due to the atypicality per se, but also because speakers may 
have found the atypical property somehow more informa-
tive or useful than the typical alternative. Such decisions 
may be different when the atypical property is not needed 
to uniquely identify the object. Secondly, Mitchell et al.’s 
(2013a) data does not provide insight into a potential re-
The idea that stored knowledge of typical colors of 
objects plays a role in content determination gains sup-
port from a production study by Sedivy (2003). Her work 
does not involve atypical colors, but she investigated 
whether speakers mention color in a referring expression 
dependent on the color diagnosticity of the objects they 
describe. Participants gave instructions to a conversation-
al partner to move one of two (typically) colored draw-
ings of objects. In the experimental trials, color was not 
necessary for helping the addressee to disambiguate the 
target object from the other object, so mentioning color 
would yield what is called an overspecified referring ex-
pression (e.g., Koolen, Gatt, Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2011; 
Pechmann, 1989). The target objects (i.e., those that were 
to be moved) were either color-diagnostic (e.g., yellow ba-
nanas), or non-color-diagnostic (e.g., yellow cars). Sedivy 
(2003) observed that for color-diagnostic objects, the pro-
portion of speakers that mentioned the (predictable) color 
of such objects was roughly thirty percent lower than when 
objects were not color-diagnostic. All objects in Sedivy’s 
experiment were typically colored, and it is yet unclear 
whether colors that contrast with stored knowledge will 
also make speakers include color. Sedivy’s (2003) results 
however do suggest that content determination is affected 
by color information in object knowledge, and that speak-
er’s decisions to encode color in a referring expression are 
not taken independently of an object’s type.
Participants in a study by Mitchell, Reiter, and Van 
Deemter (2013a) described objects with atypical materials 
or shapes, where mentioning these properties was neces-
sary for the addressee to uniquely identify the intended 
object. Although not dealing with color, Mitchell et al.’s 
(2013a) study directly suggests that atypical object prop-
erties are preferred over typical ones in content determi-
nation. In their experiment, participants instructed a lab 
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atypically colored objects. The speakers are instructed to 
describe one of the objects in such a way that a conversa-
tional partner can uniquely identify this target object. The 
contexts are constructed as such that color is never nec-
essary for unique identification. As such, we keep the in-
formativeness of color for the addressees’ task to identify 
the intended referent equal across all conditions. So, when 
speakers mention color, this is in a strict sense redundant. 
In Experiment 1, we investigate how the degree of atypi-
cality of a color for the target object (on a continuum, es-
tablished in a pretest) affects the proportion of descrip-
tions including color. We aim to maximize the diagnostic 
value of color by focusing on objects with a low-diagnos-
tic shape (e.g., Bramão et al., 2011a). In Experiment 2, we 
compare typically and atypically colored objects that have 
a shape that is more versus less diagnostic, in order to ad-
dress the second factor that is expected to moderate color 
typicality. So, we investigate whether our findings from the 
first experiment extend to objects for which color itself is 
a less central property, and whether shape diagnosticity 
moderates speaker’s sensitivity to color atypicality in ref-
erence production.
Experiment 1
Referring to objects with 




Forty-three undergraduates (thirty-two women and elev-
en men, with a median age of 21 years, ranging from 18 
to 25) participated for course credit. The participants were 
native speakers of Dutch (the language of the study). All 
lationship between the degree of atypicality of an object 
property and the probability that it is included in a refer-
ring expression. It may be less straightforward to define a 
degree of atypicality for a shape or material given some 
object, but this is possible in the case of color typicality. 
Finally, we argue that it is interesting to look specifical-
ly at color, because color is often found to be one of the 
most salient properties of objects and is realized in refer-
ring expressions more often than any other property (e.g., 
Pechmann, 1989), also in more naturalistic domains (e.g., 
Mitchell, Reiter, & Van Deemter, 2013b).
Experiments
To investigate how effects of color atypicality in object 
recognition may affect content determination in reference 
production, we test whether speakers redundantly include 
color in a referring expression, and whether this is propor-
tional to the degree of (a)typicality of that color for the 
object that is referred to. Following the object recognition 
literature, the degree to which specific objects are associ-
ated with particular colors theoretically depends on two 
factors. One factor is the degree of color atypicality: Some 
colors are more atypical for an object than other colors 
(e.g., blue bananas are more atypical than green ones). 
The other factor is shape diagnosticity: Manipulations of 
color typicality are expected to be more conspicuous for 
low-shape-diagnostic objects (e.g., lemons) than for high-
shape diagnostic ones (e.g., lobsters), because for the latter 
type of objects color may be less crucial in object recogni-
tion. Given the integral role of object recognition in refer-
ence production, the question is how these factors affect 
the production of referring expressions.
In two language production experiments, speakers view 
simple visual contexts composed of multiple typically and 
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sition of the slider was linearly converted to a typicality 
score ranging from 0 to 100, where 100 indicated that the 
color-object combination was judged as most typical (i.e., 
the slider was placed in the rightmost position). For each 
photograph, the typicality score was averaged over partic-
ipants in order to calculate a measure of color typicality.
Materials
Based on the results of the pretest, fourteen objects were 
selected for the experiment. Two objects were rejected be-
cause typicality scores were low for all the colors tested, 
or because many participants had difficulties naming the 
object (see the appendix for details). Furthermore, of each 
object two colors were discarded, such that the final set 
of objects and colors would represent the whole spectrum 
of the typicality ratings continuum obtained in the pretest 
(scores ranging from 2 to 98, from very atypical to very 
typical, plus scores in between). As an illustration: The 
least typical objects were a blue bell pepper and red let-
tuce, among the most typical ones were yellow cheese and 
a red tomato. A yellow apple and a green tomato fell about 
halfway in between the extremes.
The final set of objects was used to construct forty-two 
experimental visual contexts. Figure 3.2 presents three ex-
amples of these contexts. Each context contained six dif-
ferent objects, positioned randomly in a three by two grid. 
The colors of these objects were chosen such that there 
were three different colors in each context, with each color 
appearing on two objects. Also, the typicality score aver-
aged over the six objects in each context was similar for 
all trials (the mean typicality score of each context was be-
tween 40 and 60). One of the objects in each context was 
the target object, which was marked with a black square 
outline. The other five objects were the distractors. The 
target object was always of a unique type in each context, 
so mentioning the target object’s color was never neces-
gave consent to have their voice recorded during the ex-
periment. Their participation was approved by the ethical 
committee of our department.
Materials pretest
A pretest was conducted to determine the degree of atyp-
icality of objects in certain colors. Sixteen high-color-di-
agnostic objects were selected on the basis of stimuli used 
in object recognition studies (e.g., Naor-Raz et al., 2003; 
Therriault et al., 2009). These objects were mainly fruits 
and vegetables, with simple shapes. In terms of geons (cf., 
Biederman, 1987), they were mainly comprised of one or 
two simple geometric components. Such simple objects 
have an uncharacteristic shape, as shape is relatively un-
informative for distinguishing these objects from other 
object categories (Tanaka et al., 2001). This makes color 
more instrumental in object recognition (Bramão et al., 
2011a). For each of the objects a high quality photograph 
was obtained, which was edited such that the object was on 
a plain white background. Further photo editing was done 
to make a red, blue, yellow, green, and orange version of 
each object. This resulted in a set of eighty photos (sixteen 
object types in five colors).
The photos were presented to forty participants in an 
on-line judgment task (twenty-seven women and thirteen 
men, with a median age of 22.5 years, ranging from 19 to 
54; none participated in any of the other experiments and 
pretests in this chapter). To manage the length of this task, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two halves 
of the photo set. For each photo, participants first had to 
type in the name of the object (“what object do you see 
above?”) and the object’s color (“which color has the ob-
ject?”). Then, they answered the question “how character-
istic is this color for this object?” by using a slider control 
ranging from “is not characteristic” to “is characteristic” 
(“niet kenmerkend”, “wel kenmerkend” in Dutch). The po-
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settings and parameters. The algorithm outputs physical 
salience scores for each pixel of an image, which expresses 
the relative salience of that pixel with respect to other pix-
els in the image. In our visual contexts, six areas of interest 
(AOIs) were defined, one for the target object and five for 
the distractor objects. Of each AOI, the mean relative sali-
ence of the pixels was calculated, which expresses how sa-
lient the object in that AOI is compared to the other AOIs 
(i.e., objects) in the context.
Analyses of the mean relative salience as determined by 
the algorithm showed that there was no significant corre-
lation between the degree of physical salience of the tar-
get object in each scene and its color typicality, Pearson 
r(40) = 0.05, p = .721. The atypically colored objects in our 
experiment were physically not more salient than the typ-
ically colored ones (and vice versa). Furthermore, a one-
way analysis of variance with color as the independent and 
sary to disambiguate the target from any of the distractors. 
Crucially, the forty-two target objects differed in their de-
gree of typicality, as established in the pretest.
To ensure that the degree of color typicality of the tar-
get object was not confounded with physical salience, we 
assessed salience by using a computational perceptual sa-
lience estimation algorithm (Erdem & Erdem, 2013). We 
did this because any effect of color atypicality on whether 
speakers mention color in a referring expression should 
not be attributable to the object’s color being more bright, 
contrasting, or otherwise physically salient to the speaker. 
Crucially, the algorithm that we used does not incorpo-
rate any general knowledge about objects and their typical 
colors, as it only measures salience based on physical (im-
age-level) features.
We ran Erdem and Erdem’s (2013) algorithm on our 
forty-two experimental visual contexts, using its standard 
FIGURE 3.2 EXAMPLES OF VISUAL CONTEXTS IN EXPERIMENT 1.
A B C
NOTES (A) CONTEXT WITH A HIGHLY TYPICAL TARGET (RED TOMATO; TYPICALITY SCORE 97), (B) CONTEXT WITH NOT TYPICAL NOR ATYPICAL TARGET (YELLOW APPLE; 
TYPICALITY SCORE 58), (C) CONTEXT WITH WITH AN ATYPICAL TARGET (BLUE PEPPER; TYPICALITY SCORE 2).
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had been aware of the goal of the study. The experiment 
had an average running time of about twenty-five minutes.
Research design and data analysis
For each of the experimental trials, we determined wheth-
er the speakers’ description of the target object resulted in 
unambiguous reference, which mainly implied annotating 
whether respondents used the correct type attribute. Be-
cause the target object was always of a unique type in each 
context, mentioning type was sufficient. We also assessed 
whether the object’s type was named correctly. Using the 
correct type was important, because otherwise we could 
not deduce whether the object’s color was regarded as typ-
ical or atypical. We annotated each description as either 
containing a color adjective, or not.
Whether mentioning color was related to the degree of 
color atypicality of the target object was analyzed using 
logit mixed models (Jaeger, 2008). Initial analyses revealed 
that stimulus order had no effects, so this was left out in 
the following analyses. In our model, color typicality (as 
scores on the pretest) was included as a fixed factor, stand-
ardized to reduce collinearity and to increase compara-
bility with Experiment 2. Participants and target object 
types were included as random factors. The model had a 
maximal random effect structure: Random intercepts and 
random slopes were included for all within-participant 
and within-item factors, to ensure optimal generalizabil-
ity (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Specifically, the 
model contained random intercepts for participants and 
target objects, and a random slope for color typicality at 
the participant level.
Results and discussion
The data of three participants was not analyzed because of 
technical issues with the audio recordings. Of the remain-
ing 1680 descriptions, 1629 descriptions (97 %) were intel-
salience as the dependent variable showed no differences 
in salience for each of the five target colors, F(4, 41) = 1.05, 
p = .397.
In addition to the experimental contexts, we created 
forty-two filler contexts. These consisted of four hard-to-
describe greebles (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997), all purple, so 
that participants were not primed with using color in the 
other trials. One greeble was marked as the target object 
that had to be distinguished from the distractors.
procedure
Participants sat at a table facing the experimenter, with 
a laptop in front of them. The participants were present-
ed with the forty-two trials, one by one, on the laptop’s 
screen. Between each experimental trial, there was a fill-
er trial. Participants described the target objects in such 
a way that the experimenter would be able to uniquely 
identify them in a paper booklet. The instructions empha-
sized that it would not make sense to include location in-
formation in the descriptions, as the addressee would see 
the objects in a different configuration. Participants could 
take as much time as needed to describe the target, and 
their descriptions were recorded with a microphone. The 
addressee (experimenter) never asked the participants for 
clarification, so the data presented here are one-shot ref-
erences.
The procedure commenced with two practice trials: one 
with six non-color-diagnostic objects in different colors, 
and one practice trial with greebles. Once the target was 
identified, this was communicated to the participant, and 
the experimented pressed a button to advance to the next 
trial. The trials were presented in a fixed random order 
(with one filler after each experimental trial). This order 
was reversed for half of the participants, to counterbal-
ance any potential order effects. After completion of the 
experiment, none of the participants indicated that they 
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for objects, such that the object-color combinations span a 
range of atypicality scores. For example, speakers have de-
scribed blue tomatoes (very atypical), green tomatoes (not 
atypical nor typical), and red tomatoes (very typical). How-
ever, target objects in Experiment 1 were predominantly 
simply shaped fruits and vegetables, i.e., objects for which 
color is especially instrumental in their identification (as 
their shape is not very informative about the identity of 
the objects; Bramão et al., 2011a; Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). 
As explained in the theoretical background, the diagnostic 
value of an object’s color in recognition is lower when its 
shape is more diagnostic (Bramão et al., 2011a). Accord-
ingly, would color atypicality be less conspicuous when 
ligible, unambiguous and contained a correct type attrib-
ute, resulting in unique reference. As expected, practically 
all analyzed descriptions were of the form “the tomato” or 
“the yellow tomato”.
Figure 3.3 plots the atypicality score of a target object 
in the pretest against the proportion of descriptions that 
contained color in the production experiment (exact pro-
portions and typicality scores are listed in the appendix). 
The mixed model revealed a significant effect of color typi-
cality on whether a target description contained a color at-
tribute or not (β = −2.36, SE = 0.25, p < .001). The direction 
of the effect indicated that lower typicality in the pretest 
was associated with more referring expressions containing 
color. An additional analysis by means of bivariate corre-
lation between the typicality score of each object and the 
proportion of speakers mentioning color for this object 
reconfirmed that these were significantly related (Pearson 
r(40) = −.86, p < .001).
The results of our experiment warrant the conclusion 
that content determination is affected by the degree of 
typicality of a target object’s color. When a color is more 
atypical for an object, the proportion of referring expres-
sions that include that property increases. This effect is 
very strong, as exemplified by the high correlation be-
tween the two variables. Figure 3.3 also suggests that it is 
highly consistent across speakers: For a considerable num-
ber of typically colored stimuli, the percentage of speakers 
not using color approaches zero, and conversely, for some 
atypically colored stimuli this percentage approaches one 
hundred percent. This supports the theory that speakers 
evaluate contrasts with stored knowledge about typical 
features of objects in long term memory when producing a 
referring expression.
In Experiment 1, we have manipulated the degree of 
atypicality of the target objects by using different colors 
FIGURE 3.3 TYPICALITY SCORES OF OBJECTS (HORIZONTAL AXIS) AND THE 
PROPORTION OF DESCRIPTIONS OF THESE OBJECTS THAT CONTAIN COLOR 
(VERTICAL AXIS) IN EXPERIMENT 1.
NOTE THE DOTS’ COLORS ARE THE OBJECT’S COLORS. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE 
OBJECTS ARE LABELED IN THIS PLOT. THE DOTTED LINE REPRESENTS THE 
CORRELATION BETWEEN THE TWO VARIABLES.
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were native speakers of Dutch (the language of the study). 
None of the participants took part in any of the other ex-
periments and pretests in this chapter. They gave consent 
to have their voice recorded during the experiment. Their 
participation was approved by the ethical committee of 
our department.
Materials
High quality white-background photos of sixteen target 
objects were selected and edited, similar to Experiment 1, 
and supplemented by stimuli used in object recognition 
studies. The typical color of these objects was either red, 
green, yellow, or orange. Even though the saliency algo-
rithm we employed showed no differences in physical sa-
lience between the five target colors used in Experiment 1, 
we decided for Experiment 2 to not use blue objects (which 
were all atypical in Experiment 1), and to equally balance 
color frequencies throughout the experiment. As such, the 
proportions of target objects in each color was kept identi-
cal in all conditions.
Half of the objects were low in shape diagnosticity: 
They had relatively simple shapes, as they were mostly 
round with very few protruding parts, like in Experiment 1. 
The other objects were high in shape diagnosticity, having 
relatively complex shapes, comprising many protruding 
parts and no basic round shape (i.e., comprised of many 
geons). Such objects (e.g., lobster; see the appendix for a 
complete list of objects used) thus have a more charac-
teristic (diagnostic) shape, which sets it apart from other 
object categories.
As in Experiment 1, the target objects were placed in 
visual contexts of six objects. Again, the colors of these 
objects were chosen such that there were three different 
colors in each context, with each color appearing on two 
objects. Three of the objects were typically colored, the 
other three atypically colored. One of the objects in each 
shape is more diagnostic, resulting in a moderation of the 
color atypicality effect on reference production? There-
fore, the goal of Experiment 2 is to investigate the effect 
of color typicality on reference production, as a function of 
objects’ shape diagnosticity.
Experiment 2
Referring to typically and 
atypically colored objects 
with high or low shape 
diagnosticity
In Experiment 2, we cross color typicality with shape di-
agnosticity in a language production task similar to the 
one used in Experiment 1. As such, we aim to extend our 
findings from the first experiment to low-color-diagnos-
tic objects (with more diagnostic shapes). We expect to 
find a similar relationship between color typicality and 
content determination as in Experiment 1, but because 
for low-color-diagnostic objects color is less instrumen-
tal in their identification we predict that higher shape di-
agnosticity overall decreases the proportion of referring 
expressions that include color. Secondly, we predict that 
shape diagnosticity and color typicality interact, such that 
effects of color typicality are larger when shapes are less 
diagnostic compared to when shapes are more diagnostic.
method
participants
Sixty-two undergraduates participated for course credit. 
They participated in dyads, with one participant acting 
as the speaker and the other as addressee. So, there were 
thirty-one speakers (twenty-four women and seven men, 
with a median age of 22 years, ranging from 18 to 25), all 
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The target objects were subjected to an on-line judg-
ment task similar to the pretest in Experiment 1. Sixteen 
participants took part in this task (ten women and six men, 
with a median age of 21 years, ranging from 18 to 26; none 
participated in any of the other experiments and pretests 
in this chapter). As expected, typically colored objects 
yielded a higher typicality score (range 87.50 to 99.75) than 
atypically colored objects range 0.83 to 10.50). There were 
no differences in typicality scores for object with a high 
and a low shape diagnosticity (F < 1), and the two factors 
did not interact (F < 1). The pretest also showed that none 
of the objects were difficult to name.
As in Experiment 1, we used the computational physical 
salience estimation of Erdem and Erdem (2013) to ensure 
that color typicality was not confounded with differences 
in relative physical salience between typical and atypical 
objects, and between objects with high and low shape di-
agnosticity. Analyses of variance of the mean relative sali-
ence of the target objects showed no differences between 
typically colored and atypically colored target objects (F < 
1), nor between objects with high and low shape diagnos-
ticity (F < 1). The two factors did not interact (F < 1). This 
shows that possible (interaction) effects involving shape 
diagnosticity cannot be ascribed to colors being physical-
ly more salient when for example shapes are simple and 
colored areas may appear to be larger.
procedure
Participants took part in pairs. Who was going to act as the 
speaker and who as the addressee was decided by rolling 
a dice. In contrast to Experiment 1, addressees were naive 
participants instead of a confederate, in order to improve 
ecological validity (cf. Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013). Partici-
pants were seated opposite each other at a table, and each 
had their own computer screen. The screens were posi-
tioned in such a way that the face of either participant was 
context was the target object, singled out by a black square 
outline for the speaker. The other five objects were the dis-
tractors. The target object was always of a unique type, so 
that mentioning the target object’s color was never neces-
sary to disambiguate the target from any of the distractors.
Eight contexts contained objects that were low in shape 
diagnosticity, and the other eight contexts contained ob-
jects high in shape diagnosticity. Also, in half of the con-
texts the target object was typically colored, and in the 
other half it was atypically colored. Figure 3.4 presents ex-
amples of the contexts in each of the four resulting condi-
tions: The contexts on the left contain a typically colored 
target object; in the contexts on the right the target has an 
atypical color. The upper contexts comprise of low shape 
diagnostic objects; the lower contexts has high shape di-
agnosticity.
FIGURE 3.4 EXAMPLES OF VISUAL CONTEXTS IN EACH OF THE CONDITIONS IN 
EXPERIMENT 2, IN TWO COLOR TYPICALITY CONDITIONS (HORIZONTAL AXIS) 
AND IN TWO SHAPE DIAGNOSTICITY CONDITIONS (VERTICAL AXIS).
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tic objects (as in Experiment 1). Once the addressee had 
identified a target, this was communicated to the speaker, 
and a button was pressed to advance to the next trial. The 
experiment finished when all trials were described and the 
addressee identified the last target object. The experiment 
had an average running time of about fifteen minutes.
Research design and data analysis
Data annotation was identical to Experiment 1. We ana-
lyzed whether using a color adjective or not was related 
to the degree of color atypicality of the target object using 
logit mixed models (Jaeger, 2008). Initial analyses revealed 
that stimulus list and stimulus order (trial number) had no 
effects, so these factors were left out in the following anal-
yses. In our model, color atypicality and shape diagnostic-
ity were included as fixed binomial factors, standardized 
to reduce collinearity and to increase comparability with 
Experiment 1. Participants and target object types were 
included as random factors. The model had a maximal 
random effect structure: Random intercepts and random 
slopes were included for all within-participant and with-
in-item factors, to ensure optimal generalizability (Barr et 
al., 2013). Specifically, the model contained random inter-
cepts for participants and target objects, random slopes for 
color atypicality and shape diagnosticity at the participant 
level, and a random slope for color atypicality at the target 
object level.
Results and discussion
In total, 496 target descriptions were recorded in the ex-
periment. 472 descriptions (95 %) were intelligible, unam-
biguous and contained a correct type attribute, resulting 
in unique reference. Practically all analyzed descriptions 
were of the same form as those in Experiment 1.
Our model revealed a significant effect of color atyp-
icality on whether a target description contained a color 
not obstructed (ensuring that eye contact was possible), 
while participants could not see each other’s screen.
Each speaker described the target object of the sixteen 
visual contexts, as well as thirty-two filler contexts con-
taining purple greebles. We made two lists containing the 
same critical trials, but with reversed typicality: Target 
objects that were typically colored for one speaker were 
atypically colored for another. As such, color typicality and 
shape diagnosticity were manipulated within participants, 
while ensuring that each target object appeared in only 
one typicality condition for each participant. We did this 
because one could speculate that the overall proportion of 
color adjectives in Experiment 1 might inflate because par-
ticipants used them to express contrasts between objects 
of the same type over trials. The order of the contexts in 
each list was randomized for each participant, but there 
were always two filler trials between experimental ones 
(i.e., one more than in Experiment 1, to further assure that 
that the colorful nature of our stimuli does not boost the 
overall probability that color was mentioned; see Koolen, 
Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2013).
The addressee was presented with the same contexts as 
the speaker, but without any marking of the target object. 
Also, the objects on the addressee’s screen were in a dif-
ferent spatial configuration than on the speaker’s screen, 
in line with the instruction that it would not make sense 
for the speaker to mention location information. In each 
trial, the addressee marked the picture that he or she 
thought the speaker was describing on an answering sheet. 
Although the addressee was instructed that clarifications 
could be asked, there were no such requests during the 
whole experiment, so the data presented here are one-shot 
references.
The procedure commenced with two practice trials with 
greebles, plus one practice trial with non-color-diagnos-
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not a single speaker acted against the general pattern and 
mentioned color more often for typically colored objects 
than for atypically colored ones. However, a mere three 
speakers mentioned color in all atypical trials, and never 
mentioned color in the typical trials. While most speakers 
showed more variation in their response to color atypi-
cality, only these three speakers show what is often called 
deterministic behavior in the literature (e.g., Van Deemter, 
Gatt, Van Gompel, & Krahmer, 2012b).
Experiment 2 shows that the effect of color typicality 
on content determination is moderated by the diagnostic-
ity of an object’s shape. Color is more often mentioned for 
objects with low shape diagnosticity. It is for these objects 
that the color atypicality effect is slightly larger compared 
to objects with higher shape diagnosticity. This further 
supports the idea that object recognition and the status of 
features of objects in long-term memory is closely related 
to reference production.
General discussion
We investigated the role of speakers’ stored knowledge 
about objects when producing referring expression. The 
experiments reported in this chapter show a strong effect 
of color atypicality on the object properties mentioned by 
speakers. Speakers mention the color of atypically color-
ed objects significantly more often than when objects are 
typically colored, and this effect is moderated by the de-
gree of atypicality of the color, and the diagnosticity of the 
object’s shape. These results support the view that stored 
knowledge about referred-to objects influences content 
determination. When a property of an encountered object 
contrasts with this knowledge, the probability that this 
property is included in a referring expression increases 
significantly. This also suggests that because object rec-
attribute or not, β = 3.53, SE = 0.39, p < .001. Of the refer-
ences to atypically colored target objects, 75.3 % contained 
color, compared to 14.3 % for typically colored target ob-
jects. Also, the model showed a significant main effect of 
shape diagnosticity, β = −0.89, SE = 0.35, p = .010. Referenc-
es to objects with a high diagnostic (i.e., complex) shape 
contained color in 38.4 % of the cases, compared to 49.1 % 
for low diagnostic (i.e., simple) shape target objects. Color 
typicality and shape diagnosticity interacted, such that the 
effect of typicality on using color in a referring expres-
sion was larger for low shape diagnostic objects than for 
the high shape diagnostic objects, β = −0.70, SE = 0.32, p = 
.030. Figure 3.5 plots the proportion of referring expres-
sions containing color for each of the four conditions in 
the experiment.
With respect to the effect of color typicality on con-
tent determination, inspection of the data revealed that 
FIGURE 3.5 THE PROPORTION OF REFERRING EXPRESSIONS CONTAINING 
COLOR FOR EACH OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 2.
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other rules or mechanisms to determine the content of a 
referring expression.
The idea that speakers may rely on different content 
determination processes than calculations of informa-
tiveness has been postulated in a number of recent papers 
(e.g., Dale & Viethen, 2009; Van Deemter et al., 2012b; 
Koolen et al., 2013; Viethen et al., 2012; Viethen, Dale, 
& Guhe, 2014). Instead of a careful consideration of the 
properties and salience of all (or a subset of) the objects 
in a visual context, speakers may turn to quicker, simple 
decision rules to make judgments in the content determi-
nation process. Such a decision rule that would fit our data 
would be: “If the contrast between the color of the target 
object and stored knowledge is strong, increase the proba-
bility that it is mentioned”.
Speakers’ reliance on relatively simple decision rules is 
argued to be related to the visual complexity of the con-
texts that they are confronted with. Some researchers hy-
pothesize that speakers may especially rely on the “fast 
and frugal heuristics” in cases where considering all prop-
erties of all objects in a context is cognitively costly (e.g., 
Van Deemter et al., 2012b, p. 179). However, the contexts 
in our experiments are undoubtedly very simple: Speakers 
only have to consider the type of six objects that are pre-
sented in an uncluttered and simple environment, which is 
a task that is arguably well within the speakers information 
processing capacity (e.g., Miller, 1956). Yet speakers seem 
to apply (a variation of) the aforementioned decision rule 
in contexts with an atypically colored target. Such con-
texts are not more complex or visually cluttered than the 
typical ones. So, the decision rule that we propose above 
would not be one that merely applies when the (limited) 
processing capacity of speakers is exceeded, but one that 
is universally available whenever the content of a referring 
expression is determined.
ognition is an integral part of reference production, there 
may be a close relation between findings in object recogni-
tion related to color diagnosticity and typicality on the one 
hand, and effects on reference production on the other.
Combined with the findings of Mitchell et al. (2013a), 
who report similar effects of atypical materials and atypi-
cal shapes on content determination, the current chapter 
forms converging evidence for sizable effects of atypicality 
on the production of referring expressions. Furthermore, 
our results corroborate Sedivy’s (2003) finding that object 
knowledge affects content determination, and that speak-
ers’ decisions to encode color in a referring expression are 
not taken independently of the object’s type. Our research 
also resonates with Viethen et al.’s (2012) findings on how 
the specific color of an object can affect a speaker’s deci-
sion to include this color in a referring expression. While 
Viethen et al. focus on colors that are relatively easy to 
name or not (e.g., blue versus light blue), we report effects 
of specific colors combined with specific object types.
We attribute the effects of color atypicality on content 
determination reported in this chapter to the speakers’ 
visual attention allocation, and cognitive salience in par-
ticular: Because atypical colors attract visual attention 
(e.g., Becker et al, 2007), speakers tend to encode these 
colors in a referring expression (e.g., Krahmer & Van 
Deemter, 2012). In the visual contexts that we used, men-
tioning the type of the object was always sufficient to fully 
disambiguate the target object from all the distractors. The 
speakers’ decision to include color is in that sense redun-
dant (i.e., the referring expressions containing color are 
overspecified; cf. Koolen et al., 2011; Pechmann, 1989). 
Instead of carefully assessing the objects and their prop-
erties in the visual context, and calculating their infor-
mativeness, speakers in our experiments appeared to use 
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(preference order) of certain colors for tomatoes (e.g., red, 
green, orange, yellow, blue), instead of a mere ranking of 
certain attributes (e.g., color, size, orientation).
The model of pragmatic reasoning by Frank and Good-
man (2012) allows salience of objects to be modeled for 
each visual context individually (instead of in a predefined 
preference order). So, in effect, the salience of atypically 
colored objects can be modeled to be different from the 
salience of typically colored ones. However, Frank and 
Goodman (2012) calculate this (prior) salience on the ba-
sis of empirical findings, so behavioral data is needed be-
fore reference production is modeled. And while it is well 
possible to estimate visual salience computationally and 
automatically (e.g., Erdem & Erdem, 2013), such salience 
estimations are not (yet) able to take general knowledge 
into account and thus respond differently to various de-
grees of atypicality.
The challenge is to feed such salience estimations with 
knowledge about what prototypical colors of objects are, 
and how important color is in the identity of these objects. 
Assuming that object types are readily recognized com-
putationally in a visual context (which works quite well 
in controlled environments nowadays, Andreopoulos & 
Tsotsos, 2013), a knowledge base containing prototypical 
object information can be queried at runtime when a re-
ferring expression is generated. This is what Mitchell et al., 
(2013a) and Mitchell (2013) propose in their discussion of 
repercussions of atypicality for REG. However, for color, a 
simpler system without a dedicated knowledge base may 
be effective too. A web search for images (e.g., on Google 
Images) may inform an algorithm about color typicality: 
When the dominant color of the first n image results of 
a web search is computationally determined, the proto-
typical color of an object should be derivable. In fact, we 
expect that this method can even generate the degree of 
Implications for (computational) 
models of reference production
Being able to refer to objects in a human-like manner is 
an important goal for NLG models of reference production 
(REG algorithms), and for the field of NLG (a subfield of 
Artificial Intelligence) in general (Dale & Viethen, 2009; 
Frank & Goodman, 2012; Van Deemter et al., 2012b). Our 
findings pose a new challenge for current REG algorithms. 
In the light of our findings, models can be enhanced by 
incorporating general object knowledge, because without 
access to such information they are unable to distinguish 
between typical and atypical objects when determining the 
content of a referring expression. Moreover, in our data, 
the decision to include color in a referring expression ap-
pears not to be taken independently of the target object’s 
type. For example, speakers decide to mention redness 
when they describe a lemon, but not when they describe a 
tomato. This is something that a model should be able to 
take into consideration.
Popular NLG models predict color use irrespective of 
the typicality and diagnosticity of the target’s color. In 
the Incremental Algorithm (IA; Dale & Reiter, 1995), at-
tributes like color, size, and orientation are included in a 
referring expression on the basis of how informative they 
are, and they are considered one by one (i.e., incremental-
ly). More salient attributes, like color, are considered early, 
because they are highly ranked in a predefined preference 
order (which is typically determined on the basis of empir-
ical data). Type is likely to be included anyway, because it 
is necessary to create a proper noun phrase, and this would 
yield fully distinguishing referring expressions in all con-
ditions in our experiments. The IA would therefore gen-
erate no color adjectives. If the IA was to be able to make 
the decision to mention the color of a yellow tomato, for 
example, and not for a red tomato, it would need a ranking 
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audience design in the literature (e.g., Arnold, 2008; Clark, 
1996; Fukumura & Van Gompel, 2012; Horton & Keysar, 
1996). As suggested in the general introduction, if speakers 
take the addressee’s perspective into account and use their 
own perception as a proxy for the addressees’ (e.g., Gann & 
Barr, 2014; Pickering & Garrod, 2004), they may decide to 
mention the color of an atypically colored object because 
this is salient to the addressees as well.
Although the face-to-face tasks in our experiments do 
not offer conclusive evidence in this discussion, there are 
reasons to believe that overspecified atypical color attrib-
utes are beneficial for addressees. For example, a visual 
world study by Huettig and Altmann (2011; Experiment 
3) suggests that listeners tend to look for objects in typi-
cal colors when this color is not specified for them. When 
listeners hear a word that refers to an object with a pro-
totypical color (even though this color is not mentioned), 
their visual attention shifts towards objects that have this 
particular color. So, listeners likely benefit from color be-
ing included in a referring expression when this color is 
not in line with their expectations about the object they 
search for. Similar suggestions come from work in visual 
search, which gives reasons to assume that listeners who 
are informed about specific details of the target, such as its 
color, find the target more efficiently in real-world scenes 
(e.g., Malcolm & Henderson, 2009, 2010).
The addressed literature is less clear on how the inter-
action with shape diagnosticity that we report in Experi-
ment 2 might translate to effects for addressees. As shape 
diagnosticity moderates effects of color atypicality on 
reference production, one could speculate that a similar 
moderation applies to the addressees’ task of identifying 
the intended target object. The object recognition litera-
ture suggests that color is relatively less instrumental in 
recognition for complex-shaped objects (e.g., Bramão et 
atypicality of a color, much alike the typicality scores that 
we obtained in a pretest for Experiment 1. A comparison 
between the n search results showing one color and the n 
results showing other colors probably yields a good esti-
mation of the degree of atypicality of that particular color.
Our results are also interesting in the light of an ob-
served tendency towards using more naturalistic stimuli in 
behavioral experiments that are aimed at evaluating com-
putational models of reference production (e.g., Clarke, 
Elsner, & Rohde, 2013; Coco & Keller, 2012; Koolen, Hou-
ben, Huntjens, & Krahmer, 2014; Mitchell, 2013; Mitchell 
et al., 2013a, 2013b; Viethen et al., 2012). Color typicali-
ty may be an important difference between artificial and 
more naturalistic stimuli, as studies that employ artificial 
contexts often present speakers with atypically colored 
objects (e.g., green television sets and blue penguins; Koo-
len et al., 2013; Viethen et al., 2014). Our results seem to 
argue against using artificial contexts in reference produc-
tion studies by showing that content determination can be 
steadily affected by atypical colors.
Color atypicality and speaker-
addressee perspectives in reference 
production
In our experiments, speakers produced referring expres-
sions for an addressee who was present in the commu-
nicative setting. Although speakers in our experiments 
presumably mention the color of atypically colored target 
objects because atypical colors are cognitively salient to 
the speakers themselves, this does not necessarily assert 
that mentioning atypical colors more often than typical 
ones is exclusively speaker-internal behavior (e.g., Arnold, 
2008; Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006; Keysar, 
Barr, & Horton, 1998). Speakers’ decisions to include color 
may as well be addressee-oriented and reflect what is called 
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finding these objects in a visual context (i.e., color is par-
ticularly instrumental to find the target in visual search). 
For example, when addressees search for a tomato, redness 
is a more relevant cue compared to when they search for a 
lobster. From this it follows (speculatively) that being in-
formed about the color of the target object being atypical 
is more beneficial for listeners when they search for sim-
ply-shaped objects, compared to when they search for ob-
jects for which shape is more instrumental for identifying 
the target. More research is needed to explore the effects 
of mentioning color on visual search, and interactions with 
color typicality and shape diagnosticity.
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Landmarks are basic ingredients in route descriptions. They often mark 
choice points: locations where travellers choose from different options 
how to continue the route. This study focuses on one of the loose ends in 
the taxonomy of landmarks. In a memory-based production experiment 
in which respondents described routes they had seen on a map, we 
studied the distribution of two types of landmarks at choice points: route-
external and route-internal descriptions (take left “at the barber shop” 
or “at the second intersection”). We systematically varied route length 
and the degree of visual clutter in the map. Cluttered maps resulted in 
a relatively higher proportion of external landmarks, which we explain in 
terms of their relatively higher degree of referential robustness. Internal 
landmarks were preferred as routes were longer and thus required more 
memory load, suggesting that they are more basic or ‘skeletal’ in route 
descriptions.
Chapter 4
Describing routes from 
schematic and realistic 
maps
introduction
Imagine you are walking as a tourist in Manhattan, and a 
stranger stops you to ask for directions to Grand Central 
Station. You do not know your way in Manhattan, but you 
can use navigation software on your smartphone. It pro-
vides a map of the environment and the route from your 
current location to Grand Central. As a result, you can pro-
vide the stranger with a route description like this: “Turn 
right at the library, walk up to the second intersection, turn 
left and you will see the station”.
Note how this description conveys two different ways to 
locate relevant points in the route: One has to turn right at 
the library, and walk up to the second street. In this chap-
ter, we explore this dichotomy in landmarks. Landmarks 
this chapter is based on:
Westerbeek, H., & Maes, A. (2013). Route-external and Route-internal 
Landmarks in Route Descriptions: Effects of Route Length and Map 
Design. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27(3), 297—305.
Earlier versions of this work have been presented in:
Westerbeek, H. & Maes, A. (2011). Referential scope and visual clutter 
in navigation tasks. In Proceedings of Bridging the gap between 
computational, empirical, & theoretical approaches to reference 
(PRE-CogSci), Boston, MA.
Westerbeek, H. & Maes, A. (2013). Twee soorten verwijzingen in 
routebeschrijvingen: Effecten van kaarttype op het gebruik van 
route-interne en route-externe landmarks. In R. Boogaart & H. 
Janssen (Eds.), Studies in Taalbeheersing 4 (pp. 351—361). Assen, 
The Netherlands: Van Gorcum.
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are references that people make to entities in the environ-
ment, in order to locate changes of direction in a route de-
scription. But under which circumstances do people refer 
to buildings like the library, and when do people use ex-
pressions such as “the second intersection”?
Notable in the example is the help of a route map. 
A route map is a map with a route depicted on it, as we 
know from Google Maps for example. It offers an environ-
ment (a map), plus a path to travel (a route) (MacEachren, 
2004). It can be translated into a route description: a se-
ries of verbal instructions to get from one point to another. 
Route descriptions typically take an egocentric frame of 
reference, using the perspective of a traveller who is ‘on 
the road’. This contrasts with survey descriptions, which 
take a bird’s eye perspective and an extrinsic frame of ref-
erence (Brunye & Taylor, 2008; Taylor & Tversky, 1992). 
The backbone of route descriptions consists of procedural 
propositional instructions, which provide information on 
actions to be taken by travellers, in particular actions on 
points were there are different options to continue (e.g., 
“turn left”). In the navigation literature, these points are 
interchangeably called ‘reference points’ (Sadalla, Bur-
roughs, & Staplin, 1980), anchor points (Couclelis, Col-
legde, Gale, & Tobler, 1987), points where orientation 
problems have to be solved (Denis, Pazzaglia, Cornoldi, & 
Bertolo, 1999), terminal joints (Daniel & Denis, 1998), or 
choice points (Allen, 2000). We will use the latter hence-
forth in this study. Apart from actions at choice points, 
route descriptions include more elements which are less 
crucial for navigation (Allen, 2000; Daniel & Denis, 1998; 
Denis et al., 1999), but which may be useful for other goals, 
for example related to what one has to do in between two 
choice points (“walk up the street”) or what the environ-
ment is like (“it is a long and bumpy road”).
Choice points are often identified using landmarks: en-
vironmental features that function as a point of reference. 
“[L]andmarks serve as sub-goals that keep the traveller 
connected to both the point of origin and the destination 
along a specified path of movement” (Allen, 2000, p. 334). 
Landmarks can refer to paths (e.g., streets) and points 
(e.g., intersections or buildings). They can take the syntac-
tic form of a (prepositional) noun phrase (“(at) the second 
intersection”) or a (presentational) sentence (“there is a 
library”). Buildings and other discrete objects along the 
routes are typical landmarks, but any other feature in the 
environment can be used as well, like road intersections 
(Klippel & Winter, 2005), side streets, squares (Denis et al., 
1999) and street names (Tom & Denis, 2004; Tom & Tver-
sky, 2012).
Obviously, landmarks are not exclusively connected 
with choice points, but there is a clear preference for us-
ing landmarks at these crucial points. According to Denis 
et al. (1999) the primary functional role of landmarks is 
to signal places where actions are to be carried out. Al-
len (2000) states that “including a number of direct defi-
nite references in describing choice points is one way to 
achieve referential determinacy” (p. 335). This preference 
is confirmed in behavioral experiments as well. For exam-
ple, Daniel and Denis (2004) asked respondents to describe 
well known routes as concisely as possible, and concluded 
that landmarks at choice points underwent less reduction 
than landmarks placed elsewhere along the route.
proper names versus noun 
landmarks
Distinguishing clear cut functional classes of landmarks 
is difficult. However, one taxonomic dichotomy is clear: 
There are two referential types of landmarks. They can 
come either as (indefinite, definite or demonstrative) 
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“Hospital Street” and “Park Street”. Because these land-
marks were invented and thus not familiar, respondents 
were not able to use the proper names in their genuine 
referential function to directly access a unique referent. 
But the indefinite nouns used by Tom and Denis (a nurs-
ery, a fish shop) offered them meaningful links to generic 
world knowledge. Such noun phrases are therefore proba-
bly more memorable. Earlier work studied the processing 
of proper names (e.g., Kalakoski & Saariluoma, 2001) and 
the role of familiarity (e.g., Lovelace, Hegarty, & Montello, 
1999), but to our knowledge no study carefully controlled 
the interaction between referential type and familiarity of 
landmarks in the production of route descriptions thus far.
In this study, we will not pursue differences in referen-
tial type any further; we will avoid the confounds by focus-
ing exclusively on descriptive NP landmarks used to mark 
choice points in unfamiliar routes. In particular, we will 
investigate the use of two types of descriptive landmarks: 
route-internal and route-external landmarks. We relate 
these to two well known conditions applicable in route de-
scription production tasks: the amount of detail or clutter 
in route maps and the length of the planned route.
Route-internal and route-external 
descriptive landmarks
We focus on two types of landmarks in route descriptions: 
route-internal and route-external landmarks. Route-inter-
nal landmarks make reference to parts of the path to travel 
itself (e.g., “take the second street on the left”). Route-ex-
ternal landmarks describe elements in the environment 
which are positioned along that path (e.g., “take left at 
the library”). This distinction is slightly different from 
the distinction between two-dimensional (e.g., streets 
and squares) and three-dimensional landmarks (church-
es, monuments) proposed in Denis et al. (1999, p. 153). 
descriptive noun phrases (NPs), or as proper names. De-
scriptive NPs refer by offering descriptive properties of 
entities (e.g., “a prestigious avenue in the city centre”, “the 
white marble mausoleum”), while proper names refer ‘by 
acquaintance’ (e.g., “Champs Élysées”, “Taj Mahal”; Don-
nellan, 1970; Russell, 1911; Strawson, 1959). In previous 
research into landmarks in route descriptions, the referen-
tial type of landmarks is acknowledged but also confound-
ed with other landmark characteristics. In a comprehen-
sion study, Tom and Denis (2004) presented respondents 
with route instructions including either street names or 
landmarks. Street names were proper names (e.g., Hospital 
Street), landmarks were indefinite descriptive nouns (e.g., 
a hospital). Congruent with frequency distributions they 
found in earlier work (Tom & Denis, 2003), they concluded 
that (descriptive) landmarks were better remembered than 
(proper) street names. Recently, Tom and Tversky (2012) 
gave a convincing explanation for this result: The differ-
ence in vividness between the descriptive nouns and the 
proper names used explained a difference in memory for 
the two types of landmarks. In a replication they showed 
that when streets and landmarks are equally vivid (“a very 
bumpy and stony dirt road”, “an office building with small 
companies”) they are remembered equally well.
Another explanation for the memory difference, how-
ever, may be related to the difference in referential type 
(which was left out in Tom and Tversky’s replication). As 
Strawson (1959) stated “it is no good using a name for a 
particular unless one knows who or what is referred to 
by the use of the name” (p. 20). This suggests that proper 
names are especially useful when landmarks are familiar, 
and thus, when they can immediately be connected to one 
unique referent, i.e., a single unique semantic node (Cohen 
& Burke, 1993; Izaute, 1999). Tom and Denis (2004) pre-
sented their respondents with fictitious proper names like 
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be constructed at any choice point in a route, whereas (ob-
vious) external landmarks may not be available at each of 
these points. But what happens when availability is not an 
issue, for example when for each choice point an internal 
and external landmark is available? Then we may expect 
user preferences to be based on referential differences be-
tween the two types.
Internal and external landmarks are referentially differ-
ent in a number of respects. First, taken all together, inter-
nal landmarks are referred to using a limited number of 
nouns related to the semantic domain of routes and envi-
ronments (“street”, “lane”, “crossing”, etc.). As most envi-
ronments contain many streets and crossings, these nouns 
can be used to identify many referents, which creates po-
tential ambiguity on the level of the descriptive content of 
the nouns. Conversely, the set of nouns for external land-
marks is virtually unlimited, and covers a large range of 
semantic domains, enabling the activation of many unique 
and memorable anchor points (see for a useful comparison 
the difference between ‘where’ and ‘what’ referents in Lan-
dau & Jackendoff, 1993).
People often add numerical locative attributes (“the 
second/next street”), in order to avoid ambiguity and es-
tablish uniqueness. On the one hand, this underscores the 
basic function of landmarks as part of the path to travel 
itself (Denis et al., 1999), on the other hand, it also makes 
them dependent on the location and perspective of the 
traveller only, which may make them less reliable, for ex-
ample in the case of disorientation.
These differences create an interesting referential 
choice in situations in which the two types of landmarks 
are equally available (and equally unfamiliar). Speakers 
can refer to choice points by directly tapping in the route 
itself and taking the route perspective by opting for in-
ternal landmarks, and/or they can include additional se-
Although route-internal landmarks are mostly two-di-
mensional, horizontally extended entities that one can 
walk on, and route-external ones are three-dimensional, 
there are exceptions. Three-dimensional landmarks can be 
route-internal (e.g., bridges), and two-dimensional land-
marks can be external (e.g., ground level parking lots, but 
also for example notable side streets, that are not intrin-
sic part of the planned route). The proposed distinction 
also slightly differs from the distinction between path and 
point landmarks. Internal landmarks typically refer to con-
tinuous path entities (streets, lanes, roads, passages) which 
are schematized in maps as (intersecting) lines, whereas 
external landmarks typically refer to discrete point enti-
ties along the route (hotels, churches, distinctive hous-
es, statues), depicted in maps as circles, points or blobs 
(Tversky, 2002). However, path and point landmarks do 
not completely coincide with route-internal and external 
landmarks: Traffic lights are notable route-internal point 
landmarks; and some route-external landmarks like for-
ests and meadows are regions rather than discrete points. 
However, as we focus on landmarks at choice points, the 
difference between path and point entities is less relevant. 
Both path and point entities (e.g., the second street, the li-
brary) are used to locate a specific point in the route where 
the navigator has to take action.
External and internal landmarks can both be used to 
successfully identify choice points in route descriptions. In 
Denis et al.’s (1999) analysis, over sixty percent of the land-
marks used were two-dimensional and mostly route-inter-
nal. This may be surprising, as many other studies associate 
landmarks primarily with external discrete three-dimen-
sional entities (see for example the terms landmarks and 
streets in Tom & Denis, 2003, 2004; Tom & Tversky, 2012). 
One reason for the high proportion of internal landmarks 
in Denis et al.’s study may be that internal landmarks can 
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NOTES (A) SHORT ROUTE ON A SCHEMATIC MAP, (B) SHORT ROUTE ON A CLUTTERED MAP,  (C) LONG ROUTE ON A SCHEMATIC MAP, (D) LONG ROUTE ON A CLUTTERED MAP.
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depictions facilitate the processing of implied motion bet-
ter than photorealistic depictions. Visual clutter also af-
fects language production. Coco and Keller (2009) present-
ed participants with more or less cluttered photographs 
of scenes and concluded that cluttered scenes tended to 
result in the production of more complex constructions. In 
a follow-up experiment Coco and Keller (2010) also found 
more complex eye tracking patterns.
How can we expect visual clutter to affect the use of in-
ternal and external landmarks? Cluttered (photographic) 
maps provide a larger amount of environmental details. 
This diminishes the relative saliency of the route, and may 
hence promote the use of environmental features as land-
marks. Also, the higher visual memory load associated with 
visual clutter may increase the feeling of disorientation on 
the part of speaker and hearer. This in turn may discourage 
landmarks that make use of ambiguous concepts and that 
depend on the route perspective, and it may promote land-
marks based on concepts with a higher chance of unique-
ness within the scope of the map instead.
An interesting question concerning internal and exter-
nal landmarks is which of the two types is considered to 
be the most basic or skeletal. To address this question, we 
systematically varied the memory load of the description 
task by designing short and long routes for the respond-
ents to remember and describe. We expected respondents 
to gradually keep descriptions more minimal and skeletal 
as the memory load increased. What we wanted to know 
is which of the two types of landmarks was considered to 
be the most basic or skeletal. On the one hand, external 
landmarks are considered the most genuine and real land-
marks, as we noted above, which may result in more ex-
ternal landmarks in tasks eliciting a higher memory load. 
On the other hand, short-term memory is limited (Miller, 
1956), so respondents may well skip external landmarks 
mantic and environmental knowledge via the use external 
landmarks. In our study, we construct fictitious navigation 
situations and test the use of the two landmarks against 
two variables: the amount of visual detail in the maps, and 
the length of the planned route.
For the visual detail variable, we started from two map 
view types well-known from Google Maps and the like: 
map and satellite view, which represent two successive 
stadia in the development of more realistic displays. Based 
on Google’s examples, we created two types of maps: sche-
matic and cluttered maps (see Figure 4.1). These two map 
types differ on a number of dimensions which we expected 
to make the job of producing adequate route descriptions 
more or less difficult. Visual clutter is defined as the com-
bination of the physical characteristics of feature conges-
tion, dense edges, and low entropy (Donderi, 2006; Rosen-
holtz, Li, & Nakano, 2007). Also, the cluttered version adds 
depth and visual detail to the map. These additions offer 
viewers a sort of three-dimensional photorealistic visual 
experience. Smallman and Cook (2011) convincingly ex-
plain that these two variables impair performance as they 
add misplaced faith in realistic visual displays, but do not 
fit the physics with which our brain tries to understand the 
world.
Cluttered maps offer a more realistic experience than 
schematic ones, but irrelevant details are often consid-
ered disturbing (e.g., Agrawala & Stolte, 2001). Navigation 
studies offer very little support for the beneficial effect of 
visual richness. For example, Devlin and Bernstein (1997) 
varied color and detail, but did not find a difference in effi-
ciency when people searched for locations on these maps. 
Other studies, not focussing on navigation, show that 
visual clutter results in higher visual short-term memory 
load (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Rosenholtz et al., 2007). 
Conversely, Holmes and Wolff (2010) show that schematic 
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ered six blocks (long routes). In the routes, each intersec-
tion following a block was considered a choice point, as 
it resulted in a choice for the navigator (going left, right, 
straight, or reach the end point). Short routes had three 
choice points, at the end of each block, long routes had 
six. All routes had the same starting point, located in the 
middle of the map. On every choice point that was present 
in at least one of the routes, a labeled icon was added indi-
cating an external landmark. The icons were identical (red, 
representing a house), their white caption labels differed. 
Each map showed the same fifteen route-external land-
marks on the same location of the map, so that any po-
tential influence of the nature of the landmarks was kept 
constant in all the experimental conditions. The starting 
point of the routes was a green circle with the word “start” 
in it, pointing in the direction of the route. The route itself 
was depicted as a thick red, dashed line. The end point of 
the routes was designated by a purple circle with a black 
and white checkered flag pattern. Together, the 24 routes 
represented all configurations possible in a four-block 
area. The routes were set out on the maps in such a way 
that long routes did not contain parts that also appeared 
as short routes throughout the experiment. The cluttered 
map versions were photorealistic real-world examples tak-
en from Google Maps, slightly modified to remove obvious 
landmarks (using Adobe Photoshop). The schematic ver-
sions were made by tracing the satellite pictures in Ado-
be Illustrator. The maps, 700 by 700 pixel uncompressed 
colored bitmaps, were presented on a 22 inch, 60 Hertz, 
32-bit color Dell LCD screen, at a resolution of 1680 by 
1050 pixels. The maps measured about 20 by 20 centime-
ters on the screen. We checked the data compression rate 
of the two map types, by converting them to compressed 
jpeg-files. Since cluttered maps contain more visual infor-
mation, their compression rate is lower (e.g., Rosenholtz 
(and their extensive and diverse semantic domains), and 
stick to the route itself instead and the restricted vocabu-




Forty-two Dutch-speaking Tilburg University undergrad-
uate students in communication sciences participated 
for course credit. They were randomly assigned to one 
of the two map conditions (cluttered or schematic). Men 
and women were almost evenly distributed in both con-
ditions (cluttered: 18 women and 3 men; schematic: 17 
women and 4 men). The median age of the participants 
was 22 years, ranging from 18 to 35. They were unaware 
of the conditions in the experiment. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No formal training 
in geography or cartography was part of their study curric-
ulum. The experiment was conducted in accordance with 
the ethical guidelines of our faculty, and all participants 
gave their consent to the use of their data.
The data of three additional participants was not ana-
lyzed (two because of technical problems, one participant 
did not follow the instructions and did not produce route 
descriptions).
Design and materials
We constructed twenty-four routes in two versions. Each 
route was set out on the same map, derived from a section 
of Upper East Side Manhattan (New York City, NY, USA), 
represented under an angle of about 30 degrees from true 
north, so that no road ran truly vertically or horizontal-
ly on the map. Eight routes covered three blocks on the 
map (short routes, as in Figure 4.1), the other sixteen cov-
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ed 6 to 7 seconds study time before starting their route 
description. Speech was recorded with the microphone. 
Stimulus presentation time and audio recordings of the 
responses were controlled and registered using E-prime 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). The order of 
the routes within a set was randomized for each partici-
pant, mixing short and long routes, while controlling that 
the first part of each route did not coincide with that of the 
previous one.
After completing all trials, the participants filled out a 
pen and paper questionnaire with eight semantic differen-
tial scales on perceived difficulty of the task they had just 
completed. These questions were taken from the NASA 
Task Load Index (Hart & Staveland, 1988). We added three 
five-point semantic differentials on aesthetic apprecia-
tion, clarity and complexity of the maps (beautiful−ugly, 
messy−clear, simple−complex). The participants took ap-




Of each choice point in the route descriptions, the usage of 
route-external and route-internal landmarks was flagged. 
This resulted in two values for each choice point: presence 
of an external landmark (present or absent) and presence 
of an internal landmark (present or absent). Note that not 
all route descriptions contained all choice points that were 
present in their corresponding maps, as description errors 
occurred.
We then coded each choice point description on a 
three-point scale. When only an external landmark was 
mentioned (e.g., “turn left at the bank”), the code −1 was 
assigned. For choice points localized with an internal 
landmark only (e.g., “take the second on your right”), we 
et al., 2007). The compression rate of cluttered maps was 
significantly lower than that of the the schematic maps (89 
% vs. 95 % of the uncompressed bitmap originals, t(7) = 
2782.60, p < .001).
procedure
The experiments took place in a sound proof and dimly 
lit cabin. The participants sat behind a desktop computer 
equipped with a table-top microphone. They pressed the 
space bar on the keyboard to bring up the instructions on 
the computer screen. In these instructions, the participants 
read that they would get to see route maps for six seconds 
and that they had to produce a spoken description of the 
route they had just seen directly after the map disappeared 
from the screen. There was no information about any po-
tential addressee in the instructions, nor were the partic-
ipants informed about the distinction between short and 
long routes, the map conditions, the location (New York 
City) and different types of landmarks. After the instruc-
tions, a practice trial consisting of two medium-length 
maps started, during which questions could be asked to the 
experimenter. Then the participants were left alone in the 
cabin to perform the actual task. Each of the twenty-four 
map trials started with the display of a fixation cross for 
50 milliseconds, located at the screen where the starting 
point of the map would appear. Next, a map was presented 
for 6500 milliseconds. Then the screen turned black, indi-
cating that the participants could describe the route they 
had just seen. After they had described the route, partic-
ipants pressed the space bar to start the next trial, until 
they completed all twenty-four trials. 
The presentation time (respondents were told that maps 
would be shown for 6 seconds, maps were actually present-
ed a bit longer, 6.5 seconds) was based on a small-scale 
pretest designed to determine average first pass map study 
time. It turned out that respondents in the pretest need-
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of correct pattern descriptions for each route in each map 
condition.
Descriptive efficiency
Each route description consists of a number of proposi-
tions, most of them instructional units as defined by Barshi 
and Healy (2002). A distinction can be made between cru-
cial instructions (actions at choice points) and non-crucial 
instructions (actions between choice points). As explained 
above, people tend to include non-crucial instructions in 
natural route descriptions (e.g., Denis et al., 1999). Typi-
cal non-crucial instructions in our experiment are “keep 
walking” and “go straight ahead”. It should be noted that 
the Dutch word for going straight ahead (“ga rechtdoor”) 
is ambiguous, as it can either mean that one has to keep 
on walking ahead, or that one has to go straight at a street 
crossing. However, with the original maps in hand these 
expressions could be disambiguated.
The relatively low importance of between choice point 
instructions like “keep walking” and “go straight ahead” 
was confirmed in a small scale evaluation experiment, 
in which 20 respondents rated the relevance of these el-
ements on a ten-point scale as compared to instructions 
at choice points (Mat = 9.72; Mbetween = 6.06; t(19) = 7.30, p 
<.001). None of the respondents in this evaluation took 
part in the main experiment.
For each produced route description, the total number 
of propositions was counted, and the number of non-cru-
cial instructions was registered. Initially all route descrip-
tions were coded by a single coder. Reliability was assessed 
by having a second coder code a sample of 25 % of the route 
descriptions, with an equally large but random subsample 
of each participant (n = 252). The two coders agreed on 
the presence of non-crucial actions in 89 % of the cases, 
Cohen’s κ = .81 (p < .001, 95 % CI = .77 − .86), indicating al-
most perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Given the 
assigned +1. A zero (0) was associated with choice points 
where both landmark types were used (e.g., “at the next 
intersection at the cafe you go left”). When there was no 
landmark specified, no value was assigned.
This analysis resulted in an average landmark score 
ranging from −1 to 1 for each route map in each clutter 
condition. The score indicated a preference for either 
external or internal landmarks.The higher the score, the 
more often participants opted for using internal land-
marks (as compared to opting for external landmarks). A 
score below zero indicated more frequent use of external 
landmark descriptions over internal descriptions.
Initially all route descriptions were coded by a single 
coder. Reliability was assessed by having a second coder 
code a sample of 25 % of the route descriptions, with an 
equally large but random subsample of each participant 
(n = 252). The two coders agreed on the usage of internal 
landmarks in 90 % of the cases, Cohen’s κ = .85 (p < .001, 
95 % CI = .81 − .89), indicating almost perfect agreement 
(Landis & Koch, 1977). Given the observed marginal fre-
quencies of the labels, the maximum value of κ was 1. The 
two coders agreed on the usage of external landmarks in 
91 % of the cases, Cohen’s κ = .85 (p < .001, 95 % CI = .81 − 
.90), indicating almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 
1977). Given the observed marginal frequencies of the la-
bels, the maximum value of κ was .91 in this case. In all our 
analyses, we used the codings of the first coder only.
Descriptive accuracy
As especially the long routes resulted in a large number 
of incomplete and wrong descriptions, we considered a 
route description ‘correct’ if it contained the correct direc-
tion changes in the correct order (i.e., in Figure 4.1 these 
correct orders or patterns are left-right and left-left-right-
left, respectively). This analysis resulted in a percentage 
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Results
Landmark types
Table 4.1 presents the mean landmark score for each con-
dition (first row). A higher score represents a higher pref-
erence for internal landmark NPs, as these were coded as 
+1. A lower score represents a higher preference external 
landmark NPs, as these were coded as −1. Analysis of land-
mark type reveals a main effect of visual clutter, as clut-
tered maps evoked a relatively higher preference for exter-
nal landmark NPs than schematic maps, F(1, 22) = 110.21, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .834. Additionally, long routes elicited relative-
ly more internal landmark NPs than short routes, F(1, 22) 
observed marginal frequencies of the labels, the maximum 
value of κ was .90 in this case.
Also, the number of words in each route description 
was counted. These analyses resulted in three means for 
each route map: the number of propositions, the number 
of non-crucial instructions, and the number of words.
Statistical analysis
In all our analyses, visual clutter was implemented as a 
within-maps variable, and route length was implemented 
as a between-maps variable in a multifactorial analysis of 
variance.
TABLE 4.1 MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR LANDMARK SCORE, PERCENTAGE OF PATTERN CORRECT ROUTE DESCRIPTIONS, NUMBER OF PROPOSITIONS, NUMBER OF 
NON-CRUCIAL INSTRUCTIONS, AND NUMBER OF WORDS FOR EACH MAP CONDITION, SPLIT BY ROUTE LENGTH.









M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
LANDMARK SCORE PER DESCRIPTION – 0.16 (0.18) 0.16 (0.16) 0.17 (0.19) 0.58 (0.11) ***
% ROUTE PATTERNS CORRECT 94.0 (4.9) 91.1 (5.9) 54.2 (18.4) 52.9 (19.2)
PROPOSITIONS PER DESCRIPTION 3.65 (0.37) 3.36 (0.27) 5.09 (0.61) 4.94 (0.45) **
NON-CRUCIAL INSTRUCTIONS PER DESCRIPTION 0.98 (0.15) 0.86 (0.20) 1.24 (0.31) 1.05 (0.25) **
WORDS PER DESCRIPTION 22.4 (2.3) 19.4 (1.0) 29.0 (3.2) 26.3 (2.0) ***
NOTES * P < .05, ** P < .005, *** P < .001. THESE P-VALUES CONCERN EFFECTS OF VISUAL CLUTTER.
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Perceived difficulty of the task and appreciation of 
the maps
The participants indicated that the mental load associated 
with the task using six seven-point Likert scales based on 
the NASA Task Load Index (Hart & Staveland, 1988) was 
relatively high. Participants in the cluttered condition 
indicated that they found the task slightly more difficult 
than participants in the schematic condition did (Mcluttered 
= 5.82, Mschematic = 5.09; t(28.83) = 2.16, p < .05). Additional-
ly, they indicated that they thought their performance was 
less perfect (Mcluttered = 5.45, Mschematic = 4.52; t(43) = 2.28, p < 
.05). There were no significant differences between the two 
conditions on perceived physical and temporal demand of 
the task, as well as on perceived effort and frustration as-
sociated with the task.
As to the three five-point scales (aesthetic appreciation, 
clarity and complexity), the cluttered maps were judged 
as more ugly (Mcluttered = 2.55, Mschematic = 1.96; t(43) = 2.04, 
p < .05) and more messy (Mcluttered = 3.00, Mschematic = 1.65; 
t(34.42) = 4.27, p < .001) than the schematic maps. There 
was no significant difference between the two conditions 
on the perceived complexity of the maps.
discussion
Map design influences the strategies people use to de-
scribe a route. Systems like Google Maps provide users 
with the option to actively switch between cluttered and 
uncluttered maps. This variation in map design influences 
whether people use route-external or route-internal land-
mark NPs to locate choice points in a route description. So, 
when we tell somebody how to go to Grand Central Station 
(as we did in the introduction), the choice for a map design 
has likely influenced the way we instructed the inquirer. 
= 38.51, p < .001, ηp
2 = .636. Visual clutter and route length 
did not interact, F(1, 22) = 1.62, p = .07.
Descriptive accuracy
Table 4.1 presents the percentage of correct route patterns 
for each condition (second row). Visual clutter did not af-
fect the correctness of the produced route patterns, F < 
1. Short routes evoked more correct pattern descriptions 
than long routes, F(1, 22) = 37.43, p < .001, ηp
2 = .630. Visual 
clutter and route length did not interact, F < 1.
Descriptive efficiency
Analysis of the mean number of propositions per route de-
scription, shown in Table 4.1 (third row), reveals a main 
effect of visual clutter, as cluttered maps evoked more 
propositions than schematic maps, F(1, 22) = 6.91, p < .025, 
ηp
2= .239. Additionally and unsurprisingly, long routes elic-
ited more propositions than short routes, F(1, 22) = 63.28, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .742. Visual clutter and route length did not 
interact, F < 1.
Analysis of the mean number of non-crucial instruc-
tions per route description, shown in Table 4.1 (fourth 
row), reveals a main effect of visual clutter, as cluttered 
maps evoked more non-crucial instructions than schemat-
ic maps, F(1, 22) = 8.07, p < .025, ηp
2 = .268. Additionally and 
unsurprisingly, long routes elicited more non-crucial in-
structions than short routes, F(1, 22) = 5.86, p < .025, ηp
2 = 
.210. Visual clutter and route length did not interact, F < 1.
Analysis of the mean number of words per route de-
scription, shown in Table 4.1 (fifth row), reveals a main 
effect of visual clutter, as cluttered maps evoked longer 
route descriptions than schematic maps, F(1, 22) = 25.25, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .534. Additionally and unsurprisingly, long 
routes elicited longer descriptions than short routes, F(1, 
22) = 58.65, p < .001, ηp
2 =.727. Visual clutter and route 
length did not interact, F < 1.
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erential expressions: They use more information to iden-
tify referents, and put more effort in avoiding ambiguous 
expressions. The relative use of internal and external 
landmarks in the produced route descriptions aligns with 
this view. Using more external landmarks in the cluttered 
condition can be seen as a way of including additional in-
formation, and at the same time as a way of using con-
cepts with broad scope in the visual environment. Con-
versely, using less internal landmarks suggest a strategy 
of avoiding concepts of which many instances are pres-
ent in the visual environment, and avoiding expressions 
which are dependent on one perspective only. And, as we 
have demonstrated, when a map is cluttered people tend 
to avoid this referential ambiguity more often than when 
a map contains no clutter. But, producing external land-
marks from memory comes at the cost of higher memo-
ry demands. This is reflected by two findings. First, par-
ticipants in the cluttered map condition rated their task 
as more difficult than participants in the schematic map 
condition did. Second, when a route is longer, and more 
descriptives have to be remembered, people show a higher 
preference for internal landmarks.
The results suggest that landmark preferences are 
caused by different strategies resulting from a more or less 
demanding referential task (due to a higher or lower de-
gree of visual clutter). The preferences, however, may well 
relate also to viewers attending differently to external and 
internal landmarks in the two map versions. Obviously, we 
need other data (e.g., with eye tracking as a method) to 
find out the details of such a relationship. For current pur-
poses, we started from two well known map versions: map 
(schematic) and satellite (cluttered). It is more than likely 
that the visual salience of both external and internal land-
marks is higher in the schematic version, compared to the 
cluttered version. In the cluttered version, the two land-
And if Grand Central was further away and the route was 
longer, that would have also affected our instructions.
In our experiment, participants studied route maps and 
produced route descriptions from short-term memory. To 
refer to choice points in a route, people made use of either 
route-external landmark NPs (e.g., “go left at the phar-
macy”) or route-internal landmark NPs (e.g., “go left at 
the second street”). Confirming our hypotheses, we have 
found that when a map contains a high degree of visual 
clutter, a route description based on that map is more like-
ly to contain external landmark NPs than when a map is 
less cluttered. At the same time, a preference for internal 
landmark NPs is stronger when a route is longer and the 
accompanying route description therefore contains more 
choice points. We have also seen that visual clutter in a 
map evokes more words, propositions, and more non-cru-
cial instructions in route descriptions.
Why do people use different strategies in route descrip-
tions when visual clutter in a map varies? Both landmark 
types are obvious descriptives for localizing changes of di-
rections in a route description, but their referential prop-
erties differ. We reason that external landmarks provide 
additive information to a route description (i.e., they ‘add 
up to’ the path one has to walk), are relatively unambig-
uous, and identify a choice point in a perspective inde-
pendent manner, independent of the current location of 
the traveller. On the other hand, internal landmarks are 
intrinsic parts of the route and therefore do not provide 
route-additive information. These internal landmarks are 
localized relative to the current location of the traveller in 
a route.
The preferences resulting from our post-task question-
naire suggest that visual clutter makes the referential task 
more demanding. When the going gets tough, language 
users tend to put more referential effort in producing ref-
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they would use external landmark NPs. Additionally, map 
design has not been studied extensively yet, but we have 
seen that a general and real-world variation in map design, 
namely the presence of visual clutter (or the use of realis-
tic satellite maps and schematic drawn maps as provided 
by Google Maps), does influence the way people describe 
routes depicted on these maps. Moreover, a simple and ob-
vious difference in route length also exerts an effect on the 
referential strategy people use to refer to choice points.
As was already proposed by Tversky and Lee (1998, 
1999), research on the interplay between maps and route 
descriptions suggests that it may be possible to automat-
ically translate visual information on maps and in envi-
ronments into spoken or written route descriptions. The 
GIVE challenge (Koller et al., 2010) poses researchers a 
very similar question: Can you use natural language gen-
eration (NLG) to automatically formulate usable route 
instructions for a treasure hunt in a virtual environment, 
where only visual properties of the environment function 
as input? The research presented in this chapter proposes 
an interesting connection between visual input and route 
directions or instructions, namely that visual aspects of a 
scene (i.e., visual clutter) affect the way people select and 
communicate aspects of the environment in a route de-
scription.
Our results and experimental set-up raise some new 
empirical questions. First, the simplicity and organized na-
ture of the environment we have used may have promoted 
the participant’s confidence to use internal landmark NPs. 
Typical route-internal landmarks such as streets inter-
sections are very prominent in the grid-like street plan of 
Manhattan. A more complex task with more natural and 
varying environments may challenge our findings. Second, 
it might be interesting to further test our findings with 
respect to individual differences, as it is known that fac-
mark types are surrounded by many other visual details, 
making the landmarks less salient. It is unlikely, however, 
that external landmarks are relatively more prominent in 
the cluttered version and internal landmarks more promi-
nent in the schematic version.
Apart from the choice between external and internal 
landmarks, the increase of visual clutter also resulted in 
a number of collateral effects on descriptive efficiency 
and on perceived difficulty of the route description task. 
Participants who used a cluttered map to produce a route 
description produced more propositions and words than 
participants that used schematic maps. At the same time, 
they included more non-crucial instructions in their route 
descriptions (i.e., instructions like “you start to walk” and 
“keep walking”). This suggests an association between ir-
relevant visual detail on the input side and irrelevant ver-
bal detail as output. It should be noted that the instruc-
tions that we label ‘non-crucial’ or ‘irrelevant’ are only 
irrelevant with respect to the route pattern, but may very 
well be relevant and useful from a pragmatic perspective, 
as is reflected by our finding that people still rate the im-
portance of ‘non-crucial’ instructions with a six on a ten 
point scale.
Our findings pose a number of interesting implications 
for research on route maps and route descriptions. Many 
previous studies (e.g., Allen, 2000; Daniel & Denis, 1998, 
2004; Lee & Tversky, 2005; Lovelace et al., 1999; Tversky 
& Lee, 1999) did not systematically distinguish internal 
and external landmarks, and almost exclusively focused 
on external landmarks. However, we have demonstrated 
that other descriptive strategies for locating choice points 
can very likely occur in route descriptions as well. Espe-
cially in a setting where external and internal landmarks 
are equally available at each choice point (like in our task) 
people are at least as likely to use internal landmark NPs as 
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of the time while explaining the route, for politeness rea-
sons perhaps. This made us decide to ask respondents to 
produce a route description without looking at the map. Of 
course the lab simulation is not the same as its real-world 
counterpart. In particular, in reality speakers go back more 
often to the map, and addressees often interrupt and in-
teract with the speaker. These are phenomena which were 
excluded here to make the production output more com-
parable, but which also pose interesting directions for fol-
low-up research.
To conclude, our findings suggest that a cluttered visual 
input leads to more absolute and perspective-independent 
references in language production. While we have used 
route maps and route descriptions to create a task wherein 
a natural translation from visual information to verbal de-
scriptions is evoked, it is very interesting to test the indi-
vidual effects of the potentially confounding variables that 
we have ruled out in our design.
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For the design of representational pictures in educational materials, 
research suggests that schematic line drawings facilitate comprehension 
more than detailed photographs. We extend research on the potential 
advantage of schematic graphics by disentangling visual detail from 
visual emphasis, and by focusing on the perceptual integration of text 
and graphics. In an experiment on learning about mitosis, secondary 
school students studied text with either schematic drawings, detailed 
photographs, or hybrid pictures (photographs with superimposed line 
drawings). The results reveal that as students attempt to integrate text 
and pictures by making referential connections between them, they do 
so better with schematic and hybrid pictures compared to the detailed 
photographs. Moreover, students who are able to make more correct 
connections, typically score higher on comprehension. By comparing the 
three picture types, we attribute the advantage of schematic drawings 
to visual emphasis, and not to leaving out irrelevant detail compared to 
photographs.
Chapter 5
Learning with schematic, 
realistic, and hybrid 
pictures
introduction
Schoolbooks, educational web sites, and other instruction-
al materials typically provide students with visual mate-
rials in combination with expository text. A considerable 
subset of these materials consist of pictures that are rep-
resentational, in the sense that they show what the top-
ic of the text and its parts looks like, and how these parts 
are located (e.g., Carney & Levin, 2002; Levin, 1981). As 
such, representational pictures provide visual referents to 
concepts described in the text. Adding pictures to text is 
generally found to improve comprehension and learning 
of the materials, compared to when only text is studied 
(e.g., Carney & Levin, 2002; Hannus & Hyönä, 1999; Levie 
this chapter is based on:
Westerbeek, H., Van Amelsvoort, M., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (submitted). 
Benefits of schematic line drawings compared to detailed 
photographs in educational materials: Effects of visual emphasis on 
text-picture integration and comprehension.
An earlier version of this work has been presented in:
Westerbeek, H., Van Amelsvoort, M., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2014). 
Contents and graphics in line: When is it beneficial to schematize 
pictures in expository prose? In Building bridges: Improving our 
understanding of learning from text and graphics by making the 
connection (EARLI SiG 2), Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
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& Lentz, 1982; Mayer, 1997, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2011; 
i.e., the multimedia effect).
One variable in picture design that has received schol-
arly attention over the years is the degree of visual detail 
in static (e.g., Butcher, 2006; Dwyer, 1976; Imhof, Scheit-
er, & Gerjets, 2011; Mason, Pluchino, Tonatora, & Araisi, 
2013; Moreno, Ozogul, & Reisslein, 2011), and dynamic 
visualizations (e.g., Höffler & Leutner, 2007; Jenkinson & 
McGill, 2013; Rodicio, 2012; Scheiter, Gerjets, Huk, Imhof, 
& Kammerer, 2009). Research on the effect of visual detail 
in representational pictures in combination with exposi-
tory text typically focuses on comparing detailed graphics 
(e.g., photographs) to schematic graphics with regard to 
effectiveness for comprehension, retention, and transfer 
(Butcher, 2006; Dwyer, 1976; Imhof et al., 2011; Joseph & 
Dwyer, 1984; Mason et al., 2013; Rodicio, 2012; Scheiter et 
al., 2009). Figure 5.1a and 5.1b show examples of a detailed 
photograph and a schematic drawing of a biological cell. 
Schematization is achieved by abstracting from a detailed 
picture, thus by leaving out nonessential information, and 
at the same time by putting visual emphasis on the impor-
tant parts of a cell by highlighting important information 
through the addition of thick contrasting lines, dots, and 
other markings.
Schematic drawings are (intuitively) considered to be 
more legible and more clear than photographs, and such 
pictures are therefore argued to be easier to understand, 
and are thus advised to be used in practical applications 
(e.g., Pettersson, 2013; Tversky et al., 2002). In contrast, 
in a visually detailed picture it may be hard to tell what 
is important and what is not. Especially when the domain 
or topic of study is unfamiliar for students, an advantage 
of schematic pictures seems evident. These intuitions are 
formalized in prescriptive advice for (educational) picture 
design: Instructional designers are advised to avoid un-
necessary elements in pictures, arguing in favor of simple 
line drawings over detailed photographs (e.g., Pettersson, 
2013; Rieber, 2000).
In cognitive psychology, explanations for the potential 
benefits of schematic pictures in educational materials 
mainly focus on one side of schematization: differences in 
the amount of visual information present in detailed and 
schematic pictures. Detailed pictures contain a higher de-
gree of irrelevant visual details than schematic pictures. It 
is argued that processing these details in working memory 
comes at the cost of processing the essential information 
(e.g., Butcher, 2006; Mason et al., 2013; Pettersson, 2013; 
Rodicio, 2012; Scheiter et al., 2009). This explanation is 
embedded in the Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learn-
ing (CTML; Mayer, 1997, 2005): a theoretical framework 
which allows researchers to compare instructional formats 
on the basis of the cognitive load in working memory they 
imply. It proposes that learning from text and pictures 
takes place in a number of consecutive stages: Information 
is perceived by the eyes and ears (perception); processed 
in a perceptual short term memory store; and passed on 
to working memory. Working memory contains separate 
FIGURE 5.1 EXAMPLES OF A PICTURE SHOWING THE METAPHASE OF MITOSIS.
A B C
NOTES (A) SCHEMATIC LINE DRAWING, (B) DETAILED PHOTOGRAPH, 
(C) HYBRID: PHOTOGRAPH WITH DRAWING SUPERIMPOSED.
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levels of prior knowledge (e.g., Dwyer, 1968; Joseph & Dw-
yer, 1984). In a more recent study, Butcher (2006) report 
that students who learn about the heart and circulatory 
system by reading text and viewing simplified line draw-
ings acquired more factual knowledge than students whom 
received visually detailed pictures. For animations, Scheit-
er et al. (2009) report better comprehension when anima-
tions are schematic line drawings compared to detailed 
microscopic videos in an experiment on learning about the 
biological process of mitosis. Rodicio (2012) reports simi-
lar effects in a study on learning about geology and plate 
tectonics.
However, other studies report no effects of using sche-
matic graphics on comprehension and learning. Some 
studies in Dwyer’s research remain inconclusive about 
effects of visual detail on learning (e.g., Dwyer, 1976). In 
a more recent study by Mason et al. (2013), high school 
students learned about physics (gravitational forces on an 
inclined plane) from a text with either a detailed picture 
or a more schematic one, but no effects of picture type on 
knowledge and transfer tests were found. Michas and Berry 
(2000) report no differences in performance after learning 
how to carry out first aid tasks (i.e., bandaging) with sche-
matic line drawings or detailed video stills. Null effects 
are reported for animations as well: Imhof et al. (2011) 
instructed students about different locomotion patterns 
of fish using detailed videos of actual fish and schemat-
ic line drawn animations, but no difference in classifying 
and recognizing locomotion patterns between the groups 
was found. Partly, this null effect may be attributable to 
the detailed videos offering more useful information than 
the schematic animations (as suggested by Imhof et al.). 
Additionally, meta-analyses do not find reliable support 
for schematic advantages either. Reinwein and Huberdeau 
(1988) conducted a meta-analysis on twenty-one experi-
subsystems for visual (pictorial) and verbal (textual) infor-
mation. Importantly, the capacity of these subsystems is 
limited: Only a small amount of information can be pro-
cessed simultaneously (Baddeley, 1992; Miller, 1956). It 
is assumed that pictorial and textual information is inte-
grated in working memory. in coordination with students’ 
prior knowledge (stored in long term memory), this entails 
comprehension and learning.
When manipulations of visual detail in representa-
tional pictures are discussed in terms of the CTML, it is 
hypothesized that because nonessential visual detail 
is processed in working memory, detailed pictures may 
lead to extraneous (i.e., superfluous) demand for working 
memory resources (e.g., Höffler & Leutner, 2007; Imhof et 
al., 2011; Joseph & Dwyer, 1984; Scheiter et al., 2009). In 
other words, visual detail in materials presents students 
with nonessential information, and induces them to pro-
cess details that are not necessary for comprehending the 
contents of the expository text. In terms of the CTML, de-
tailed pictures may cause a coherence or seductive details 
effect (i.e., details in the materials activate unnecessary 
knowledge; e.g., Harp & Mayer, 1998; Mayer et al., 2001), 
or a modality effect (i.e., the visual subsystem of working 
memory is overloaded; e.g., Mayer & Moreno, 2003), and 
working memory is overloaded with information that is 
not central to the learning objective. This arguably ham-
pers the integrative processes in working memory.
Support for this reasoning comes from studies in which 
presenting students with schematic pictures lead to better 
comprehension and learning than detailed photographs. 
In an extensive body of research, Dwyer and colleagues 
compared learning about the human heart and circulato-
ry system with text, adjoined by pictures of various levels 
of visual detail. They found that schematic line drawings 
were more effective for most learning goals and general 
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Firstly, in the studies reviewed above, two different ap-
proaches to describing the differences between schematic 
or detailed conditions can be discerned. The differences 
between the conditions are described in terms of excessive 
or irrelevant detail, as schematic pictures leave out such 
details (e.g., Scheiter et al., 2009; Dwyer, 1976; Butcher, 
2006; Imhof et al., 2011). But it has also been argued that 
schematic pictures highlight important information (Ma-
son et al., 2013; Scheiter et al., 2009; Tversky et al, 2002). 
A closer inspection of the examples in Figure 5.1 makes 
clear that the schematic picture, compared to the detailed 
one, can be defined both in terms of leaving out irrele-
vant details and in terms of signaling or highlighting. In 
other words, the schematic picture gains clarity because 
it does not contain nonessential visual detail and because 
it emphasizes essential visual information by means of 
thick contrasting lines, dots, and other markings. This 
visual emphasis may work much like visual cues that are 
employed to add visual emphasis that directs students’ 
(visual) attention towards what is important (e.g., De Kon-
ing, Tabbers, Rikers, & Paas, 2009; De Koning, Tabbers, 
Rikers, & Paas, 2010). This raises the question whether ef-
fects of schematization are primarily related to differences 
in visual detail, or differences in visual emphasis. There-
fore, in this study we aim to disentangle the two variables 
of visual detail and visual emphasis, by experimentally 
comparing schematic and detailed pictures to a third con-
dition where visual emphasis is present, but visual detail is 
not reduced (as in Figure 5.1c). This hybrid condition also 
yields a picture format that may be interesting to be ap-
plied in instructional design.
Secondly, it remains unclear which phases of the learn-
ing process are affected by using schematic line drawings 
instead of detailed photographs. It is likely to assume that 
learners benefit most from pictures when they try to con-
ments by Dwyer and colleagues, and report that there is no 
support for the hypothesis that visual detail affects com-
prehension. Reviewing studies on instructional anima-
tions, Höffler and Leutner (2007) conclude that research 
concerning visual detail in representational animations 
is inconclusive, to a great extent because detailed vid-
eo-based animations more often have a representation-
al function than computer-based low detail animations, 
which are generally decorational. For representational 
animations, Höffler and Leutner conclude that it is yet un-
clear what the effects of schematization may be.
Taken together, despite inconclusive results, the liter-
ature suggests that schematic line drawings may facilitate 
comprehension compared to detailed photographs. How-
ever, the question why students may benefit from sche-
matic line drawings warrants further investigation. There-
fore, it is fruitful to consider means by which explanations 
for the effect can be extended. In the remainder or this in-
troduction, we elaborate on two ways in which the effects 
of schematic line drawings in comparison with detailed 
photographs may be further understood. One way is to ad-
vocate a more precise comparison between schematic and 
detailed graphics, by focusing on the question what under-
lies the potential benefit of schematic line drawings over 
detailed photographs. Is it leaving out irrelevant detail, 
emphasizing what is important, or both? The second way 
to further understand effects of using schematic line draw-
ings is to shift our attention to the study process instead 
of learning results. So, we consider the potential effects of 
schematic line drawings in relation to how students pro-
cess (read) a multimedia instruction composed of text and 
pictures. In turn, this should lead to more insight into how 
findings with regard to schematization can be applied in 
cognitively inspired instructional design.
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pictures. This integration probably leads to better compre-
hension.
The idea that making referential connections between 
text and pictures leads to better comprehension has been 
proposed in the literature before, although not in rela-
tion to schematization of representational pictures (e.g., 
Ainsworth, 1999, 2006; Butcher, 2006; Crooks et al., 2012; 
Schüler et al., 2015). An association between finding visual 
referents and comprehension is most directly measured in 
eye tracking studies on text-picture combinations (Hannus 
& Hyönä, 1999; Hegarty, Carpenter, Just, 1991; Mason et 
al., 2013). If learners can successfully find visual referents 
to concepts in the text, the more helpful the pictures are 
expected to be for them, and comprehension is improved 
(e.g., Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 1999; Schüler et al., 
2015). Research on cueing and explicit attention guidance 
in learning specifically supports this proposed relation be-
tween making the correct referential connections between 
text and picture on the one hand, and comprehension and 
learning on the other. Cueing is aimed specifically at guid-
ing students in making the right referential connections 
between representations, by visually emphasizing relevant 
visual referents. Among the types of cues found in the lit-
erature are colored labels (Ozcelik, Aslan-Ari, & Cagiltay, 
2010), color coding (Crooks et al., 2012), temporarily shad-
ing (fading) unimportant parts in animations (De Koning 
et al., 2010; Lowe & Boucheix, 2011), and arrows pointing 
from words in the text to parts of the pictures (Liu, Lin, & 
Paas, 2013). These cues function as guiding attention to 
specific locations in the pictures, thereby selecting what 
is important, and making explicit which parts of the text 
refer to which parts of the picture (De Koning et al., 2009; 
2010). These studies show the beneficial effect of cueing 
on learning and comprehension. In our study, we add to 
this evidence by using a method that enables us to explic-
nect words in the text to parts of the pictures. It may be 
likely that schematic line drawings, albeit related to differ-
ences in visual detail and/or visual emphasis, help students 
during this phase of making such text-picture connections. 
These connections are considered to be referential: Words 
in the text refer to elements in the picture (e.g., Crooks, 
Cheon, Omam. Ari, & Flores, 2012; Mason et al., 2013). 
Such referential connections are made during reading, 
when students are involved in finding visual referents in 
the pictures that are related to the concepts mentioned 
in the text. Because visual attention is selective − viewers 
do not attend to and process all or many details of their 
visual environment, but they make meaningful selections 
in early perceptual stages instead (e.g., see Eimer, 2014, 
and Peelen and Kastner, 2014 for recent overviews) − irrel-
evant visual details may hamper this process of identifying 
visual referents. We therefore propose to investigate how 
schematization of representational pictures combined 
with text may affect how well students can identify these 
visual referents in pictures.
Thirdly, irrespective of what exactly causes schematic 
pictures to be clearer than detailed ones, if making con-
nections between text and pictures is improved when pic-
tures are schematized, it is expectably easier to integrate 
information from both modalities into one representation. 
A better integration of information from text and pictures 
may be beneficial for comprehension (e.g., Ainsworth, 
1999, 2006; Bodemer et al., 2004; De Koning et al., 2009; 
Gyselinck, Jamet, & Dubois, 2008; Hannus & Hyönä, 1999; 
Scheiter & Eitel, 2015; Schüler, Arndt, & Scheiter, 2015). 
So, we investigate the relationship between schematiza-
tion, finding visual referents, and comprehension. Sche-
matization is expected to support the process of finding 
visual referents, thus supporting integration of text and 
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emphasis, but do not contain less visual detail than the 
detailed photographs (RQ 1). After studying a text with 
pictures, the secondary school students perform an arrow 
drawing task to measure how well they can make referen-
tial connections between the two modalities (RQ 2). This 
combination of tasks allows us to study effects of visual 
detail on finding these referential connections, and the 
relationship between making these connections and com-
prehension (RQ 3).
We believe that studying the effects of schematization 
in the domain of mitosis and biology is representative for 
learning about an inherently visual domain (Jenkinson & 
McGill, 2013), which is argued to be a difficult topic in sec-
ondary education (Çimer, 2012; Scheiter et al., 2009; She & 
Chen, 2009). Like other more abstract topics, understand-
ing mitosis may be hard for students because it encom-
passes objects and processes that are not visible to the un-
aided human eye (She & Chen, 2009). Textual explanations 
of the processes and phases in mitosis contain a relatively 
high amount of domain-specific terms that refer to con-
crete objects, which can be shown in representational pic-
tures (e.g., chromosomes, microtubuli, centrioles). We ex-
pect that the proposed difficulties with this topic motivate 
students to search for referential connections between dif-
ficult concepts in the text and parts of the pictures.
By means of an eye tracking pretest, we aim to estab-
lish that students typically look to these pictures in our 
materials and that they make meaningful connections be-
tween the two modalities while studying, allowing them 
to identify visual referents. As such, it provides an on-line 
control measure of the processes that we aim to study with 
the (off-line) arrow drawing task.
itly study the association between identification of visual 
referents and comprehension, and how that is related to 
schematization of representational pictures.
Our expectations regarding the effects of schemati-
zation of representational pictures lead to a number of 
research questions. As it is unclear what schematization 
of representation exactly entails, we want to investigate 
whether schematic drawings lead to benefits because they 
visually emphasize what is important, or because they 
leave out irrelevant details, or both (Research Question 
1). These benefits are expected to be found in the process 
of finding visual referents. But is finding visual referents 
to words in the text facilitated by pictures being schemat-
ic drawings, compared to when they are detailed photo-
graphs, or hybrid pictures (Research Question 2)? Finally, 
we aim to test whether finding visual referents predicts 
comprehension. If schematic pictures indeed make the 
identification of visual referents easier, is successful find-
ing of visual referents related to better comprehension of 
the materials (Research Question 3)?
We address these questions in an experiment in which 
secondary school students study a text about the biolog-
ical process of mitosis, accompanied by pictures in three 
visual detail conditions.
Experiment
We conduct an experiment on learning from a text about 
mitosis, that is, the biological process of cell reduplication. 
Crucially, the mitosis text is accompanied by either sche-
matic line drawings, by detailed photographs, or a by hy-
brid version of these pictures (Figure 5.1). The three con-
ditions make it possible to disentangle effects of reducing 
irrelevant visual detail from effects of visual emphasis in 
schematic pictures: The hybrid pictures do provide visual 
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left side of the text. There were no explicit exophoric refer-
ences (e.g., “see picture”) to the pictures in the text.
Critically, we manipulated whether these pictures were 
schematic line drawings, detailed microscope photo-
graphs, or hybrid versions in which the line drawings were 
superimposed on the photographs. The detailed photo-
graphs were gathered from educational web sites, where 
representative microscopic photographs of each of the six 
phases of mitosis were selected. The photographs were 
converted to grayscale with the goal of equalizing contrasts 
between the six pictures. The schematic line drawing ver-
sions of the pictures were created by (digitally) tracing the 
photographs. By tracing, aspects such as the positioning of 
cell parts, their scale, and spatial ratios were preserved in 
the process of schematization. Hybrid pictures were creat-
ed by superimposing the line tracings on the photographs. 
Figure 5.2 presents the text and six pictures in the three 
picture type conditions.
Eye tracking materials test
To test our assumption that, while studying, students will 
search for visual referents in the pictures that accompany 
each text section, we obtained eye tracking measures in a 
materials test. We aimed to answer two questions: Do stu-
dents fixate on the pictures when they study the materials, 
and do they make transitions between text sections and 
relevant pictures? Pictures are considered relevant when 
they show the respective mitosis phase that the text that is 
being read is about. As such, only “horizontal” transitions 
in our materials (see Figure 5.2) are considered to be be-
tween text and relevant pictures.
Eye tracking yields an on-line record of where students 
gaze, and how long they fixate on text and pictures, and 
whether they make transitions between these modalities. 
In eye tracking research, a convincing relationship be-
tween where the eyes gaze and to what viewers attend to 
method
participants
121 Secondary school students (seventy-one women and 
fifty men, with a median age of 16 years, ranging from 15 to 
19) participated, in seven groups of about twenty students 
each. All were students of the fourth, fifth or sixth year of 
the (Dutch) secondary school level called HAVO or VWO 
(comparable to British A-level or US pre-university edu-
cation). They were randomly assigned to one of the three 
conditions in the study: 44 in the schematic pictures con-
dition, 43 in the detailed photographs condition, and 34 in 
the hybrid condition. Participants were enrolled in three 
different educational programs (called “culture and soci-
ety”, “economy and society”, and “nature and technology” 
in the Dutch school system), but none of the participants 
had biology as a compulsory subject in their curriculum. 
Their level of prior knowledge is assumed to be compara-
ble.
Materials
A 303-word expository text about mitosis was construct-
ed. Its contents were based on various educational texts 
on the subject aimed at a secondary school audience. It 
was deliberately difficult for the target group, i.e., it had a 
Flesch reading ease score of about 42, which is lower than 
what is argued to be easily understood by secondary school 
students (Flesch, 1948). This was done to avoid ceiling ef-
fects in comprehension, and to motivate thorough study 
and inspection of the pictures. The text was divided into 
six sub-headed sections of about equal length, each cor-
responding to one of the six phases of mitosis (interphase, 
prophase, prometaphase, metaphase, anaphase, and telo-
phase). Each section was accompanied by an approximate-
ly 4 by 4 centimeter picture, which was positioned on the 
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as the participants in the main experiment (explained be-
low), with one exception: They read the mitosis text from 
a computer screen, and their eye movements were regis-
tered using an SMI RED250 eye-tracker (SensoMotoric In-
struments, Berlin, Germany). The eye-tracker was paired 
with a vertically oriented 22 inch, 60 Hertz, 32-bit color 
Dell LCD screen, at a resolution of 1050 by 1680 pixels. The 
screen was set up in a vertical position in order to display 
the questionnaire page with the mitosis text in a size com-
parable to the A4 paper sheet that was used in the main 
has been established (see, for example, Hannus & Hyöna, 
1999; Mason et al., 2013; Rayner, 1992). Therefore, we re-
gard the measurement of eye fixations and gaze patterns 
as a suitable method to assess our materials.
Twenty-two undergraduate students from our universi-
ty participated for course credit (20 females and 2 males, 
with a median age 21 years, ranging from 18 to 24). All 
indicated to have completed their final secondary school 
exam within five years prior to the study, and none did a 
final exam in biology. They followed the same procedure 
FIGURE 5.2 THE TEXT AND SIX PICTURES AS USED IN THE EXPERIMENT, IN THREE CONDITIONS.
A B C
NOTES (A) SCHEMATIC LINE DRAWINGS, (B) DETAILED PHOTOGRAPHS, (C) HYBRID PICTURES.
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pictures, between a text section and the relevant picture, 
and between a text section and a non-relevant picture. 
Analyses on the proportions of transitions showed a main 
effect of type of transition on the number of transitions, 
F(3, 51) = 38.65, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.695. Most transitions were 
made between text sections (M = .50, SD = .04), followed by 
transitions between text and related pictures (M = .31, SD 
= .01). Pairwise comparisons (LSD) showed that the pro-
portion of transitions between related text and pictures 
was significantly higher than the proportion of transitions 
between unrelated text and pictures (M = .11, SD = .01), p 
< .001. Thus, meaningful transitions between text and re-
lated pictures occurred regularly. Students switched their 
visual attention back and forth between text section and 
picture, and generally did this between text sections and 
pictures concerning the same phase of mitosis.
Procedure of the main experiment
Participants in the main experiment worked through a pen 
and paper questionnaire, composed of five parts. In the 
first part, the participants read general instructions about 
the experiment. These emphasized that they were not al-
lowed to browse through the pages, and were only allowed 
to go to the next page when that was indicated by the ex-
perimenter. Consecutively, they filled out general demo-
graphic questions, and estimated their last final grade for 
biology class on a scale from one to ten. This scale is the 
common way in which Dutch student tests are graded, with 
one being the lowest possible grade, and ten being a per-
fect score. They also indicated whether they liked biology 
on a ten-point Likert scale.
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of a 
short general introduction on cells and mitosis, explaining 
that mitosis was a biological process in which single cells 
split into two cells. When all students indicated that they 
understood this introduction, they were instructed to go to 
experiment. Participants were randomly were assigned to 
one of the three versions of the material (schematic line 
drawings, detailed photographs, hybrid pictures), and were 
given five minutes to study it, before they had to answer 
questions about mitosis. They were seated at a normal 
operating distance to the monitor, and the RED250 was 
calibrated one or more times until the validation yielded 
satisfactory results. Calibration, stimulus presentation, 
timing, as well as the collection of fixation data, was ad-
ministered using SMI iViewX and SMI Experiment Center. 
Eye movements of two participants were not analyzed due 
to problems with calibration and validation.
To answer the question whether students fixate on the 
pictures while studying, we analyzed the mean fixation 
duration on text and pictures. This analysis revealed that 
more visual attention was spent on the text (M = 181.7 s, 
SD = 39.4 s) than on the pictures (M = 19.0 s, SD = 10.9 s), 
F(1, 19) = 295.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .946. This is in line with 
other eye tracking studies on multimedia materials, as par-
ticipants’ studying behavior is largely text-directed (e.g., 
Hannus & Hyönä, 1999; Schmidt-Weigand et al., 2010). 
About one tenth of the total fixation time was spent on in-
specting the pictures though, which warrants the conclu-
sion that the pictures are attended to during studying the 
materials, and that the total fixation time on the pictures 
can be considered normal. Further analysis showed that 
there were no significant differences in mean fixation time 
between the six pictures of the respective mitosis phases 
in terms of mean fixation duration, F < 1, nor was there a 
difference in fixation time on text and pictures between 
the three versions of the materials, F < 1.
To test whether students make relevant (i.e., horizon-
tal) transitions between text and pictures, four types of 
transitions between areas of interest (AOI) were defined. 
We annotated transitions between text sections, between 
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The fifth and final part of the questionnaire presented 
the text once again (in the same condition as in which it 
was studied), but with nineteen key concepts in the text 
underlined (e.g., “chromosome”, “microtubuli”, “centri-
ole”). The students were instructed to draw arrows from 
the underlined words to the corresponding parts of the 
picture for that mitosis phase. For reasons of clarity, they 
were asked to draw circles around these parts in the pic-
tures as well.
The questionnaire was administered in a classroom at 
the students’ respective schools. An experimenter, present 
during the entire procedure, made sure that students were 
not able to look at each other’s answers and kept track of 
time. The experiment took about 30 minutes to complete 
per group of participants.
Scoring, data analysis, and research design
A comprehension score was calculated by awarding a point 
for each correctly answered multiple choice question, by 
awarding a point for each correctly named phase in the 
sorting task, and by giving points for sorting the pictures 
in the sorting task correctly. This yielded a total score of 
maximally 29 points. For the arrow drawing task, a point 
was awarded for each correctly drawn arrow, yielding a 
maximum score of 19. Because not all participants drew 
nineteen arrows or answered all questions, analyses were 
performed on proportions of the total number of arrows 
drawn or the total number of questions answered. So, un-
answered questions and non-drawn arrows were not rated 
as incorrect, but where excluded from analysis.
These analyses yielded a between-participants experi-
mental design with picture type as the independent varia-
ble with three levels: schematic drawings, detailed photo-
graphs, and hybrid pictures. Dependent variables were the 
perceived usefulness of the pictures, perceived cognitive 
load, the proportional comprehension score, and the pro-
the next page, which contained the text and pictures about 
mitosis. The students had exactly five minutes to study 
this page, to ensure that there were no differences in study 
time between participants and conditions. They were in-
structed to study in a similar way as how they would pre-
pare for an exam, and that they had to answer a number of 
questions on this text later on.
Following the study phase, the third part of the ques-
tionnaire was composed of six ten-point Likert scales 
measuring the perceived usefulness of the pictures (e.g., 
“Have you looked at the pictures”, “How useful did you 
think these pictures were in general?”). Also, there were 
five ten-point Likert scales inquiring the perceived cogni-
tive effort involved in studying the text. These questions 
were based on the NASA Task Load Index (TLX), which 
measures perceived cognitive load and experienced time 
pressure (Hart & Staveland, 1988).
The fourth part of the questionnaire measured com-
prehension. Seventeen four-choice questions were an-
swered. Six questions concerned the functions of parts of 
the cells during mitosis (e.g., “What is the function of the 
centromere?”). Six other questions inquired definitions of 
names of cell parts (e.g., “What are microtubuli?”). The re-
maining five questions measured knowledge of dynamics 
and processes during mitosis (e.g., “How do the centrioles 
move in the prometaphase?”). After answering these ques-
tions, the students performed a sorting task. In this sort-
ing task, they saw the six pictures from the text again (in 
the same condition as in which were studied), in a random 
order. The students were asked to write the name of each 
mitosis phase on each picture, as well as a number from 
1 to 6 to indicate the correct order of the pictures. The 
comprehension tests were based on Scheiter et al. (2009)’s 
comprehension test on the same topic.
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during the study phase (i.e., the mean score on the time 
pressure scale was 4.83 out of 10).
Comprehension
The mean proportion of correctly answered questions per 
picture type is shown in Figure 5.3 (left). Analysis of com-
prehension scores revealed a main effect of picture type, 
F(2, 118) = 3.61, p = .030, ηp
2 = .058. Comprehension scores 
in the detailed photographs condition (M = 42.7 %, SD = 
16.7 %) were lower than in the schematic drawings (M = 
50.0 %, SD = 18.4 %) and hybrid pictures conditions (M = 
52.7 %, SD = 15.9 %). Pairwise comparisons showed that 
the difference between the detailed photographs and the 
other two picture types was significant (detailed vs. sche-
matic: p = .050; detailed vs. hybrid: p = .012). The sche-
portion of correctly drawn arrows. We analyzed whether 
these dependent measures were affected by our manip-
ulation using GLM ANOVA’s, and pairwise comparisons 
following Tukey’s LSD procedure. Whether arrow drawing 
performance was associated with learning outcomes was 
tested by means of linear regression.
Results
Control measures
As said, none of the participants had biology as a com-
pulsory subject in their study curriculum. Students in the 
three student programs were equally distributed over the 
three picture type conditions, χ2(4) = 1.46, p = .833. The 
same holds for school year and level, χ2(6) = 2.95, p = .815, 
and age (F < 1). Also, self-reports of the average grade for 
biology in the past and liking biology did not differ across 
conditions, F’s < 1.
Evaluation
For perceived usefulness of the pictures, the rating was 
averaged over six 10-point Likert scales (Cronbach’s α = 
.86). Analysis of the mean perceived usefulness revealed 
an effect of picture type, F(2, 118) = 9.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .139. 
Ratings were the highest for hybrid pictures (M = 6.75, SD 
= 1.84), followed by the schematic drawings (M = 5.86, SD 
= 1.77), and lowest for detailed photographs (M = 4.94, SD 
= 1.84). Pairwise comparisons showed that all conditions 
differed from each other (hybrid vs. schematic: p = .034; 
schematic vs. detailed: p = .020; hybrid vs. detailed p < 
.001).
The five scales for perceived cognitive effort were not 
reliably related (Cronbach’s α = .47), so these measures 
were analyzed separately. These analyses showed no sig-
nificant effects of picture type (F’s < 1.6). Analysis of per-
ceived cognitive effort also indicated that participants 
said not to have experienced a high level of time pressure 
FIGURE 5.3 RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT.
NOTES (LEFT) MEAN PROPORTION OF CORRECTLY ANSWERED QUESTIONS, 
(RIGHT) MEAN PROPORTION OF CORRECTLY DRAWN ARROWS, EACH SPLIT 
BY PICTURE TYPE CONDITION (ERROR BARS ARE +1 STANDARD DEVIATION).
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F(1, 41) = 11.52, p = .002; hybrid pictures: R2 = .12, F(1, 31) 
= 4.26, p = .047).
discussion
We have studied secondary school students’ comprehen-
sion of an expository text combined with representational 
pictures. These pictures were either schematic line draw-
ings, detailed photographs, or hybrid pictures (see Figures 
5.1 and 5.2). We measured whether the type of picture af-
fected students’ ability to identify the referential connec-
tions between text and pictures, and we tested their com-
prehension of the material. The results show that making 
referential connections is supported best by schematic 
and hybrid pictures, and that detailed photographs lead to 
worse performance on this task. Furthermore, better per-
formance on identifying referential connections predicts 
better comprehension.
These results show that the advantage of schematic line 
drawings over detailed photographs is solely attributable 
to added visual emphasis, and not to a reduction of visual 
detail (RQ 1). Compared to detailed photographs, sche-
matic line drawings provide legibility by leaving out (ir-
relevant) visual detail and by visually signaling what is im-
portant through graphical devices such as thick lines and 
dots. The hybrid condition in our experiment also provid-
ed visual emphasis, but did not contain less visual detail 
compared to photographs (see Figure 5.1). Results of both 
arrow drawing and of comprehension show no significant 
differences between schematic and hybrid pictures, while 
both are more effective than detailed photographs. So, 
adding visual emphasis alone leads to learners’ benefits, 
and leaving out visual detail is not necessary for obtaining 
such an advantage.
matic drawings and the hybrid pictures did not differ from 
each other (p = .489).
Arrow drawing
The mean proportion of correctly drawn arrows (i.e., ref-
erential connections between text and picture) per picture 
type condition is shown in Figure 5.3 (right). Analysis of 
arrow drawing scored revealed a main effect of picture 
type, F(1, 117) = 40.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .411. Scores in the de-
tailed drawings condition (M = 45.9 %, SD = 17.3 %) were 
lower than for schematic drawings (M = 74.9 %, SD = 19.7 
%) and hybrid pictures (M = 78.3 %, SD = 15.6 %). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the difference between the de-
tailed drawings and the other two picture types was signif-
icant (detailed vs. schematic: p < .001; detailed vs. hybrid: 
p < .001). The schematic drawings and the hybrid pictures 
conditions did not differ from each other (p = .399).
Association between arrow drawing and 
comprehension
To measure whether a higher proportion of correctly 
drawn arrows (i.e., referential connections) predicted a 
higher proportional comprehension score, we carried out 
linear regressions between the two variables. A higher pro-
portion of correct referential connections was associated 
with higher comprehension scores, β = .47, t(118) = 5.71, 
p < .001. The proportion of correctly drawn arrows signifi-
cantly predicted comprehension scores, R2 = .22, F(1, 118) 
= 32.61, p < .001.
Per picture type, the two measures were similarly asso-
ciated (schematic drawings: β = .44, t(42) = 3.15, p = .003; 
detailed photographs: β = .47, t(41) = 3.39, p = .002; hybrid 
pictures: β = .35, t(31) = 2.06, p = .047). For all picture types, 
the proportion of correctly drawn arrows significantly pre-
dicted comprehension scores (schematic drawings: R2 = 
.19, F(1, 42) = 9.89, p = .003; detailed photographs: R2 = .22, 
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Mayer, 2005). Finding visual referents and thus connecting 
information is impeded with detailed and/or less legible 
pictures, and this may hamper the formation of a presum-
ably unified mental representation (e.g., Ainsworth, 1999, 
2006; Schüler et al., 2015). Adding visual emphasis to de-
tailed pictures (by creating schematic or hybrid pictures) 
aids students in finding these visual referents.
As our study focused on the earlier phases of learning, 
where students make meaningful connections between 
text and pictures by finding visual referents, this may allow 
us to speculate on why earlier comparisons of schematic 
and detailed graphics have resulted in unstable effects 
on comprehension and learning. In some cases, as in the 
aforementioned studies by Mason et al. (2013) and Michas 
and Berry (2000), manipulations of visual detail may have 
had little effect on finding and identifying visual referents. 
This could be caused by detailed/concrete graphics to be 
still relatively simple (as in Mason et al.’s materials). In Mi-
chas and Berry’s study, students learned about procedural 
first aid tasks, and pictures showed concrete situations in-
volving people. Detecting limbs and bandages in realistic 
visual settings is arguably such an everyday cognitive task 
that identifying referents in pictures should not have been 
problematic. Finally, as suggested by Imhof et al. (2011), 
visual detail may also in some settings offer additional 
clues for some specific tasks. In Imhof et al.’s experiment, 
participants’ task was to identify fish, which may also be 
achieved by considering the specific backgrounds (hab-
itats) of the fish species. So, for some tasks, identifying 
visual referents is not an important subprocess in accom-
plishing the task at hand.
Our results are reminiscent of the eye tracking study by 
Mason et al. (2013) on learning about physics and gravita-
tional forces from a written text with either a simplified or 
a more detailed picture. Although their picture can be ar-
Secondly, our results support the view that finding 
visual referents in representation pictures is affected by 
visual emphasis. Detailed photographs proved detrimental 
for students’ abilities to identify the (correct) visual refer-
ents to concepts in the text, compared to schematic and 
hybrid pictures (RQ 2).
Thirdly, the ability to make referential connections is 
related to comprehension. Better performance in the arrow 
drawing test is found to (i.e., identifying visual referents) 
reliably predict higher comprehension scores (RQ 3). These 
results advocate the proposed relationship between sche-
matization in representational pictures, students’ ability 
to identify visual referents, and comprehension. Finding 
visual referents is facilitated by the addition of visual em-
phasis in pictures, which is achieved by schematizing them 
or by creating hybrid versions. Consequently, students are 
aided in making the correct referential connections be-
tween text and pictures, which may make integration the 
two modalities in a single representation cognitively less 
effortful, which means better comprehension. This is in 
line with research on explicit cueing or signaling of refer-
ential connections between the two modalities, which also 
shows that comprehension is improved when students’ 
attention is explicitly guided towards the relevant visual 
referents (e.g., Crooks et al., 2012; De Koning et al., 2009; 
2010; Lowe & Boucheix, 2011; Scheiter & Eitel, 2015).
In terms of the CTML (e.g., Mayer, 1997, 2005), our study 
suggests that detrimental effects of visually detailed pic-
tures (without visual emphasis) on comprehension and 
learning are not solely attributable to increased cognitive 
load caused by seductive details, coherence, or redun-
dancy effects in working memory, but also to perceptual 
constraints caused by a contiguity effect in finding visual 
referents and making meaningful connections between 
text and picture (Harp & Mayer, 1998; Mayer et al., 2001; 
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& Boucheix, 2011; Lowe, Schnotz, & Rasch, 2011). Not only 
the spoken text does not remain available during learn-
ing, the graphics change over time as well. This expectably 
hampers making meaningful referential connections, and 
amplifies benefits of schematization. Comparing static to 
animated graphics is an interesting direction for future re-
search in the context of our investigation into the benefits 
of schematic graphics over detailed ones. It would however 
require substantially more complex methodology.
Practical applications and advise for instructional de-
signers arise from our work as well. The fact that hybrid 
pictures did not perform worse than schematic pictures 
on our dependent measures, and that students appear to 
appreciate this type of picture the most, advocates in fa-
vor of using hybrid pictures in expository materials. To our 
knowledge, such hybrid pictures, in which detailed pho-
tographs are superimposed with schematic line drawings, 
are relatively rare in (educational) practice. Still, hybrid 
pictures may have an additional advantage in some do-
mains and circumstances when students can benefit from 
knowing what the subject of study looks like in reality, 
without suffering from the detrimental effects of using de-
tailed, realistic pictures without visual emphasis. A second 
practical implication of our findings is, in line with previ-
ous research on cueing, is that visual emphasis that explic-
itly guides student’s attention may help them to identify 
relevant visual referents, which entails better comprehen-
sion. Overall, it can be argued that providing students with 
support for making relevant connections between text and 
pictures is very much advisable in practice.
This chapter fits in a recently renowned interest in the 
effectiveness of schematic or simplified graphics versus 
detailed or photographic ones, that is observed in the re-
search literature (e.g., Butcher, 2006; Imhof et al., 2011; 
Mason et al., 2013; Rodicio, 2012; Scheiter et al., 2009). Re-
gued to be more of a diagram than a representational pic-
ture (it shows an abstract situation of an object on a slope, 
with arrows to indicate forces), their analysis of eye gaze 
patterns during studying suggests similar findings than 
our present work does. Mason et al. report that making 
transitions between picture and text is facilitated by the 
simplified picture, and that there is a correlation between 
the number of picture-to-text transitions and perfor-
mance on an immediate knowledge test in their simplified 
picture condition. So, together with our findings, Mason et 
al.’s results suggest that integration between text and pic-
ture is facilitated by using simpler graphics, and that this 
positively affects comprehension. However, transitions 
between picture and text do not directly measure how well 
students can accomplish this integration (i.e., by making 
referential connections). We consider our arrow drawing 
results a valuable addition to this line of research. Our re-
sults possibly add to this converging evidence, as it sup-
ports a more perception-based account for the potential 
benefits of schematic representational graphics for learn-
ing and comprehension.
Our work also brings to mind other studies that focused 
on the case of learning about mitosis (e.g., She & Chen, 
2009), and in particular Scheiter et al.’s (2009) work on 
schematic animations versus detailed microscopic videos 
of mitosis, accompanied by spoken text. Scheiter et al. also 
report an advantage of schematization on comprehension, 
and their effects seem to be somewhat stronger than what 
we report in this chapter. We speculate that this is attrib-
utable to differences between time-critical animation and 
static text and pictures. Although an animation provides 
more explicit information about temporal changes in the 
process of mitosis, it arguably comes at the cost of needing 
to process considerable quantities of information that is 
available for only a restricted time (e.g., Lowe, 1999; Lowe 
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search into the potential benefits and drawbacks of visual 
detail on comprehension and learning remains an immi-
nent direction for research. Especially in the light of recent 
technological advances, and how expository materials are 
moving away from print towards high quality digital dis-
plays, the degree of visual detail that such materials can 
encompass has never been higher than today.
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We present an analytic and a large scale experimental comparison of two 
informationally equivalent information displays of soccer statistics. Both 
displays were presented by the BBC during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. 
The displays mainly differ in terms of the number and types of cognitively 
natural mappings between visual variables and meaning. Theoretically, 
such natural form-meaning mappings help users to interpret the 
information quickly and easily. However, our analysis indicates that the 
design which contains most of these mappings is inevitably inconsistent 
in how forms and meanings are mapped to each other. The experiment 
shows that this was detrimental for how fast people can find information 
in the display, and for which display people prefer to use. Our findings 
shed new light on the well-established cognitive design principle of 
natural mapping: While in theory information designs may benefit from 
natural mapping, in practice its applicability may be limited. Information 
designs that contain a high amount of form-meaning mappings, for 
example for aesthetic reasons, risk being inconsistent and too complex 
for users, leading them to find information less quickly and less easily.
Chapter 6
Understanding a visually 
rich information display
introduction
Soccer is one of the most popular sports worldwide. Print 
and online media present reports to communicate what 
happened during important games. Often, these reports 
contain displays that visualize quantitative information 
about the games, such as possession of the ball, free kicks 
taken, and goals scored. Such displays come in visually 
attractive formats, designed not only to be clear and ef-
ficient, but also to be engaging and fun to consult. In this 
chapter, we analyze and experimentally evaluate two ex-
amples of such displays, focusing on how efficiency and 
use are affected by their design.
During and after the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the BBC 
presented two different displays of soccer stats (British 
this chapter is based on:
Westerbeek, H., Van Amelsvoort, M., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2014). 
Effects of cognitive design principles on user’s performance and 
preference: A large scale evaluation of a soccer stats display. 
Information Design Journal, 21(2), 129—145.
An earlier version of this work has been presented in:
Van Amelsvoort, M. & Westerbeek, H. (2012). Visualizing football 
statistics: Performance and Preference. In Proceedings of 
Staging knowledge and experience: How to take advantage of 
representational technologies in education and training? (EARLI SiG 
2), Grenoble, France.
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FIGURE 6.1 THE FIELD DISPLAY, AS USED IN OUR ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENT. 
BELOW: THE “MORE STATS” PANEL OF THE FIELD DISPLAY.
FIGURE 6.2 THE LIST DISPLAY, AS USED IN OUR ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENT.
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sign that exploits the workings of human perception (e.g,. 
Tversky, Kugelmass, & Winter, 1991; Hegarty, 2011). For 
example, by making a visual element larger, it naturally 
expresses something that is ‘greater than’ or ‘more than’ 
an element that is smaller. As shown in the right panel of 
Figure 6.1, for instance, the cross that displays 10 fouls of 
one team is smaller than the cross displaying the 12 fouls 
of the other team. Another example of cognitively natu-
ral design in Figure 6.1 is that elements of one team are 
shown in another color than elements of the other team. 
By giving things different colors, the design naturally con-
veys that these things belong to different categories.
This idea of natural mapping is proposed in the litera-
ture in several ways, ranging from practical design advice 
to the cognitive underpinnings of the visual system. De-
signers are advised to map the visual appearance of ele-
ments in a display to meaning in a way that is “compatible” 
with visual perception (Kosslyn, 2006), or that “capitalizes 
on the human facility for processing visual information” 
(Agrawala, Li, & Berthouzoz, 2011; Vande Moere & Pur-
chase, 2011). Cognitive scientists argue that natural de-
sign-meaning mappings are those that have their origins 
in the body and the world (Tversky et al., 1991; Tversky, 
2011b). For example, a large quantity of something in the 
everyday world takes up more space, so a visualization of a 
large quantity should be sized accordingly. This approach 
is closely related to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980): Natural design-meaning mappings are 
grounded in everyday perception and action. The natural-
ness of some mappings has also gained support in experi-
ments in which people produce visualizations, which show 
that people converge on mappings of time, places and 
people (Kessel & Tversky, 2008; 2011), and of quantities or 
qualities (Tversky et al., 1991). This makes it conceivable 
that information can be displayed in ways that are more 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2010). There was an innova-
tive field-based display (reproduced in Figure 6.1), and a 
more conventional and simple list-based one (Figure 6.2). 
Both displays show the same statistics (i.e., they are in-
formationally equivalent; Larkin & Simon, 1987), but do 
so in a different way. The field display is more ‘realistic’ as 
it shows some analogies to the real world: It looks like a 
football field, and there is a clock in the middle of the field. 
A more general difference between the displays is that the 
field display uses more design features to convey meaning. 
Information elements (for example the number of corners) 
are defined by using different colors, different sizes and 
different forms, and the positioning of these elements also 
plays a role in their interpretation. These differences raise 
the question: Which of these visualizations is better? Do 
the added design features and analogies in the field display 
help users to find information more quickly, or do they 
lead to a ‘design overload’ that may be more pleasurable, 
but harder to interpret?
The goal of asking these questions however is not to 
propose a more efficient, more pleasurable, and easier to 
interpret redesign of the stats display. Instead, the rele-
vance of our question goes beyond these two displays and 
soccer (stats). It touches upon a more fundamental ques-
tion in data visualization and human cognition, namely 
how complex real-world data should be visualized, tai-
lored to the workings of human perception (e.g., Larkin 
& Simon, 1987; Hegarty, 2011; Tversky, 2011a; Zhang & 
Norman, 1994). Our research focuses on the theoretical as-
sumption that natural mapping in an information display 
is beneficial for its users. According to this assumption, 
an information display that is designed in such a way that 
elements in the display express a meaning that is cogni-
tively natural is more efficient to use than a display that is 
not designed in that way. Cognitively natural design is de-
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ers with more handles to understand the meaning of the 
elements. This leads to a more efficient display in which 
information can be found more easily (more quickly), and 
that is enjoyable to use. On the other hand, increasing the 
number of visual variables can lead to ‘overload’. We use 
the term overload because interpreting the meaning of 
one information element (e.g., the number of corners of 
a team) can depend on considering as many as four visual 
variables (color, size, form, and space). This may impede 
finding information, and could also discount appreciation 
for the visualization. Furthermore, potentially, when a de-
sign encompasses more design choices, the risk of apply-
ing these choices inconsistently may increase.
To explore the effects of using many visual variables in 
a richly designed information display on both efficiency 
and user preferences, we compare the two displays both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative analysis 
describes the field display in terms of how design choices 
convey meaning, and compares this to the list display. This 
analysis is aimed at providing a detailed description of the 
two displays under discussion, and exploring possible ad-
vantages or problems of the designs. In the quantitative 
comparison, we address the question whether our findings 
from the qualitative analysis have repercussions for actual 
efficiency of the displays, and for user preferences. There-
fore we conduct a large-scale user evaluation experiment 
in which we measure how quickly people can find infor-
mation, and which display they prefer given a number of 
usage scenarios.
Analysis of the displays
This qualitative analysis is structured in terms of Bertin’s 
(1981) description of visual variables (see Carpendale, 
2003 for a comprehensive overview). Bertin describes how 
natural than others. As such, an information display that 
makes extensive use of natural mapping is easier to un-
derstand, and preferred by users over displays that make 
little use of such techniques. However, it remains unclear 
whether adding more of such mappings to a display makes 
it better.
The beneficial effects of using such natural mappings 
in information designs have been investigated using rela-
tively simple designs in experiments, such as single charts 
(e.g., Zacks & Tversky, 1999; Shah & Friedman, 2011). How 
the design principle of natural mapping scales up to more 
complex designs remains largely unexplored however (see 
Hegarty, 2011). In order to explore natural mapping in a 
more complex, real-life display, we analyze and compare 
the BBC’s soccer stats displays. These displays, shown in 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2, differ in terms of the amount of natural 
mappings they employ to convey meaning. In our analysis 
we will show that the field display contains a considera-
ble number of different design features (i.e., differences 
in color, size, form, and space), which are mapped onto 
different meanings (i.e., different teams, different quan-
tities). Each information element obtains meaning from a 
number of these features, for which we use the term visual 
variables (Bertin, 1981; Carpendale, 2003). The alternative, 
list-based display represents the same information in a de-
sign that uses a smaller amount of such design-meaning 
mappings.
A comparison of the displays is a benchmark test of 
the general applicability of natural mapping as a design 
principle, and an exploration into what happens when 
the amount of mappings in a display is relatively high. On 
the one hand, increasing the number of visual variables 
in an information display may be ‘the more, the better’: 
When more design-meaning mappings are used to convey 
meaning to information elements, the design provides us-
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The analyses below describe how different visual varia-
bles (color, size, form, and space) are used to convey mean-
ings on different levels of precision (nominal, ordinal, and 
interval) in the two soccer stats displays under discussion. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize these design-meaning map-
pings for both displays.
The field display
The display presented in Figure 6.1 is reminiscent of an 
actual soccer field, with information elements distributed 
on this field. On the center line there is a clock display-
ing events that occurred during the ninety minutes of the 
game (goals, bookings, substitutions). Additional informa-
tion elements are available when a user clicks on the “more 
stats” button in the bottom of the display. This reveals a 
panel that shows attendance, fouls, free kicks, and offsides 
(Figure 6.1, right panel). Table 6.1 summarizes how each 
visual variable adds meaning to the individual information 
elements in the field display. Below, we discuss the role of 
each of the four visual variables in the display.
All information elements in the field display have a color 
that corresponds to a soccer team. So, color adds informa-
tion on the nominal level: It assigns elements to each of 
the teams. This usage of color is consistent throughout the 
display because it applies to every element. Independent 
of this grouping of elements by team, the color of red and 
yellow cards on the clock is analogous to real soccer. Note 
that these cards are grouped by team through colored lines 
that connect them to the clock.
The size of elements in the field display represents 
quantity. The rectangles that show shots on/off goal are 
larger as the number of shots increases, and thus show 
interval information. In doing that, they also imply or-
dinal information, as it allows users to see which team 
shot the most. The same holds for corners, free kicks, and 
visual features of information elements can vary in a dis-
play, and how this variation can convey meaning. Elements 
can, for example, vary in terms of color, size, location, and 
form − where the latter, form, is the appearance of an ele-
ment and encompasses what an element looks like (i.e., its 
shape and texture). For example, in the field display fouls 
are represented as crosses, and goals are visualized as little 
balls. As such, form also includes any visual analogies (i.e., 
iconicity) in the element.
If elements differ on a visual variable, this expresses 
meaning by defining what the elements visualize (e.g., Ber-
tin, 1981; Tversky, 2001; 2011a). In the case of the soccer 
display, for instance, elements with different colors belong 
to different soccer teams. So, color expresses meaning by 
defining different groups in the data. But visual variables 
can express meaning on different levels of precision (nom-
inal, ordinal, interval, ratio; see Tversky et al., 1991; Tver-
sky, 2001). A difference in appearance between elements 
creates groups, which is information on the nominal level. 
Meaning can also be expressed on an ordinal level: The 
location of elements in the space of the visualization can 
bring order to them, such that elements can precede or 
follow each other. And when the distance between these 
elements is meaningful, interval level information be-
comes available (much alike Bertin’s associative and or-
der characteristics of visual variables; Carpendale, 2003). 
Changes in visual variables can also express information 
on the ratio level by displaying proportions, for example in 
a segmented bar chart, where the sizes of segments repre-
sent proportions (MacDonald-Ross, 1977). The four levels 
of precision (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio) are ordered 
inclusively (Tversky, 2001): Information that is defined on 
one level of precision (e.g., interval) implies definition on 
the previous levels as well (e.g., nominal and ordinal).
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TABLE 6.1 ANALYSIS OF THE FIELD DISPLAY.
VISUAL VARIABELS
COLOR SIZE FORM SPACE/LOCATION
SHOTS ON / OFF GOAL
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
ORDINAL SIZE OF THE ELEMENT 
INCREASES BY QUANTITY
NOMINAL SHOTS ON/OFF GOAL 
HAVE GOT A UNIQUE SQUARE 
SHAPE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL LOCATION IS RELATED 
TO REAL SOCCER EVENT 
(ICONIC)
CORNERS
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
ORDINAL SIZE OF THE ELEMENT 
INCREASES BY QUANTITY
NOMINAL CORNERS HAVE GOT 
A UNIQUE CIRCULAR ANGLE 
SHAPE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL LOCATION IS RELATED 
TO REAL SOCCER EVENT 
(ICONIC)
GOALS
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE LINE 
GROUPS IT BY TEAM
NOMINAL GOALS HAVE GOT A 
UNIQUE ICON (BALL)
ORDINAL LOCATION ON THE 
TIME CIRCLE STANDS FOR 
POINT IN TIME (RELATIONAL)
BOOKINGS 
(YELLOW AND RED CARDS)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE LINE 
GROUPS IT BY TEAM
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE CARD 
ICON CORRESPONDS TO TYPE 
OF BOOKING
NOMINAL BOOKINGS HAVE GOT 
A UNIQUE ICON (CARD)
ORDINAL LOCATION ON THE 
TIME CIRCLE STANDS FOR 
POINT IN TIME (RELATIONAL)
SUBSTITUTIONS
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE LINE 
GROUPS IT BY TEAM
NOMINAL SUBSTITUTIONS 
HAVE GOT A UNIQUE SYMBOL 
(DOUBLE ARROW)
ORDINAL LOCATION ON THE 
TIME CIRCLE STANDS FOR 
POINT IN TIME (RELATIONAL)
POSSESSION OF THE BALL
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE BAR 
SEGMENT CORRESPONDS TO 
TEAM
RATIO SIZE OF THE BAR 






NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
ORDINAL SIZE OF THE CHART 
ELEMENT INCREASES BY 
QUANTITY
NOMINAL FREE KICKS HAVE 
GOT A UNIQUE SHAPE (CIRCLE)
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
CORRESPONDS WITH TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
FOULS
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
ORDINAL SIZE OF THE CHART 
ELEMENT INCREASES BY 
QUANTITY
NOMINAL FOULS HAVE GOT A 
UNIQUE SHAPE (CROSS)
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
CORRESPONDS WITH TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
OFFSIDE
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
ORDINAL HEIGHT OF THE BAR 
INCREASES BY QUANTITY
NOMINAL OFFSIDES IS THE 
ONLY BAR CHART
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
CORRESPONDS WITH TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
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left-right organization of elements is not exerted relative-
ly to the field, but per pair of elements. The left element 
of each pair corresponds to one team, the right to the oth-
er. The location of these element pairs relative to the field 
does not bear meaning.
Another relational use of space is found in how the clock 
in the center of the display visualizes time. It is important 
to note that mapping time on space is arguably very natu-
ral. For example, people make this mapping spontaneously 
when producing visualizations (Tversky et al., 1991). And, 
when talking about time, people often use spatial meta-
phors (Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), for example 
when we say that “something lies behind us”, or when 
something is “far away into the future”. It has even been 
argued that mental representations of time are essentially 
partly built out of representations of space (Casasanto & 
Boriditsky, 2008).
While mapping time on space is very natural, it intro-
duces additional inconsistency in the meaning of location 
in the field display. Besides the left-right nominal group-
ing of elements, the clock in the center of the display use 
space to define ordinal and interval aspects of elements. 
The location of event elements on the clock (goals, book-
ings, and substitutions) expresses the order in which 
events took place. Also, the distance between events on 
the clock is meaningful, as it expresses temporal intervals 
between these elements.
Taken together, space is used to define all elements in 
the display, but it is used in an ambiguous way. It can be 
iconic (space means space) or relational (space groups and 
orders), and this is different for different elements. Fur-
thermore, the grouping sometimes works on the display as 
a whole, and sometimes per pair of elements. Finally, space 
is used to express both nominal and interval information. 
Analogies with the real world also play an inconsistent 
fouls (Figure 6.1). The use of size in the display is how-
ever somewhat inconsistent, as it is not available for all 
elements (it does not apply to those placed on the clock). 
And, size is used to display ratio information too, namely 
in the segmented bar chart (cf. MacDonald-Ross, 1977) in 
the center of the display, that shows possession of the ball.
Each type of element in the display has its own distinct 
form, including the graphs in the “more stats” panel (Fig-
ure 6.1, lower panel). So, form provides meaning on the 
nominal level. What is inconsistent about the use of form 
in the display however, is the relationship between an 
element’s form and its meaning. This relationship rang-
es from analogies with real soccer (balls represent goals, 
little cards represent yellow and red cards awarded in the 
game), to something that is more symbolic (e.g., crosses 
for fouls, quarter circles for corners), and to shapes that 
bear no visual similarity to what they represent at all (e.g., 
circles for free kicks, rectangles for shots on goal).
Each element has a location in the field display, and 
this location bears meaning. The field display is a hybrid 
display (Hegarty, 2011, p. 449), because it uses space in 
two ways. The elements displaying shots on/off goal and 
corners are located iconically: Their location is analogous 
to locations on an actual football field, and space in the 
display is thus used to represent space in the real world. 
Location is however also used relationally: It groups and 
orders all elements in the display. This hybrid usage of 
space means that the meaning of the visual variable space 
is ambiguous within the display.
Looking at the relational use of location only, more 
inconsistencies become apparent. Elements are grouped 
by team as elements on the left of the field belong to one 
team, and elements on the right to the other. This left-
right organization relative to the field is applied to shots 
and corners. However, for fouls, free kicks, and offsides the 
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There is only one analogy to actual soccer in the display, 
and that is in the display of bookings. These are visualized 
with little red and yellow cards next to player names in the 
list display, similar to what is the case in the field display.
Conclusions qualitative analysis
From the analyses of the two displays a generalizable ob-
servation emerges. When visual variables are ‘stacked’ 
(i.e., a high number of visual variables is used to define 
information elements) problems with consistency of de-
sign-meaning mappings may become hard to avoid. Fur-
thermore, analogies in a display can potentially lead to 
problems as well. They can mislead, because they may sug-
gest that they are important in defining elements in a dis-
play (while they are not). It may be difficult to apply analo-
gies to all elements in hybrid displays as well, so analogies 
are easily inconsistent in a display (i.e., some elements 
derive meaning from visually salient analogies while other 
elements do not).
We have established that the field display contains 
more visual variables that convey meaning than the list 
display, providing more handles to find information. But 
it may also confuse users due to inconsistencies in map-
pings, and the applicability of analogies. Does this have re-
percussions for users when they are searching for informa-
tion? The analyses raise a number of expectations about 
how easily users can find information in the displays, and 
about preferences that users might have. These expecta-
tions are based on the observation that resulted from our 
qualitative analysis: When many visual variables express 
design-meaning mappings within a single display, incon-
sistencies and ambiguities may arise, and this may slow 
down users in finding information. It may also influence 
preferences that users have for different types of displays. 
role when it comes to space in the display. Some elements 
derive meaning from their location on the football field, 
and the way in which events are placed on a circle is anal-
ogous to how clocks work. And then there is inconsistency 
in these analogies as well. The location of elements on the 
field ignores the fact that, in reality, soccer teams shoot on 
the other side of the field, and that teams switch sides half-
way through a game. And, unlike real clocks, a full circle 
in the display does not make up sixty but ninety minutes.
The list display
The list display (Figure 6.2) appears to be more abstract 
than the field display, as there are no salient visual analo-
gies like football fields and clocks in it. Although this dis-
play is more text-reliant than the field display, and there-
fore significantly less visual variables are used to express 
meaning, still some forms of graphic organization play a 
role in the list display.
The table-like structure of the list display organizes in-
formation elements along two axes: the vertical (y) axis, 
and the horizontal (x) axis. The segmented bar charts on 
the bottom end of the display also fit in this x−y structure.
All organization along the x axis is nominal, as informa-
tion of one team is on the left, and information of the oth-
er team is on the right. This left-right grouping by space 
is consistent throughout the whole display. Space is only 
used in this relational way, and does not represent any 
other type of information (like it displays time intervals in 
the field display). Comparable to the field display, elements 
are consistently grouped by team by using different colors 
for each team. Finally, size is consistently used to display 
ratio-level information, as all segmented bar charts in the 
list display work along the same principles. Table 6.2 sum-
marizes the design-meaning mappings in the list display.
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TABLE 6.2 ANALYSIS OF THE LIST DISPLAY.
VISUAL VARIABELS
COLOR SIZE FORM SPACE/LOCATION
SHOTS ON / OFF GOAL
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
RATIO SIZE OF THE BAR 
SEGMENT CORRESPONDS TO 
PERCENTAGE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
CORNERS
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
RATIO SIZE OF THE BAR 
SEGMENT CORRESPONDS TO 
PERCENTAGE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
GOALS
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
BOOKINGS 
(YELLOW AND RED CARDS)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE CARD 
ICON CORRESPONDS TO TYPE 
OF BOOKING
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE CARD 




GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
POSSESSION OF THE BALL
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
RATIO SIZE OF THE BAR 
SEGMENT CORRESPONDS TO 
PERCENTAGE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
FREE KICKS
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
RATIO SIZE OF THE BAR 
SEGMENT CORRESPONDS TO 
PERCENTAGE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
FOULS
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
RATIO SIZE OF THE BAR 
SEGMENT CORRESPONDS TO 
PERCENTAGE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
OFFSIDE
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
RATIO SIZE OF THE BAR 
SEGMENT CORRESPONDS TO 
PERCENTAGE
NOMINAL LEFT-RIGHT 
GROUPING BY TEAM 
(RELATIONAL)
NOMINAL COLOR OF THE 
ELEMENT GROUPS IT BY TEAM
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want to be entertained. The mapping of temporal aspects 
of the game on a spatial representation (i.e., the clock) can 
lead to people preferring the field display when they want 
to see the time course of the game and figure out how the 
game developed. The list display, on the other hand, may 
appear simpler and more conventional, and could be pre-
ferred for tasks like getting a quick idea of the game, and 
remembering data.
We test our expectations in a large-scale user evalua-
tion of the two displays.
quantitative comparison 
of the displays
In the quantitative comparison, we address the question 
whether the differences between the displays described 
in the qualitative analysis have repercussions for the ef-
ficiency and appeal of the displays when they are actually 
used. Therefore, we compare how quickly users can find in-
formation in the field display, compared to the list display 
− and whether they prefer one display over the other.
method
participants
539 Participants (210 women and 329 men, with a median 
age of 23 years, ranging from 8 to 74) volunteered to take 
part in the study. They were recruited by students in an 
introductory methodology course.
Materials
The BBC displays for three games played during the actual 
2010 World Cup served as the basis for the experimental 
materials. In the previous sections, we have analyzed how 
the two displays differ in terms of the levels of precision 
(nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio) on which visual variables 
(color, size, form, space) express meaning. In the field dis-
The BBC’s soccer stats displays form an interesting design 
case that we use to attest these expectations.
So, for these displays we expect that finding and com-
bining information is faster when the list display is used, 
relative to the field display. This is not just because some 
information in the field display is on the “more stats” pan-
el and clicking that button obviously takes some time, but 
because of the differences in the information design be-
tween the two displays. Previous studies suggest that nat-
ural mappings of design variables to meaning in a display 
helps users to find information efficiently (e.g., Tversky, 
2001; Tversky, 2011a), and that such natural mappings 
aid in making inferences (Kessel & Tversky, 2011), and in 
comparing information elements to each other. One might 
interpret these findings as leading to the expectation that 
finding and combining information in the field display is 
faster than in the list display, as the former display em-
ploys more natural mappings than the latter. However, our 
observations in the qualitative analysis leads to a contrary 
expectation. We predict that the list display is faster than 
the field display, because the stacking of visual variables in 
the field display can lead to inconsistency and ambiguity.
In comparing the displays, we take special interest in 
how easily users can deduce information about temporal 
aspects of the games. For such information, the field dis-
play is expected to have a clear advantage over the list dis-
play because the field display visualizes temporal aspects 
of events that take place during a game in its clock.
Our expectations about appreciation of the displays and 
preferences that the users have for the displays in certain 
usage contexts are more speculative. Because the field dis-
play contains more design features than the list display 
(i.e., it has more variation in visual variables and it has 
salient likenesses to a soccer field), this could mean that 
people appreciate it more, and prefer to use it when they 
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Fourteen questions about the games were composed. To 
answer each question, participants were required to find 
information in the displays. Four questions related to in-
formation that was on the “more stats” panel in the field 
display, and thus required participants to click a button to 
find the information. The other ten questions inquired in-
formation that was directly available in the two displays. 
Within this set of ten non-click questions, we defined two 
subsets. There was one subset of three questions which 
inquired temporal information, for example by asking in 
which half of the game the first goal was scored. The sec-
ond subset (six questions) required participants to com-
bine multiple information elements, by requiring a com-
parison to be made (e.g., deciding which team shot on goal 
the most), or inferences to be drawn (e.g., finding which 
player scored the winning goal). Some questions required 
information to be combined and inquired temporal aspects 
of the games at the same time, while other questions did 
neither of the two.
procedure
The study was carried out through a web-based interface. 
The participants completed the experiment individually. 
They first read a general introduction, telling them that 
they were going to take part in a study about soccer. Then, 
the fourteen questions had to be answered for one game 
using one of the two displays, and then for another game 
with the other display. The questions were answered one 
at a time: Participants typed an answer, and by pressing 
enter or clicking “next”, the next question appeared on the 
screen. The order of the displays and the games used were 
counterbalanced throughout the experiment, and the or-
der of the questions was randomized for each participant 
and display. The questions and the displays were present-
ed in a split-screen view with the soccer stats on the left 
and the questions on the right. After answering all ques-
play, the high amount of mappings between visual varia-
bles and meaning has the consequence that mappings be-
come inconsistent or ambiguous throughout the display. 
This can be seen in Table 6.1: The meaning expressed by 
one visual variable (one column in the table) is not the 
same for all information elements in the field display. 
Additionally, analogies with reality sometimes add mean-
ing. This is also inconsistent though: Only a few elements 
get additional meaning by analogies with real football or 
clocks. While the display’s most salient spatial character-
istic is that it looks like a soccer field, this analogy has a 
very limited scope.
The list display, on the other hand, is very consistent in 
the few design-meaning mappings that it employs. Table 
6.2 shows that the meaning of the different visual varia-
bles is consistent throughout the list display: Mappings 
for one visual variable (i.e., one column in Table 6.2) are 
nearly identical for all elements. The list display does not 
make use of salient analogies to the real world, such as a 
football field and a clock.
A few slight alterations were made to the BBC displays 
prior to the quantitive experiment. To make sure that par-
ticipants would not recognize the actual games and base 
their answers on that knowledge, team names were re-
placed by generic animal names (e.g., Wolves vs. Bears), 
and player names were replaced by common surnames. 
The displays were placed on a dark gray background. To 
make the views fully informationally equivalent, timings 
of bookings and the number of free kicks were added to the 
list displays (these were not present on the original BBC 
displays). A footnote was written below the field display to 
emphasize that clicking on the display would reveal more 
stats. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show both displays for one of the 
games, as they were used in the experiment.
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Results
Search times
Analysis of search times, shown in Figure 6.3, revealed a 
significant effect of display used, F(1, 476) = 95.87, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .168. Search times for answering questions using the 
field view (M =  16.5 s) were slower than when the list view 
was used (M = 14.4 s).
We also looked at the mean search time for questions 
that inquire temporal information, as we expected that the 
field display would have an advantage over the list display 
because it visualizes time. This analysis of a subset of the 
questions however revealed an opposite effect of display 
used on search times, F(1, 476) = 62.14, p < .001, ηp
2 = .115): 
Search times were slower when the field display was used 
(M = 18.3 s) than when the list display was used (M = 15.0 
s).
tions using both displays, appreciation for the displays was 
measured. The participants chose one of the two displays 
based on three statements concerning clarity, usability, 
and, completeness. Then, preferences were inquired: Par-
ticipants chose a display on the basis of seven short usage 
scenarios (e.g., “which display is better if you want to see 
how the match developed?”).
Research design and statistical 
analysis
Search times were calculated by logging the time span be-
tween the appearance of a question on the screen, and the 
appearance of the next question. Therefore, the measured 
search times included reading the questions, searching the 
display, and typing the answer. This was the same through-
out both conditions in the experiment.
Search times for the four questions that required par-
ticipants to click the “more stats” button in the field dis-
play were not analyzed, because this would obviously only 
affect search times in the field display, leading to a delay 
that cannot be (solely) ascribed to the difference in visual 
properties of the displays. For the other ten questions 
10,780 search times were recorded. We discarded all search 
times times for incorrect answers (n = 844), and correct re-
sponses that took longer than sixty seconds (n = 269). This 
outlier procedure resulted in discarding 10 % of the data. 
For each participant, we calculated mean search times for 
the ten non-click questions and the subsets of questions.
The search times were analyzed using repeated meas-
ures ANOVA’s, with display and type of question as with-
in-participants factors, and search time as the dependent 
measure. The appreciation and preference measures were 
analyzed with chi-square tests against equal proportions.
FIGURE 6.3 MEAN SEARCH TIME PER DISPLAY AND QUESTION TYPE.
NOTE ERROR BARS ARE +1 STANDARD DEVIATION.
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display when it came to “seeing the development of the 
game”, (χ2(1) = 55.28, p < .001). There was also a preference 
for the field display for “watching the information for fun” 
(χ2(1) = 80.37, p < .001). There was no significant difference 
between the proportion of participants that preferred the 
field display and those that preferred the list display when 
it came to “explaining the game to someone else” (χ2(1) = 
2.88, p = .09) and “understanding the game” (χ2(1) = 1.19, 
p = .28).
Analysis of search times for questions that required in-
ferences or comparisons between elements again revealed 
a main effect of the display that was used, F(1, 506) = 31.19, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .058). This main effect was qualified by an 
interaction with the type of question (display × question 
type, F(1, 506) = 35.99, p < .001, ηp
2 = .066). When answering 
a question required an inference to be made, search times 
were slower when the field display was used (M = 18.4 s) 
than when the list display was used (M = 15.3 s), F(1, 506) 
= 57.96, p < .001, ηp
2 = .103). This difference between the 
two displays was not present when answering a question 
required information elements to be compared: The differ-
ence between search times when the field display was used 
(M = 15.6 s) and when the list display was used (M = 15.4 s) 
was not significant, F < 1.
Appreciation of the displays
Analysis of the two-alternative forced choices concerning 
appreciation, shown in Figure 6.4, revealed that the list 
display was found to be useful by more participants than 
the field display (χ2(1) = 79.14, p < .001). The same holds 
for clarity (χ2(1) = 79.14, p < .001) and completeness (χ2(1) 
= 5.14, p < .025).
Preference for the displays
Analysis of the preferences, shown in Figure 6.4, revealed 
that more participants preferred the list display over the 
field display for three of the seven usage scenarios. The list 
display was preferred over the field display for “having an 
overview of the match” (χ2(1) = 73.64, p < .001). The list 
display was not only faster with regard to the search times, 
more participants preferred the list display of the field dis-
play for wanting to “view the game quickly” (χ2(1) = 66.28, 
p < .001). The list display was also preferred by most people 
for “remembering the information” (χ2(1) = 22.74, p < .001).
Concerning the other four scenarios, in line with our 
expectations users did show a preference for the field 
FIGURE 6.4 PREFERENCES FOR THE DISPLAYS, EXPRESSED AS THE 
PERCENTAGE OF USERS PREFERRING EACH DISPLAY.
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General discussion
In this study, we have compared two real-world informa-
tionally equivalent displays of soccer stats (Figures 6.1 
and 6.2), to address the more general question of how data 
should be visually displayed. We have compared the dis-
plays in a qualitative analysis, and in a large-scale quan-
titative user evaluation, to examine the assumption that 
cognitively natural design-meaning mapping in an infor-
mation display is beneficial for users.
The results of the qualitative analysis, summarized in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2, show that the displays differ in terms 
of the number of design-meaning mappings they employ, 
and that having more of such mappings increases the risk 
of using the same visual variable for different meanings. 
Also, some mappings do not apply to all information el-
ements. To test whether these differences between the 
displays have repercussions for the efficiency and appeal 
of the displays when they are actually used, we conducted 
a large-scale quantitative user evaluation of the displays 
to measure performance (search times) and preferences of 
the users.
The quantitative evaluation showed that the more rich-
ly designed (and, as a consequence, inconsistent) field-
based display (Figure 6.1) led to slower search times than 
the list display (Figure 6.2) when users were asked to find 
information and answer questions about soccer games. 
This is largely in line with our expectations, as our anal-
ysis of the displays yielded the observation that the field 
display’s performance may be compromised as a result of 
having inconsistencies and ambiguity in design-meaning 
mappings. This also led to the field display being slower for 
answering questions that required inferences to be made. 
However, for questions concerning temporal aspects of the 
soccer games we expected the opposite. Because the field 
Conclusions quantitative experiment
The search time analyses revealed that the field display led 
to significantly slower responses than the list display. We 
expected that the field display would be slower than the 
list display overall, but we did not expect that this was also 
the case when participants had to answer questions that 
inquired temporal aspects of the games. No advantage of 
the field display’s visualization of time was found in the 
search times − on the contrary, the field display is slower 
than the list display.
We also compared search times for the two displays 
for questions that required an inference to be made (e.g., 
“which player scored the winning goal?”), and that re-
quired multiple information elements to be compared 
(e.g., “which team had the most shots on goal?”). We found 
that the field display is slower than the list display for an-
swering questions that require inferences (Kessel & Tver-
sky, 2011; Tversky, 2001; Tversky, 2011a). But concerning 
questions that required information elements to be com-
pared, no significant difference in search time was found.
Looking at appreciation and preferences, our (tentative) 
expectations were supported by the data. The list display 
was found to be more useful, clear, and complete than the 
field display. The field display was only preferred over the 
list display when it came to watching the information for 
fun, and seeing the development of the match. This latter 
preference contrasted with the findings from the search 
time analysis: After using the displays participants indi-
cated that they appreciated the visualization of temporal 
information in the field display, yet they did not seem to 
take advantage of it in terms of efficiency.
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consistencies in how these multiple visual variables define 
the element, and that analogies in a design may be mis-
leading. To disentangle these potential causes for a rich 
design to become less efficient, experiments can be carried 
out that take performance measures while systematically 
varying the number of visual variables, consistencies, and 
analogies in a design.
Can the differences in search times between the two 
displays also be ascribed to the possibility that the list 
display may be more conventional as a display of soccer 
stats than the field display is? Users of information dis-
plays apply knowledge of display conventions (i.e., “dis-
play schema’s”; Hegarty, 2011, p. 454) when interpreting 
an information display. So, if the list display adheres to 
these display schema’s where the field display does not, 
this may greatly affect search times to the benefit of the 
list display. We have looked into this by studying whether 
the search times that we report may fluctuate as a factor 
of a user’s familiarity with soccer and soccer stats. We did 
ask participants in the quantitative analysis whether they 
liked soccer and whether they were familiar with soccer 
stats. However, we could not find reliable interaction ef-
fects between liking soccer (stats) and the the display that 
was used on search times or preferences. Future research 
can address the question as to what extent knowledge of 
particular visualization styles plays a role in assessing the 
effectiveness of information displays.
We have found that a more richly designed informa-
tion display is often not preferred over a simpler display 
by users, but our data does not allow us to see which as-
pects of the displays drive these judgments. Again, further 
experiments are warranted that disentangle the effects of 
different aspects of information designs (e.g., inconsisten-
cy, analogy) on user preferences. Additionally, participants 
in our study expressed preferences after having used both 
display visualizes time on a clock, which is an arguably 
very natural design-meaning mapping, we expected that 
the field display would be faster for such question. Howev-
er, this turned out to be reversed, and even for these ques-
tions the field display was the slower of the two.
The experiment also pointed out that users mostly pre-
ferred the list display over the field display, except when 
they want to see the development of the game, or when 
they want to see the stats for fun. Because of the large 
number of participants in this evaluation (539), we not 
only have high statistical power, but we can also general-
ize over different cognitive styles, age groups, and levels 
of expertise.
Our findings challenge the view that natural mappings 
of design features to meaning in information displays al-
ways improve the effectiveness of a display by making it 
more efficient and more fun to use (e.g., Kosslyn, 2006; He-
garty, 2011; Tversky, 2011a). Natural mappings are useful, 
but we have seen that too many of these mappings may 
in fact be detrimental for performance and preference. For 
example, the field display is more ‘designed’ but is also less 
efficient to use and not always preferred over the simpler 
list display. So, stacking simple design principles into one 
design may counterfeit the efficiency entailed by the indi-
vidual principles.
This also raises some interesting new research ques-
tions, which concern both the efficiency of information 
designs and preferences of users for such designs. Our 
findings on efficiency suggest that there may be some kind 
of a threshold in design choices: When some number of 
natural mappings used to define information elements 
is exceeded, a design can become less efficient (i.e., us-
ers find information less quickly). In the displays that we 
compared, we found that one information element may be 
defined by multiple visual variables, that there may be in-
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The first guideline we formulate is to avoid ‘stacking’ 
visual variables in an information display. Our analyses 
and evaluation suggest that when multiple visual variables 
are used to assign meaning to an information element, ef-
ficiency of the information display may be compromised. 
A rule-of-thumb may be to not use more than two visual 
variables (e.g, color, size, location, form) to define an infor-
mation element.
This guideline is advised to be used in correspond-
ence with a second recommendation: Avoid inconsistent 
design-meaning mappings. When a visual variable (e.g,. 
color, size, position) is used to assign meaning to an in-
formation element (e.g., on a nominal or ordinal level), 
choose these design-meaning mappings in concordance 
with other mappings in the same display.
Although applying these guidelines to the field-based 
display discussed in this chapter probably leads to a more 
efficient display (and better user evaluations), future ex-
perimental research is needed to address the scope of 
these guidelines, and to investigate their generalizability.
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Chapter 7
General discussion
In this concluding chapter, first the most important find-
ings of Chapters 2 through 6 of this dissertation are sum-
marized. A brief overview of the experimental conditions 
and main findings of each chapter is given in Table 7.1. 
Second, reflections on general conclusions and overarch-
ing themes connecting the individual chapters are provid-
ed. Third, limitations of the work in this dissertation and 
a number of suggestions for future research are discussed. 
Finally, the studies in this dissertation lead to a number 
of suggestions on methodological issues in experimental 
research into the cognition of visual understanding, which 
are discussed at the end of this chapter, together with 
some considerations for practical applications of the cur-
rent work.
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research questions and 
summaries per chapter
In this dissertation, five studies are reported that investi-
gate effects of visual realism in representational pictures 
on cognitive processing. Deviations of visual realism, 
in the form of color atypicality, are the topic of study in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with deviations of 
visual realism in the form of schematization. Using realis-
tic elements in an information design is studied in Chapter 
6. Below, these chapters are discussed in the light of the 
research questions formulated in the preface (Chapter 1).
Why are incongruent pictures (atypically colored 
objects) remembered better than congruent pictures 
(typically colored objects)?
In Chapter 2, atypically colored objects were used to 
address the question why people generally remember 
‘strange’ or ‘different’ things better than common things. 
This effect is called the bizarreness effect, because the stim-
uli that are remembered better are distinctive from what is 
common or normal in the everyday world (e.g., Gounden 
& Nicolas, 2012; Hunt & Worthen, 2006; McDaniel & Ein-
stein, 1986; Schmidt, 1991). While this effect has been es-
tablished using a variety of stimulus materials and experi-
mental procedures, the question why it occurs is subject to 
ample debate. One explanation concerns processing time: 
Distinctive items are remembered better because they re-
ceive longer or more elaborate processing during encod-
ing than common items (e.g., Gounden & Nicolas, 2012; 
Kline & Groninger, 1991; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). 
In the experiments described in Chapter 2, methodology 
from object recognition research (e.g., Therriault, Yaxley, 
Zwaan, 2009) was combined with procedures in memory 
research (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 1986) to investigate 
this processing time hypothesis. Participants named typi-
cally and atypically colored objects, and naming latencies 
were measured. After a two-week delay, they performed 
in memory tasks (old/new-recognition in one experiment, 
and free recall in the other).
The results of the recognition experiment suggested 
that processing time explains the bizarreness effect: An 
increase in processing time caused by color atypicality 
in the naming task predicted increased memorability for 
atypically colored objects in the delayed recognition task. 
However, in the free recall experiment such an effect was 
not found. These findings are interpreted as indicating 
that processing time during encoding explains part, but 
not all, of the bizarreness effect.
Are incongruent pictures (atypically colored objects) 
described differently than congruent pictures (typically 
colored objects)?
In Chapter 3 color atypicality was investigated in the 
context of language production. Specifically, Chapter 3 
concerns the production of referring expressions: definite 
descriptions of objects in a visual context, produced by a 
speaker in such a way that an addressee can uniquely iden-
tify the referent object in that same visual context (such 
as “the red apple”). Previous work showed that speakers 
often produce color adjectives, even when these are not 
strictly necessary for unique identification (e.g., Koolen, 
Gatt, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2011; Pechmann, 1989). In 
Chapter 3, this is related to color typicality: Do speakers 
produce color adjectives more often when the referent ob-
ject’s color is atypical? The prediction was that they would, 
as color typicality plays an important role in object rec-
ognition (an important part of reference production; e.g., 
Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988; Tanaka, Weiskopf, 
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descriptions particularly focused on how speakers refer to 
choice points. Choice points are locations on the route map 
where one has to change direction (i.e., by turning a cor-
ner), and speakers usually refer to these points by making 
use of landmarks (e.g., Allen, 2000; Daniel & Denis, 2004). 
In the experiment in Chapter 4, participants made use of 
either so-called route-external landmarks (e.g., “go left at 
the pharmacy”) or route-internal landmarks (e.g., “go left 
at the second street”).
This choice for external or internal landmarks was 
found to be affected by the degree of visual clutter in the 
route maps: Descriptions based on cluttered maps showed 
a higher preference for external landmarks compared to 
the schematic maps condition. This effect is attributed 
to the fact that external landmarks are more robust and 
less ambiguous than internal landmarks (i.e., there are 
many points on a map that can be pinpointed as “the sec-
ond street”, while choice points designated by an external 
landmark may be more unique). However, producing exter-
nal landmarks from memory comes at a cost: One has to 
memorize the specific names of these landmarks, like “the 
bakery” or “the pharmacy”. This is reflected in our finding 
that when routes are longer, and thus contain more choice 
points, speakers revert to using the slightly more ambigu-
ous but more memory-efficient internal landmarks.
Some interesting collateral effects of visual clutter in 
route maps on spoken route descriptions were observed 
as well. Route descriptions based on cluttered maps con-
tained more verbal clutter: Such descriptions contain more 
words, more propositions, and more non-essential asser-
tions such as “keep walking”, compared to descriptions 
based on schematic maps.
& Williams, 2001), and because atypical colors attract the 
visual attention of both speakers and addressees (e.g., 
Becker, Pashler, & Lubin, 2007).
The results confirmed this prediction: There was a 
strong positive correlation between the degree of color 
atypicality of a target object and the proportion of speakers 
that mentioned color when referring to this object. Also, in 
line with studies in object recognition, the effect of color 
atypicality was stronger for objects with simple shapes 
than for objects with more complex shapes. This interac-
tion between color atypicality and shape complexity was 
attributed to a relatively higher contribution of color in-
formation in object recognition for simple-shaped objects, 
because simple uncharacteristic shapes are less informa-
tive for recognition (e.g., Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). This 
makes manipulations of color atypicality for such objects 
more conspicuous, leading to an amplified effect on the 
content of referring expressions.
Are route descriptions that are based on realistic maps 
(aerial photographs) different from those based on 
schematic maps?
Chapter 4 addressed the question whether visual detail in 
route maps affects the way people verbally describe these 
routes, by comparing route descriptions of short and long 
routes, based on schematic maps or on aerial photographs 
(much like the “map” and “satellite” modes found in pop-
ular mapping applications such as Google, Apple, or Bing 
Maps). Aerial photographs contain more visual clutter (i.e., 
redundant visual detail; e.g., Coco & Keller, 2012; Rosen-
holtz, Li, & Nakano, 2007) than schematic maps, and the 
effects of this visual clutter were investigated in a lan-
guage production experiment. Participants briefly studied 
a route map from a screen, and consecutively produced a 
spoken description of the route. Analyses of the produced 
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visual referents than schematic line drawings do. How well 
students were able to find these connections predicted 
performance on a comprehension test. Furthermore, the 
comparison between detailed, schematic, and hybrid pic-
tures showed that students in the hybrid picture condition 
performed just as good as their peers in the schematic line 
drawings condition. The hybrid condition contained the 
visual emphasis (e.g., thick lines, clear contrasts) found in 
schematic line drawings, but also showed a similar amount 
of visual detail as the photographs. This suggests that the 
potential advantages of schematic pictures for finding 
visual referents and for comprehension are mainly attrib-
utable to the added visual emphasis in schematic pictures, 
and not to a mere reduction of visual detail.
Does the use of visually realistic elements affect how 
people interpret and use an information display?
In Chapter 6, a more applied perspective on visual realism 
was adopted to study effects of using realistic elements 
and natural metaphors in an information display on how 
efficiently people can use this display. Two real-world in-
formation displays showing soccer statistics were com-
pared in a quasi-experimental setting. One display was 
mostly text and table based, and showed basically no 
visual resemblance to real-world soccer. The other dis-
play, however, looked like a football field, and icons and 
football-related symbols such as balls and yellow cards 
were distributed on the field in a manner that made use of 
real-world knowledge about soccer. For example, data on 
shots on goal was displayed in the goal areas, and statistics 
on corners were shown in the corners of the field. Addi-
tionally, the latter display made heavy use of cognitively 
natural metaphors such as showing large numbers (i.e., a 
high number of corners) as larger shapes on the field.
Why do students learn better from schematic 
pictures (line drawings) than from detailed pictures 
(microscopic photographs)?
Visual realism as visual detail is also of interest for re-
search in educational psychology and instructional design. 
Chapter 5 addressed the question whether and how visual 
detail in representational pictures affects how students 
comprehend expository materials consisting of text and 
pictures. Such materials present students with explanato-
ry text illustrated by representational pictures that show 
what certain parts and subprocesses look like. Previous re-
search suggests that using simple, schematic line drawings 
may yield better results on comprehension post-tests than 
using detailed photographs (e.g., Butcher, 2006; Joseph & 
Dwyer, 1984; Scheiter, Gerjets, Huk, Imhof, & Kammerer, 
2009). However, the question why this is the case warrants 
further investigation.
In the experiment reported in Chapter 5, secondary 
school students were presented with a short text about 
mitosis (the six-phase biological process of cell reduplica-
tion), adjoined by either detailed photographs of each of 
the phases of mitosis, by schematic line drawings, or by a 
hybrid format in which the line drawings were superim-
posed on the photographs. The focus was on the process of 
making meaningful referential connections between text 
and pictures during study, as it was assumed that students 
search for visual referents in the pictures that correspond 
to concepts in the text (e.g., when a student reads about a 
certain movement of chromosomes during the anaphase of 
mitosis, she or he attempts to identify the chromosomes in 
the picture of the anaphase).
The results of this study supported the hypothesis that 
students’ performance is hampered by detailed photo-
graphs because these yield more difficulties for finding 
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TABLE 7.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES, CONDITIONS, AND SELECTED RESULTS IN THIS DISSERTATION.
FIELD OF RESEARCH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS RESULTS (SELECTED)
CHAPTER 2
NAMING AND REMEMBERING 
TYPICALLY AND ATYPICALLY 
COLORED OBJECTS
MEMORY
TYPICALLY COLORED OBJECTS (TCO)
ATYPICALLY COLORED OBJECTS (ACO)
ACO ARE NAMED NAMED SLOWER THAN TCO.
ACO ARE REMEMBERED BETTER IN DELAYED 
RECOGNITION THAN TCO.
NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACO AND TCO 
IN FREE RECALL.
CHAPTER 3




TYPICALLY COLORED OBJECTS (TCO)
ATYPICALLY COLORED OBJECTS (ACO)
COLOR ADJECTIVES ARE MORE OFTEN USED IN 
DESCRIPTIONS OF ACO THAN IN 
DESCRIPTIONS IN TCO.
CHAPTER 4
DESCRIBING ROUTES FROM 





MORE USE OF EXTERNAL LANDMARKS 
(E.G., THE SHOP) WHEN AP ARE DESCRIBED 
COMPARED TO SM.
DESCRIPTIONS BASED ON AP ARE LONGER THAN 
THOSE BASED ON SM.
CHAPTER 5
LEARNING WITH SCHEMATIC, 
REALISTIC, AND HYBRID PICTURES





HP ARE RATED AS MOST USEFUL.
COMPREHENSION WAS LOWEST 
IN THE MP CONDITION.
MAKING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN TEXT AND 
PICTURES WAS LEAST ACCURATE 
IN THE MP CONDITION.
CHAPTER 6
UNDERSTANDING A VISUALLY RICH 
INFORMATION DISPLAY
INFORMATION DESIGN
VISUALLY RICH DISPLAY (VRD)
VISUALLY SIMPLE DISPLAY (VSD)
FINDING INFORMATION WAS SLOWER 
USING VRD THAN USING VSD.
IN MOST USAGE SCENARIOS, 
VSD IS PREFERRED OVER VRD.
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this dissertation, reported in Chapters 2 to 6, offer support 
for this hypothesis, by showing that deviations of visual 
realism in pictures, either in terms of color atypicality or 
as schematization, influence a number of human reactions 
towards these pictures.
Taken together, the experimental studies in this disser-
tation offer evidence for three explanations for differences 
in processing between pictures that are visually realistic, 
and pictures that violate visual realism. First, atypical 
pictures of objects are more distinctive, which results in 
visual salience for the viewer (Chapters 2 and 3). Second, 
schematic pictures are less visually cluttered and offer 
visual clarity (Chapters 4 and 5). Third, atypicality and 
schematization have repercussions for how cognitively 
natural pictures are to process.
Visual realism, distinctiveness, and 
visual salience
There are interesting parallels between distinctiveness 
(cf. Chapter 2) and visual salience (cf. Chapter 3). Both 
chapters have looked into behavioral effects of presenting 
pictures of objects in atypical colors, compared to control 
conditions in which the same objects are depicted in their 
natural colors. Both chapters bring to light that atypical 
colors draw visual attention (also, see Becker et al., 2007). 
By acknowledging that atypically colored pictures can be 
both visually salient and distinctive in memory, the sug-
gestion arises that salience and distinctiveness may be 
highly similar or even identical aspects of a picture.
Does distinctiveness always result in visual salience? 
Although distinctiveness is a notion stemming from mem-
ory research (e.g., Hunt & Worthen, 2006), and the concept 
of visual salience stems from research into visual process-
ing and visual search (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2000), distinctive-
ness and visual salience appear to align under certain cir-
The two information designs that were compared dif-
fered in terms of visual realism. The field-based display 
copied a number of visual elements from actual soccer, 
by showing a field, balls, yellow cards etcetera on rele-
vant places on the field. However, although the realistic 
elements in the field-based display are theoretically ben-
eficial for finding and understanding information (e.g., 
Agrawala, Li, & Berthouzoz, 2011; Kosslyn, 2006; Larkin 
& Simon, 1987; Tversky, 2011; Vande Moere & Purchase, 
2011; Zhang & Norman, 1994), the experiment in Chap-
ter 6 showed that this display was actually less effective 
in several respects, such as finding data and drawing in-
ferences. Also, the text-based display, which contained no 
realistic elements, was largely preferred by its users. These 
results support the idea that experimentally tested design 
principles may yield unexpected results when scaled up to 
real-world displays (Hegarty, 2011). In particular, combin-
ing multiple design-meaning mappings in one display may 
yield inconsistencies in how certain visual variables (color, 
size, form, and location) are to be interpreted, leading us-
ers to find information less quickly and less easily.
Reflections on overarching 
findings and themes
The experiments reported in this dissertation present 
effects of different deviations from visual realism, using 
stimuli diverging in complexity and usage context, and 
situated in multiple fields of study. Visual realism is found 
to be a factor in studies in recognition, memory, language 
production, learning and comprehension, and information 
design.
In the preface (Chapter 1), it was hypothesized that de-
viations from visual realism in representational pictures 
influence how people process these pictures. All studies in 
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to concepts in language production and visual processing 
(and vice versa).
Visual realism and visual clutter
Chapters 4 and 5 in this dissertation discuss visual real-
ism in relation to visual clutter. Visual clutter is defined 
in terms of physical characteristics of images, comprised 
of a congestion of features, dense edges, and low entropy 
(Chapter 4; Coco & Keller, 2012; Donderi, 2006; Rosen-
holtz et al., 2007). These characteristics are found to slow 
down visual search and visual processing. Visual clutter 
is found to affect language production in Chapter 4 (and 
in other recent work, e.g., Clarke, Elsner, & Rohde, 2013; 
Coco & Keller, 2012; Koolen, Krahmer, & Swerts, 2015).
It may be tempting to draw the conclusion that sche-
matization can simply be defined as a reduction in visual 
clutter. A schematic picture namely contains fewer physi-
cal features, fewer edges (and edges are less close together 
in general), and entropy is typically higher than what is 
the case for realistic or photographic pictures. Conversely, 
a picture that entails a high level of realistic detail (i.e., 
photographs) is often a visually cluttered picture. Howev-
er, Chapter 5 in particular suggests that visual clutter is 
not the one defining factor that tells apart realistic from 
schematic graphics. Schematization, besides a reduction 
of visual clutter, also involves visual emphasis of edges, 
and other visual elements. So, compared to realistic pic-
tures, schematic pictures do not only leave out visual de-
tail, they also make use of thick, sharp, and contrasting 
lines to depict things. This is further explored in Chapter 
5, but it may also be applicable to the stimuli in Chapter 4 
(and to some extend to the information designs in Chapter 
6). Schematic route maps do not only contain less visual 
detail than aerial photographs, they also use sharp lines 
and often contrasting colors to depict an environment. 
cumstances. This alignment is especially apparent when 
considering that a major dichotomy in distinctiveness ef-
fects in memory aligns well with a dichotomy in salience 
effects in visual processing. In memory research, on the 
one hand, primary and secondary distinctiveness effects 
are distinguished (Schmidt, 1991). Primary distinctiveness 
refers to an item being distinctive because it is different 
from other items in the same context (e.g., the word “dog” 
in a list of fruits). Secondary distinctiveness is related to 
an item being distinctive because it contrasts with stored 
knowledge and expectations in long-term memory (e.g., 
the sentence “the dog rode the bicycle down the street”; 
McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). In studies on visual salience, 
on the other hand, a distinction is made between visual 
salience of objects in contexts because these objects are 
incongruent with the gist of the context in which they are 
shown (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Underwood & Foulsh-
am, 2006), and visual salience of objects that show incon-
gruence within the object itself; for example because of an 
atypical color (as in Chapters 2 and 3; Becker et al., 2007). 
As such, a parallel between primary distinctiveness and 
context-dependent visual salience on the one hand, and 
between secondary distinctiveness and object-intrinsic 
oddities on the other can be observed. 
The results of the experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 give 
support to the idea that objects with object-intrinsic oddi-
ties (in this case atypical colors) are secondary distinctive, 
and visually salient: They differ from mental representa-
tions, and draw visual attention resulting in different 
verbal descriptions. A possible follow-up question to this 
may then be whether a similar parallel can be uncovered 
between primary distinctiveness and context-dependent 
visual salience. This may open up new research ventures, 
in which concepts from memory research may be related 
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ognizing, describing, and remembering atypically colored 
pictures of objects (as in Chapters 2 and 3) is affected by 
whether the processing of such pictures is less alike the 
processing of actual, natural objects. In that sense, it can 
be said that realistic pictures are indeed processed in a way 
that is more cognitively natural.
However, concerning effects of schematic pictures, it is 
less straightforward to determine whether schematic pic-
tures are less cognitively natural than realistically detailed 
ones. While some may suggest that realistically detailed 
pictures are more alike reality and are therefore easier to 
process (e.g., Imhof et al., 2011), the reduced visual clutter 
and increased clarity in schematic pictures likely makes 
the cognitive processing of schematic pictures more fluent 
(Tversky, Morrison, & Bétrancourt, 2002). The results of 
the experiments in Chapters 4 through 6 support this lat-
ter suggestion that many schematic pictures may be more 
cognitively natural to process than pictures with a high 
level of realistic detail. This may be explained by consider-
ing that a cognitively natural picture is probably one that 
is most alike previous experiences (and the mental rep-
resentation that is built on the basis of those), rather than 
a picture that is most alike ‘reality’. Schematic pictures 
may be indeed cognitively natural when considering aerial 
photographs (i.e., Chapter 4) and microscopic photographs 
of biological cells (i.e., Chapter 5): Many people probably 
know the street plan of a city without having ever seen it 
from up in the air, but they know it based on schematic 
maps. Also, most people have probably learned about bi-
ological cells and anatomy based on schematic pictures in 
schoolbooks, and not based on experiences with the topic 
in reality. Taken together, previous experiences with a top-
ic may be based on (schematic) pictures themselves, and 
not on (tangible) experiences with the topic in the world 
outside of the picture.
Furthermore, recent work on route descriptions suggests 
that effects of visual clutter on route descriptions can oc-
cur irrespective of the level of visual realism in route map 
stimuli (Baltaretu, Krahmer, & Maes, 2014). 
These observations suggest that a distinction between 
schematic and realistic visualizations is not only related to 
a reduction in visual clutter, but also involves an increase 
in visual clarity by adding lines and contrasts. The experi-
mental results reported in Chapter 5 moreover put forward 
that some benefits of schematization may only be related 
to this latter increase in clarity, and not to a reduction in 
visual clutter per se.
Visual realism and cognitive 
naturalness
Another parallel between chapters is based on the idea of 
cognitively natural processing. As introduced in Chapter 6, 
a cognitively natural design is an information design that 
exploits the workings of human perception, supporting 
a natural (‘unforced’) interpretation and understanding 
of an (information) graphic, by fitting for example image 
schemas (Hegarty, 2011) or familiar metaphors. One may 
stretch the definition of cognitive naturalness, by extend-
ing it to picture interpretation in general: A cognitively 
natural picture is one that can be processed in a less ef-
fortful way than a picture that does not align with existing 
image schemas.
An appealing question is then whether visually realis-
tic pictures are cognitively natural to process. Do visually 
realistic pictures require less cognitive effort to process 
than pictures that violate reality? This question is best 
addressed by considering the two ways in which visual 
realism is manipulated in Chapters 2 through 5 in this 
dissertation. Atypically colored pictures are presumably 
processed less fluently than typically colored ones, as rec-
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manipulations of visual realism, ignoring other potential 
violations of realism. Second, individual differences and 
relevant personal characteristics are not of primary inter-
est, while they would have been relevant for most of the 
studies. Third, despite the merits of employing cognitive 
psychology as the general approach towards exploring 
visual realism, other approaches can be considered as well.
Different types of deviations in 
pictures
Color atypicality and schematization are only two of many 
potential ways in which representational pictures can be 
incongruent with reality. Pictures can be non-realistic in 
other ways as well, for example by distorting objects’ size 
or texture. A useful perspective on a possible array of vi-
olations of visual realism may be one in terms of visual 
variables (Bertin, 1983), thereby considering violations 
of for example size, shape, orientation, and texture. In 
future work, it may be interesting and feasible to inves-
tigate whether atypicality on each one (or a combination) 
of these variables has an influence on cognitive process-
ing. Also, a perspective in terms of visual variables sug-
gests it may well be possible to schematize pictures in 
different ways, by systematically leaving out certain visual 
variables. Crossing visual variables (size, shape, etc.) with 
different types of violations (atypicality, schematization) 
yields an intricate array of directions for future research. 
Furthermore, manipulations of visual realism can entail 
both object-intrinsic violations (such as strange orienta-
tions or atypical colors, cf. Becker et al., 2007), and contex-
tual oddities (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978). Moreover, there 
is a wide range of dependent measures that can be con-
sidered in future work, especially considering how the few 
studies in this dissertation have already employed several 
dependent measures such as naming latency, recognition, 
Taken together, the above suggests that visual realism 
cannot be equated to cognitively natural design per se, 
but that cognitive naturalness relates to prior experienc-
es and the build-up of prior knowledge. Undeniably, more 
research is needed to further explore the relationships be-
tween visual realism, typicality, schematization, and cog-
nitive processing effort.
Irrespective of whether pictures that violate visual real-
ism are cognitively natural or not, the studies in this dis-
sertation do suggest that violations of visual realism can 
have a number of potentially beneficial effects. In Chapter 
2, pictures of atypically colored objects were found to be 
remembered better than typically colored objects. Chap-
ter 3 reports that spoken descriptions of atypically colored 
objects often contain color attributes, while descriptions 
of typically colored objects do not, which may be ben-
eficial for listeners who want to identify which object is 
described. Schematic pictures may be more beneficial for 
certain purposes than realistic ones as well. This is put 
forward in Chapter 4, where it is found that route descrip-
tions based on schematic maps are more efficient than de-
scriptions that are based on photographic maps. Chapter 5 
reports how secondary schools students may benefit from 
schematization in pictures when studying from textbooks. 
Finally, an evaluation of two information displays present-
ed in Chapter 6 suggests that abstaining from using realis-
tic elements in such displays leads to better performance 
when finding information.
Limitations and suggestions for 
future work
A number of limitations of the work in this dissertation 
will be discussed. First, only color atypicality and schema-
tization (i.e., leaving out visual detail) are considered as 
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such maps can be a relevant factor. In Chapter 5, concern-
ing learning with schematic and photographic pictures, 
prior knowledge on the subject of mitosis is assumed to be 
comparable across conditions, and a prior selection of par-
ticipants is made to avoid such confounds (i.e., only stu-
dents who did not have biology as a compulsory subject in 
their study curriculum took part). However, this does not 
rule out that studying interactions between prior knowl-
edge, level of expertise, personal preferences, and the ef-
fect of schematic, detailed, and hybrid pictures would be 
an interesting and potentially fruitful direction for further 
investigation.
Qualitative research and semiotics
Other limitations of the work in this dissertation are relat-
ed to the general approach in terms of cognitive psycholo-
gy, and employing quantitative, deductive research meth-
odologies to explore the influence of visual realism on the 
processing and understanding of pictures. It can be argued 
that taking an explorative and more inductive approach 
using qualitative methodology is fruitful as well. Pictures, 
graphics, and visualizations are the object of study in for 
example graphic design, semiotics, and philosophy of lan-
guage. Such analyses may start with considering visual 
realism in relation to the iconic nature of representation-
al pictures (one may for example define visual realism 
in terms of the degree of resemblance between signifier 
[picture] and signified [reality], thus effectively equating 
visual realism to the degree of iconicity of the representa-
tion). Such a semiotic view may also be more suitable in 
acknowledging the role of the sender and receiver in the 
process of visual communication: The semiotic triangle 
comprises of object (referent; reality), symbol (picture), 
and the reference (thought, of the communicator and of 
the receiver). In contrast, the dominant view in cognitive 
recall, description, comprehension, making connections, 
finding information, appreciation, and perceived utility. 
In sum, further explorations and tests into the influence 
of visual realism on processing can take many directions, 
considering different aspects of reality that can be violated 
in representational pictures, different ways in which pic-
tures can be non-realistic, object-intrinsic versus contex-
tual oddities, and a wide range of dependent measures.
Individual differences
Future work can also aim at uncovering the influence of 
personal characteristics and individual differences be-
tween perceivers of representational pictures that deviate 
from visual realism. As illustrated in Chapter 1, one can as-
sume that prior knowledge plays an important role in the 
understanding of non-realistic pictures. In effect, a picture 
is non-realistic when it violates one’s expectations and 
assumptions about reality. Considering that such expec-
tations and assumptions may be different for individuals, 
taking into account individual differences when studying 
the influence of visual realism would be relevant for both 
future work as for the work presented in this dissertation. 
Looking at Chapters 2 and 3 for example, some colors that 
are deemed atypical in Western societies (e.g., red ba-
nanas) may not be atypical for individuals living in areas 
where fruits in different colors are more common (e.g., red 
bananas are relatively popular in Central America). The 
work presented in Chapter 4, concerning navigation and 
route description, may also be relevant in the light of in-
dividual differences. Given that several (online) mapping 
and navigation software products provide users with a 
choice between photographic and schematic maps, it may 
be interesting to consider a user’s preference for either one 
of the two modes when studying how route maps are de-
scribed. Also, one’s experience with describing routes from 
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duction (Chapter 3). In other fields, such as instructional 
design (Chapter 5), the level of visual of realism in pic-
tures has been in focus for a number of decades, and our 
work can be seen more as building on existing findings and 
expanding the understanding of the potential effects of 
visual realism.
In this dissertation, it is attempted to utilize poten-
tially interesting connections between different fields of 
research. In every chapter, research in a certain field has 
been intertwined with findings and theories from one or 
more other fields. Chapter 2 combined methods from ob-
ject recognition with procedures from memory research. 
In Chapter 3, findings in object recognition and sugges-
tions from visual attention research were combined with 
language production. Chapter 4 combined research in 
route description and navigation with studies in reference 
production and visual perception. Chapter 5 combined 
insights from visual perception and visual search with re-
search on education and text comprehension. Chapter 6 
connected insights from visual metaphor with perception 
and information design. By identifying and exploiting such 
connections between different fields of study, the work in 
this dissertation motivates to further acknowledge and 
build upon the potential opportunities that such an inter-
disciplinary approach yields.
The individual studies in this dissertation bring to bear 
a number of more chapter- and field-specific methodolog-
ical implications. These implications are derived from the 
findings reported in this dissertation, as well as from the 
methodologies employed. Below, methodological implica-
tions are discussed for each chapter.
Chapter 2 introduced an experimental paradigm de-
signed to investigate the processing time hypothesis for 
the secondary distinctiveness effect in memory. Previous 
studies generally investigated this hypothesis by grouping 
psychology as well as in this dissertation is mainly focused 
on two aspects: internal and external representations (De 
Vries, 2012). This dyadic (instead of triadic) view on pic-
tures and their interpretation can be said to underrepre-
sent the importance of sender and receiver of visual com-
munication, and may therefore fall short of acknowledging 
the potential role of individual differences therein.
Visual processing and visual 
communication
A further direction for future research is related to the 
scope of this dissertation in terms of the processing of pic-
tures. The current work is limited to this processing, which 
is an important but arguably small part of visual commu-
nication. Future work may thus corroborate the current 
findings, and lead to specific questions on how variations 
in visual realism affects particular kinds of visual messages 
such as manuals, warnings, and marketing materials. For 
example, do changes in visual realism affect how instruc-
tions instruct, warnings warn, and how advertisements 
advertise and persuade? In fact, some of the work in this 
dissertation (Chapters 5 and 6, for example) takes a step 
in this direction by focusing on the utility value of visual 
realism in visual communication. However, more work can 
be done to increase the applicability and utility validity of 
the current work.
Methodological implications
The work in this dissertation constitutes an exploration 
of visual realism in representational pictures, commenced 
from a myriad of different angles and scientific fields, and 
using different methodologies. In some fields, considering 
a deviation from visual realism as a factor appears to be 
a relatively novel approach, for example in reference pro-
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affects verbal descriptions of these objects. The findings 
of Chapter 3 tap into two recent discussions in reference 
production research concerning the degree to which stim-
uli are naturalistic or visually realistic. In several recent 
publications, it is argued that when natural language pro-
duction is behaviorally studied, the pictures and objects 
that participants describe should be relatively naturalis-
tic (e.g., Clarke et al., 2013; Clarke, Coco, & Keller, 2013; 
Coco & Keller, 2012; Koolen, Houben, Huntjens, & Krah-
mer, 2014; Mitchell, 2013; Mitchell, Reiter, & Van Deemter, 
2013a, 2013b). Color atypicality is one factor that impacts 
the degree to which stimuli are naturalistic, and as it has a 
considerable impact on reference production, this may be 
relevant for studies in which stimuli are mainly composed 
of atypically colored objects. As such, our results seem to 
argue against using artificial contexts in reference produc-
tion studies because using atypical colors may undesirably 
boost color use in referring expressions.
Chapter 4 fits in a relatively recent tradition in lan-
guage production research, in which a route instruction 
task is employed to elicit referring expressions and other 
linguistic behavior (e.g., Byron et al., 2009; Koller et al., 
2010; Viethen, Dale, & Guhe, 2014). This does not only 
yield relatively natural behavior in an everyday commu-
nicative setting, but it also allows for a more direct valor-
ization of results in for example automated mapping and 
navigation solutions. However, this comes at the cost of 
data complexity: Compared to the language production 
paradigm in Chapter 3, for example, a route description 
task does yield relatively long, complex, and diverse verbal 
protocols, which may make certain comparisons between 
conditions and stimuli less precise than what would be 
possible when comparing more simple descriptions con-
sisting of one single noun phrase, for instance.
participants in different presentation time conditions, so 
that memory performance can be compared for people who 
saw stimuli for, say, 500 or 1,000 milliseconds (Gounden & 
Nicolas, 2012; Kline & Groninger, 1991; McDaniel & Ein-
stein, 1986). Instead, taking up methodology from object 
recognition research processing time was measured, instead 
of manipulating presentation time. In an object naming task, 
participants recognized and named objects, and response 
times in this task were regarded as processing time in an 
incidental learning task (e.g., Nicolas & Marchal, 1998). 
Consecutively, participants performed in recognition tasks 
to gauge their memory for the objects that were named 
earlier (comparable to for example McDaniel & Einstein, 
1986; and Michelon, Snyder, Buckner, McAvoy, & Zacks, 
2003). This combination of methodologies allowed a pre-
diction of memory performance based on processing time, 
effectively yielding a relatively direct test of the process-
ing time hypothesis. Additionally, the type of distinctive 
objects used (i.e., atypically colored objects) was based on 
stimuli in object recognition studies (e.g., Naor-Raz, Tarr, 
& Kersten, 2003; Ostergaard & Davidoff, 1985; Therriault 
et al., 2009). In such studies, it has been repeatedly found 
that atypically colored objects are recognized less quickly 
than typically colored objects. This finding from the field 
of object recognition has been utilized to investigate the 
processing time hypothesis in memory research in Chapter 
2.
Chapter 3 presented a study that combined stimuli 
comparable to those in Chapter 2 with findings in visual 
attention, to make predictions in the field of language 
production. This has yielded an experimental design that 
utilizes findings from object recognition and visual atten-
tion to study language production: Atypical colors affect 
object recognition (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2001; Chapter 2), 
they attract visual attention (Becker et al., 2007), and this 
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parisons. This is interesting from a methodological per-
spective, because as Hegarty (2011) points out, effects of 
design variables in well-defined experimental tasks and 
environments may not easily scale up to real-world situ-
ations. Findings in information design that appear almost 
trivial in controlled designs, in fact appeared to be harder 
to understand in the quasi-experimental design of Chapter 
6. Another noteworthy methodological asset of this chap-
ter lies in the procedure for recruiting participants. Instead 
of asking undergraduate students to participate in the ex-
periment (which is often the case in cognitive science re-
search), students were instructed to recruit participants in-
stead. This yielded not only a very large participant group 
— with each student recruiting a handful of volunteers, 
hundreds of participants initially took part in our study 
— but also a remarkable diversity in terms of for example 
social background and age in the participant group. This 
potentially allowed for a boost in the ecological validity 
of the study results. A potential downside of this method 
is that there is less control over the participants and that 
not all of the data can be used. It is therefore important to 
safeguard the quality of the dataset, for example by remov-
ing participants who did not finish the experiment, and by 
tracking the time course of participation and selecting 
only participants who finished the experiment within a 
reasonable time (which was done in Chapter 6).
Some considerations for 
practice
Although the work in this dissertation mainly expresses 
a theoretical and methodological approach, some con-
siderations for practical applications of our findings can 
be thought of. In general, designers of representational 
pictures for different kinds of contexts may be advised to 
Chapter 5 focused on educational psychology and in-
structional design, and studied how differences in visual 
realism may affect comprehension. In particular, the focus 
was on the process of finding visual referents. A pretest 
employed eye tracking and analysis of fixations to sup-
port the assumption that students engage in this visual 
search behavior while reading an illustrated text (alike 
Mason, Pluchino, Tornatora, & Ariasi, 2013, for example). 
Where eye tracking is an established method to investi-
gate such behavior, for the main experiment an arrow 
drawing paradigm was developed to measure effects of 
different picture types on finding visual referents. In this 
arrow drawing task, participants were instructed to visu-
alize referential connections between text and pictures by 
drawing arrows. Asking participants to draw and pinpoint 
the exact locations of relevant visual information allows 
for a more precise analysis of their ability to do so than 
eye tracking would. Eye tracking data does reveal where 
people’s gaze is, but this does not necessarily imply that 
they have identified relevant information. Also, the time-
scaled and complex nature of eye tracking data makes such 
an analysis considerably more labor intensive than using 
an arrow drawing task. However, the arrow drawing task 
measured offline behavior, and it remains unclear to what 
extent performance on the arrow drawing task mirrors ac-
tual visual search behavior during study. This would have 
not been an issue if it would have been possible to make 
high-resolution recordings of eye movements on all par-
ticipants in their classrooms, in a preferably non-obtrusive 
manner. Unfortunately, this is not (yet) possible.
Where Chapters 2 to 5 contain highly controlled lab 
experiments, with carefully designed conditions and stim-
ulus materials, Chapter 6 presents a quasi-experimental 
design in which two real-world information designs were 
employed as stimuli in qualitative and quantitative com-
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man speakers in our study, in order to be as humanlike as 
possible. For example, an artificial shopping assistant or 
robot may be more advanced and humanlike if it describes 
unripe fruits as “green”, but would neglect mentioning 
color when referring to ripe fruits in a grocery store.
Navigation systems and applications that produce ver-
bal descriptions of routes on the basis of map data may 
be enhanced to more closely mirror human behavior, such 
as the behavior that reported in Chapter 4. Human speak-
ers in that study exclusively referred to choice points by 
making use of landmarks, either route-internal (e.g., “Take 
the second street on the left”), or route-external (e.g., “Go 
left at the bookstore”). In contrast, most navigation sys-
tems (to our knowledge) produce descriptions that rely on 
distance estimates to refer to choice points (e.g., “Go left 
after 300 meters”). Context awareness can further enhance 
automated route descriptions (e.g., Tversky & Lee, 1999) 
by scanning the visual environment and providing route 
directions that tap into salient landmarks in the direct vi-
cinity of the person who receives route descriptions. Such 
a system can then decide to mention these landmarks in 
route directions. Augmented reality solutions can further 
build on this, by for example adding visual signals that 
show where a choice point is, and what direction should be 
taken (i.e., by showing arrows in situ). They can even single 
out an important landmark (a peculiar tree, for example), 
by adding visual emphasis to it for example through show-
ing a label next to an outline around the landmark.
Such visual signals, that emphasize what is important 
in the visual context, are suggested to be useful for learn-
ing and comprehension in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
The hybrid condition in that study added visual emphasis 
to printed photographs, and this helped students to iden-
tify what the important parts of these photographs were. It 
may be interesting to explore what this finding can mean 
consider using non-realistic pictures, as these can have 
beneficial effects on for example comprehending and re-
membering these pictures. Although modern screens and 
advanced printing techniques make it possible to present 
high fidelity, realistic pictures, in many contexts using non 
realistic or schematic pictures can have substantial bene-
fits.
The remainder of this section presents some more po-
tential practical applications of the findings in each chap-
ter.
Findings on visual incongruity and memory (cf. Chap-
ter 2) may be translatable to applications in marketing and 
advertising. In fact, a number of examples of incongruent 
colors are seen in advertising nowadays, such as a pur-
ple (lila) cow that the Milka chocolate brand uses in their 
branding. It may be argued that such incongruity makes the 
cow, and consequently the brand, more memorable. An-
other interesting example of color typicality and branding 
was found by Mugge and Schoormans (2012), who report a 
significant correlation between how novel a product looks, 
and the perceived quality of the product. Novelty in the 
product’s appearance was manipulated as color typicality, 
changing the color of a typically white washing machine to 
grey or black, and by changing the color of a typically black 
photo camera to lighter shades of grey and white.
Chapter 3 describes how incongruity leads human 
speakers to mention this in their referring expressions. 
This is an especially interesting finding for attempts to 
simulate human behavior (e.g., Dale & Reiter, 1995; Frank 
& Goodman, 2012; Krahmer & Van Deemter, 2012), so ap-
plications of this finding can be found in Natural Language 
Generation, Artificial Intelligence, and Social Robotics. If 
one wants to design and build an artificial agent that can 
talk about the visible world that it perceives (through cam-
eras), it should be sensitive to atypicality similar to the hu-
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forms ranging from atypically colored objects to schematic 
line drawings, on how these pictures are cognitively pro-
cessed. By studying effects of visual realism from different 
angles and in different contexts, a number of novel find-
ings in different fields of research have come to light, as 
explained above and in the preceding chapters. Addition-
ally, a number of methodological implications were formu-
lated, and some directions for practical applications of the 
current findings are presented as well.
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Target objects in Chapter 3, Experiment 1
Typicality scores for all objects in five colors as used in Experiment 1 are listed below.
TYPICALITY SCORE PER COLOR
BLUE YELLOW GREEN ORANGE RED
BELL PEPPER 2 91 88 76 97
APPLE 5 58 60 92 93
BANANA 19 91 37 25 6
CARROT 13 18 14 98 6
CHEESE 3 98 5 51 9
CORN 9 97 19 38 5
GRAPES 16 57 97 17 17
LEMON 7 95 5 71 5
LETTUCE 3 67 92 4 3
ORANGE 13 47 19 91 10
PEAR 5 40 68 33 18
PINEAPPLE 12 75 10 54 18
PUMPKIN 2 39 12 98 21
TOMATO 3 21 38 65 97
In Experiment 1, initial target objects included a cauliflower and a pomegranate. After pretests the cauliflower was rejected 
because typicality scores were disproportionally low (typicality scores were lower than 32 for all colors). The pomegranate 
was rejected because many participants had difficulties naming the object (this was the case in all colors).
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Results of Chapter 3, Experiment 1





DESCRIPTIONS WITH A 
COLOR ATTRIBUTE
RED ORANGE 10 .76
RED BANANA 6 .85
RED CARROT 6 .51
BLUE APPLE 5 .88
GREEN LEMON 5 .72
RED LEMON 5 .84
GREEN CHEESE 5 .75
RED CORN 5 .65
BLUE PEAR 5 .83
ORANGE LETTUCE 4 .73
RED LETTUCE 3 .74
BLUE TOMATO 3 .85





DESCRIPTIONS WITH A 
COLOR ATTRIBUTE
YELLOW CHEESE 98 .13
ORANGE PUMPKIN 98 .23
ORANGE CARROT 98 .13
GREEN GRAPES 97 .18
YELLOW CORN 97 .08
RED BELL PEPPER 97 .35
RED TOMATO 97 .17
YELLOW LEMON 95 .13
RED APPLE 93 .15
GREEN LETTUCE 92 .15
YELLOW BANANA 91 .15
ORANGE ORANGE 91 .10
ORANGE BELL PEPPER 76 .55
YELLOW PINEAPPLE 75 .18
GREEN PEAR 68 .10
YELLOW APPLE 58 .38
ORANGE PINEAPPLE 54 .20
ORANGE CHEESE 51 .33
YELLOW ORANGE 47 .65
YELLOW PEAR 40 .18
YELLOW PUMPKIN 39 .65
ORANGE CORN 38 .30
GREEN TOMATO 38 .68
ORANGE BANANA 25 .40
YELLOW CARROT 18 .65
RED GRAPES 17 .41
BLUE GRAPES 16 .60
GREEN PUMPKIN 12 .73
GREEN PINEAPPLE 10 .48
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Target objects in Chapter 3, Experiment 2
The target objects in both shape diagnosticity conditions, and their colors and typicality scores in both color typicality con-
ditions, as used in Experiment 2, are listed below.
TYPICALLY COLORED OBJECTS ATYPICALLY COLORED OBJECTS
COLOR TYPICALITY SCORE COLOR TYPICALITY SCORE
LOW SHAPE-DIAGNOSTIC OBJECTS 
(SIMPLE SHAPE)
BASKETBALL ORANGE 95 GREEN 6
LEMON YELLOW 99 RED 2
LETTUCE GREEN 98 YELLOW 3
ORANGE ORANGE 100 GREEN 2
STRAWBERRY RED 98 ORANGE 7
TENNIS BALL YELLOW 88 RED 8
TOMATO RED 97 YELLOW 7
WATERMELON GREEN 89 ORANGE 2
HIGH SHAPE-DIAGNOSTIC OBJECTS 
(COMPLEX SHAPE)
BROCCOLI GREEN 97 ORANGE 2
CARROT ORANGE 99 RED 1
CHEESE YELLOW 98 RED 1
CHICK YELLOW 95 GREEN 2
CROCODILE GREEN 88 ORANGE 7
GOLDFISH ORANGE 95 GREEN 11
LOBSTER RED 91 YELLOW 1
PHONE BOOTH RED 98 YELLOW 8
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